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American psychology**

**Devonis, David C., Ph.D.**

**University of New Hampshire, 1989**

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**THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUS PLEASURE  
IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY**

**BY**

**DAVID C. DEVONIS  
B. A., Temple University, 1982  
M. A., University of New Hampshire, 1986**

**DISSERTATION**

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**in**

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This dissertation has been examined and approved.

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To

*Deborah Ann Cardinale*

and to the memory of the late

*Dr. Anne W. Sandoval.*



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## ABSTRACT

### THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUS PLEASURE IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY

by

David C. Devonis  
University of New Hampshire, December, 1989

The concept of pleasure is acknowledged by historians of psychology as one of psychology's basic principles. Because the details of the concept's development are not well known, however, diverse views of pleasure's place in the history of psychology arise. Some historians see pleasure or hedonism as issues which were important only in psychology's distant past. Others believe that pleasure, understood as a conscious and valuable personal experience, vanished from psychology's conceptual vocabulary during the behaviorist period. Some have equated pleasure only with behavioristic theories and with psychoanalysis, two systems which have characterized pleasure as unconscious. These views, along with tendencies within both psychology and culture toward the devaluation of pleasurable experience, have led psychologists and historians of psychology to treat pleasure as an element of psychology's background, rather than as an interesting concept in its own right.

The historical analysis presented here affords evidence that, against the background of "unconscious" pleasure during the 20th century, a distinct psychological phenomenology of conscious pleasure has emerged. Continuously since the time of William James, American psychology's aesthetic and philosophical traditions have blended with Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, physiological psychology, motivational and cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, and psychological aesthetics in describing

pleasurable experience and explaining its causes. This developing concept of pleasure as a complex phenomenal experience has been complemented by American psychologists' promotion of pleasure as a desirable social goal, both within and outside of the psychological community. Beyond this, the history of the concept of pleasure as conscious experience speaks to psychology's "crisis of disunity." Psychology's pleasure concept emerges as a coherent entity from several diverse psychological specialty fields. Current psychological eclecticism may be a precursor of impending conceptual unity, rather than increasing fragmentation.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE DESCENT OF PLEASURE

Pleasure is an inevitable conceptual part of psychology. Yet the sporadic treatment of the idea of pleasure in psychology's standard "systems" histories might lead their readers to conclude that pleasure held little appeal for psychologists in America in the twentieth century. If one does not rely on histories of psychology but simply observes the field, one finds that psychological interest in pleasure and hedonism is not negligible or limited to only a few schools in psychology. On the contrary: pleasure is everywhere. However, the historical record gives little indication of how pleasure was conceived by psychologists, or how the concept developed and changed.

The history of pleasure in psychology is problematic for several reasons. First, there is a lack of detail in the recorded history of the concept's development. Fragments of its history are scattered throughout the literature: its historical treatment to date has been offhand, a side issue to other historical problems considered more important. In psychology's "classic" historical texts, for example E. G. Boring's (1957) or Gardner Murphy's (1949; Murphy & Kovach, 1972) there is a tendency to place the source of any hedonism in psychology in the Utilitarian tradition, or to take the hedonism of some branches of psychology, especially learning, as given. In newer general histories of psychology, pleasure, as an autonomous concept, is superseded in importance. The best and most complete treatment of the concept's elements (aesthetics, emotion, and motivation) is found in Hilgard (1986). But there, as in textbooks generally, pleasure study--when mentioned at all--is divided up across the research areas of psychology. R. I. Watson's (1967) "prescriptive" approach to conceptualizing dimensions of psychological

thought does not contain any dichotomous pairs related to the pleasure concept (unless one counts purism--utilitarianism, which relates to the applied-theoretical distinction in psychology's scientific stance rather than to concerns about value or pleasure that "utilitarianism" suggests).

Historians of psychology have taken hedonism and pleasure largely for granted and have not examined the dynamics of the concept's integration into psychology. This is especially true of their view of the modern period, from 1890 to the present. There is a tendency for psychology's historians to see questions about pleasure's place in psychology to have been decided long ago. Boring saw Utilitarian hedonism permeating common sense.<sup>1</sup> D. B. Klein (1970) centered his discussion of pleasure around Spinoza, Shaftesbury, the Scottish School, and J. S. Mill.<sup>2</sup> Thomas Leahey (1980), a leading current historian of psychology, sees the problem of pleasure in American psychology as stemming from a reaction to the hedonism implied in the systems of the French physiocrats. He views the moral philosophy of the 19th century as a reaction to this strong hedonistic challenge, but does not carry the argument further into the present day.

The concept of pleasure in psychology presents two contradictory faces. On the one hand pleasure is taken for granted. On the other, its position within psychology is insecure. It is pictured either as fundamentally split by the pressures of methodological specialization (e.g., by Berlyne, 1973), or as occasionally disappearing from view (e.g., by Martindale, 1984).<sup>3</sup> Little effort has been made to render the pattern of pleasure in psychology coherent, and its evident continuity has also been neglected.

It is probably too much to expect that the history of any psychological concept will reveal a single simple concept widely agreed upon by psychologists. But psychology has had some success during its first scientific century in finding the "go" of things, though in many cases the new syntheses of knowledge are rather fragile. If we look beyond the controversies and toward finding the pattern of psychological thought on pleasure, I

believe we will discover a sensitive rendering of a very complex idea. Such, at any rate, is my optimism about the combined efforts of American research psychologists.

This study has some limitations. First, I am interested in how psychology appears to non-psychologists, persons outside of the culture of modern American psychology. I feel it is important to take into account their understandings of pleasure, and try to fit this analysis of psychology's pleasure concept into their conceptual schemes. I am convinced that one should not generalize about Americans' pleasure concepts. Some value pleasure quite highly: to others, it is a question of minor import how much pleasure they experience. Probably the most common feature among Americans not trained in psychology is that they think that their pleasures, whatever they are and however they value them, are conscious ones. So, in hope of connecting with as wide a spectrum of understandings about pleasure as possible, I will be tracing the history of those parts of psychology which have viewed pleasure as conscious and valuable.

Another limitation concerns the "American" nature of the concept. Certainly any history of a concept as large as pleasure will ultimately include almost everyone in psychology. Much American psychological thinking on pleasure stems from psychologies not indigenously American. One of these elements in particular is psychoanalysis, which might be seen to have a special place in any history of the pleasure concept. Psychoanalysis and modern American psychology arise coevally, and in the opinion of many the influence of psychoanalysis has been decisive in the formulation of American psychologists' concepts, pleasure included. Arguments can be made on both sides. Here, psychoanalysis will be considered a separate theoretical and institutional entity to which American psychology, and the extramural psychology which it has more or less fully incorporated, provides a counterweight.

As "pleasure" includes virtually everyone, it also may include everything. There are a great number of pleasure-synonyms. My own list includes "comfort," "leisure," "safety," "efficiency," "health," and "freedom," among many others. Frederic Lyman

Wells, in the introduction to his Pleasure and Behavior in 1924 (Wells, 1924), provided a good characterization of the synonymy which besets pleasure in psychology:

There are a number of words connoting various orders of satisfaction, such as happiness, pleasure, luxury, contentment, enjoyment, and the like. Distinctions are often drawn between them, especially on ethical grounds. Of more importance in the present connection is the fundamental similarity of what they mean, namely, something agreeable. On this account, the book employs many such terms quite synonymously. (p. vii)

I ask the reader to be patient: there is, I believe (as did Wells), a concept of "pleasure" which encompasses these synonyms and more. But to understand what that concept is, some terminological ambiguity must be tolerated--it comes with the territory. I have chosen to concentrate on psychologists who have used "pleasure" and "hedonism" as superordinate terms. Occasionally, given the wide range of terminological alternatives, a synonym will be found bearing the whole weight of the concept.

Supposing that "pleasure" and "hedonism" are good markers of systems of thought which have a concept of pleasure as a conscious and valuable thing, it is important to note some constraints on these terms. A basic duality in the concept of pleasure lies behind the widespread usage of the term "pleasure" in psychology. Robert MacLeod, exponent of the phenomenological tradition in psychology and author of the valuable historical work The Persistent Problems of Psychology (1975), cast his unfortunately brief essay there on hedonism in psychology in terms of two common divisions within hedonism: psychological hedonism and philosophical hedonism.

For a psychological hedonist, pleasure is connected with a theory of behavior or mental processes. A typical psychological-hedonistic theory postulates "pleasure" as either a cause or an effect of behavior or mental processes, and does not concern itself with the value of the experience, except perhaps in terms of "valence" or "direction of sign" (if pleasure is linked with an opposite term in the theory, as it often is).



The second form of hedonism, philosophical hedonism, stems from an older tradition in which consciousness was assumed in principle. The hedonist who wishes to maximize personal pleasure and the hedonist who seeks to maximize pleasure in society are two examples of philosophical hedonists. Common to all philosophical hedonism is the valuation of conscious pleasure as an experience, and usually some connection of pleasure with "the good." Philosophical hedonism need not accompany psychological hedonism, although the tendency throughout history has been strong for theories of both types to be proposed in single philosophical systems. Thus the Epicurean has a mind, and some degree of free will, and Utilitarianism is linked to Associationism, which proposes a rational, deliberating consciousness. Philosophical hedonism is very often linked with an argument for the value of a hedonistic style of life. Arguments about pleasure are embedded in a rhetoric designed to convince the reader of the possibility and acceptability of pleasurable experiences. The two forms of hedonism, psychological and philosophical, often mix in psychology.<sup>4</sup>

Philosophical and psychological hedonism are often expressed in absolute terms, for example, "Pleasure is the sole good" or "Pleasure is the only motivating force for behavior." More modern versions of philosophical hedonism soften this absolute tone, and speak of the varieties and relative availability of pleasure in life (see, e.g., Gosling, 1969.) Likewise, there are many psychological systems which incorporate pleasure as a theoretical term, but which would fail the test as "hedonisms" were an absolute criterion adopted. Our histories appear to accept the premise that hedonism is a guiding principle in psychological thinking, but they do not differentiate between forms of hedonism. Perhaps in the future a clear dichotomous classification of psychological theories as either "hedonistic" or "non-hedonistic" can be managed, but at present it appears that the distinctions between psychological theories' hedonism can be understood by looking for grades of difference, not by a primary separation.

To get an idea of some of the contrasts within psychological hedonism, one can turn to E. C. Tolman's contrast of hedonistic psychological theory with his own non-hedonistic one. In 1932, in Chapter XVII of Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, in a section entitled "Relation of Above Doctrine to a Typical Hedonistic System such as Troland's," he describes a typical psychologically-hedonistic system of the period, Leonard Troland's. Troland, a physicist, philosopher, and psychologist, proposed a system in which pleasure and pain were consciously sensed by a system of specific pleasure- and pain-receptors in the brain, which he called "beneceptors" and "nociceptors," respectively. Tolman wrote, comparing Troland's theory to his own theory of feelings, that:

It may help here towards the better envisagement and evaluation of the above doctrine if we stop for a moment and compare it with a typical hedonistic doctrine of pleasantness and unpleasantness, such as Troland's. Troland says that, when a response to a situation is such as to cause a resultant "pleasantness" (stimulation of a "*beneceptor*"), this will tend to increase the conductance of the cortical centers for that response; whereas when a response to the given situation is such as to cause a resultant "unpleasantness" (stimulation of a "*nociceptor*"), this will tend to decrease the conductance for that response. (Tolman, 1932, p. 261)

After describing the connections between Troland's hypothetical pleasure- and pain-receptors and the neural processes involved in the responses to situations producing pleasant and unpleasant feelings, Tolman continued:

Resultant feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness (beneceptive and nociceptive sensations, or, if you will, their physiological correlates), then act for him, as they do for all good hedonists, by enhancing and depressing. They predispose the organism to favor those types of activity which have in the past led to pleasantness (i.e., erotic sensations, certain odors, bodily warmth, etc.) and to avoid those types of response which led in the past to unpleasantness (i.e., bodily pains). It is the leading to pleasantness or the having led to pleasantness, or contrariwise, the leading to unpleasantness or the having led to unpleasantness, which thus provide, according to Troland, the fundamental motives for doing and learning. To get to pleasant (i.e., beneceptive) sensations and to avoid unpleasant (i.e., nociceptive) sensations are for him the ultimate *motivations* of behavior. (p. 262)

This brief catechism of what "good hedonists" in psychology believed contains many common features of psychological hedonism in this century: belief in receptor and brain processes which mediate experiences of pleasantness, belief in the correlation of brain activity--described in general terms of cellular excitement and depression--with pleasant experience, and the implicit idea that the pleasant sensation or experience is a guide to future action. Pleasantness is linked with unpleasantness: psychological hedonism in the twentieth century ordinarily discussed the two different experiences as aspects of one process.

Tolman utilized Troland's system as a background for his own theory of the connection between pleasant feelings and behavior. Of his own system, Tolman wrote:

The organism does not, according to us, do things in order to feel pleasant, and not to feel unpleasant, as Troland supposes. Rather the organism does things in order to get to quiescence and to avoid disturbance. And he feels pleasant when he thinks (i.e., expects) that persisting in the situation before him is going to lead to quiescence. And he feels unpleasant when he thinks (i.e., expects) that persisting in the situation before him is going to lead to disturbance. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are, as we see it, results, not causes. They are indicators of cognitive expectations already made. (p. 262)

Tolman's and Troland's systems had a common element: expectancy. But Tolman's system bears the marks of the most common psychological "hedonisms" between 1910 and 1960. First, in his system, pleasure is achieved through "tension reduction." The idea that pleasure was the result of the resolution of a prior unpleasant situation or condition was nearly universal in American psychology in that period. As will be seen, this hypothesis contributed to the decline of conscious pleasure, and formed a focus for criticisms of behaviorist approaches. Second, the idea that pleasure is only an effect, never causal, is strongly in evidence--another hallmark of behaviorism. And third, Tolman's system is based upon a hypothetical non-introspective organism. (His book was dedicated to *Mus Norvegicus*, the Norway Rat.)

Pleasure, especially after the advent of behavioristic thinking in psychology, did not necessarily have to be conscious pleasure. It is difficult to say whether Tolman meant pleasure to be a fully conscious experience. For Tolman, pleasure was a "feeling." But of "feelings," Tolman wrote that "these most 'subjective' of experiences also constitute no bogey for our behaviorism" (p. 260). At the end of the book he suggested three "scrap heaps" into which "raw feels" might be "chucked" (p. 426). Feelings may be "mere scientific will-of-the-wisps. They are subject matter for poetry and aesthetics and religion, not for science" (p. 426). Or, feelings may be correlated with what Tolman called "immanent determinants," processes within the organism directing its behavior. Or, he says, they may be physical realities, part of a pan-psychic reality. It is clear, however, that these are all "scrap-heaps" for feeling and introspection. This is one example of the problem which confronts the historian of pleasure in psychology when psychological hedonism is considered. All behaviorist theory can be thought of as hedonistic, in the sense that pleasure (or one of the terms which behaviorism substituted for it) continues on in the systems. But the consciousness of the experience is shadowy, at best, in these.

There are problems, then, with the status of conscious pleasure within psychological hedonism. As "pleasure" has been used in American psychologically-hedonistic theories, it may mean "conscious pleasure" or it may not be any more than a marker denoting a stage in an unconscious process. The degree of phenomenal consciousness of the experience must be inferred.

The exchange between Troland and Tolman can be also seen as a debate centering around a cluster of ideas called evolutionary hedonism. Evolutionary hedonism arose in the flux of ideas following on the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859. Originating in the psychologies of Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain, evolutionary

hedonism contained the following elements, according to a concise summary of its postulates in 1947 by Leo Postman (Postman, 1947):

1.) **The idea of random movement:** Organisms facing problems in their environments respond to these with movements which are random, the result of spontaneous brain and muscular activity.

2.) **The idea of effect:** Pleasure and pain resulting from the random movements are effective in the selection of responses which will occur in similar situations in the future. Postman notes that the postulation of this associative mechanism led to the further postulation of physiological mechanisms which would accomplish this association.

3.) **The idea of strengthening:** The repetition of a successful response--a response which produced pleasure rather than pain--would strengthen the response. Allied with this was the further idea that it was a motor response (rather than an internal connection of some sort) that was strengthened.

This was the "motor" by which the selection of responses was to occur, according to the evolutionary hedonists. This formulation became quite successful in American psychology, and led directly to the "law of effect" familiar in the history of behavioristic psychologies. It is important to see that there were several dimensions to evolutionary hedonism. One was a purely mechanical one, relying on the elements described above. At the time that these elements were assembled by Spencer and Bain, the attack on consciousness that reached its peak in America in the 1920's was only just beginning.

The elements isolated by Postman which led to the law of effect were only part of evolutionary hedonism. For its originators, and for many of the original comparative psychologists, consciousness was distributed widely among animal species.<sup>5</sup> Another

element not mentioned by Postman, and quite important, was the idea that, during evolution, the connections made between environmental stimuli and organisms' responses revealed, in effect, the range of "pleasantness" that could be experienced by the organism. Things that were "good for" organisms were also seen as things that were "pleasant" for them. Theoretically, an organism would, over time, come to perform responses which had only pleasant consequences, since continuing to perform unpleasant responses would mean that the organism was consuming noxious substances which would work against its survival. Spencer saw evolution in optimistic terms: mismatches between good things and pleasant experiences would, over time, be eliminated<sup>6</sup> He saw this not only in abstract "organismic" terms, but in "humanistic" social and philosophic terms as well. As will be seen later, something of the same faith that pleasantness and the good would naturally coincide lay behind Troland's social philosophy as well as his psychology.

By Tolman's time, evolutionary hedonism was very severely revamped in American psychology. The speculations about consciousness in animals were replaced by neutral or antagonistic positions: Tolman's organism, for example, was non-introspective. Tolman also attacked what he saw as the inflexibility of evolutionary hedonism:

Finally, the present account and Troland's may be compared on one further point. According to Troland, pleasantness and unpleasantness are the products of specific end-organs, the beneceptors and the nociceptors. And this is something which would seem to be fixed once and for all by the innate physiological constitution of the organism. According to us, on the other hand, the organism is, to be sure, endowed initially with certain original propensities to expect that certain discriminanda-commerces (for example, the eating of sweets) will lead to good quiescences; but, if these initial expectations prove faulty, he can, within limits, unlearn them. He need no longer feel pleasantnesses relative to these specific types of discriminanda. He does not, according to us (as he would according to Troland), have to go on through life feeling pleasantness in response to specific sweets which actually have resulted in immediate and violent pain time after time. (p. 263)

The straightforwardness of evolutionary hedonism provided a basis for non-conscious behaviorist associationism. It also carried the idea of a physiology of pleasure forward into American psychology. Paradoxically, the hypothesis of evolutionary hedonism also served as a point into which several wedges could be driven to dislodge the concept of hedonism and the idea of pleasure from American psychology. Its forthright equation of "goodness" or "pleasantness" and survival value appeared naive and empirically false to its critics very early on. Its physiology, as simplistic and arbitrary as were ancient physiologies of pleasure, also served as an anvil on which critics of hedonism could hammer. Behaviorist formulations which stripped the idea of evolutionary hedonism of its social implications and which reduced its sensory and physiological aspects were dominant for a long time. Its main effect was to strengthen views of pleasure which diminished the role of consciousness. But aspects of evolutionary hedonism continued to resurface during the twentieth century in connection with psychological hedonisms in which conscious pleasure was important. These effects will become clearer if evolutionary hedonism, like psychoanalysis, is not considered a univalent explanation for the historical development of the pleasure concept.

It would be convenient if psychologists practiced only psychological hedonism, saving the rhetorical effort for philosophers. However, psychological and philosophical hedonism mix in psychology, and any psychological theory can be rated on both dimensions. For the present, I would like to keep psychological hedonism and philosophical hedonism separate, describing each in turn. It appears that the undifferentiated, "basic principle" characterization of pleasure in the history of psychology is explained by assumptions of equivalence between both conscious and unconscious psychological hedonism, and the mixture of both of these with philosophically-hedonistic rhetoric. In the rest of this chapter, I will trace the pattern of

psychologically-hedonistic systems and ideas in psychology over this century, concentrating on those which support the idea of pleasure as conscious and valuable.

### The Decline and Revival of Conscious Pleasure

In the Psychological Review in 1953, Harry Harlow described the downward progress of psychological hedonism up to that time. "Many of psychology's theoretical growing pains," he said,

--or, in modern terminology, conditioned anxieties--stem from the behavioral revolution of Watson. The new psychology intuitively disposed of instincts and painlessly disposed of hedonism. But having completed this St. Bartholomew-type massacre, behavioristic motivation was left with an aching void, a nonhedonistic aching void, needless to say. (Harlow, 1953, p. 23)

Behaviorism, so he said--and so some modern commentators still say--killed hedonism. Historically, however, the development of the pleasure concept in psychology is not so simply explained.

There are three main aspects of the historical dynamics of the development of psychological hedonism in this century. First, there was a decline in the viability of psychological hedonism from 1890 to approximately 1955. Then, a reaction to this decline began around 1955 and continues up into the present. Lastly, there was a part of psychology in which this pattern of decline and re-emergence did not occur. Within various parts of psychology, and even within some of the parts of psychology associated with the decline of psychological hedonism, pleasure remained a subject of interest. Over these three lies a fourth aspect, that of the mixing of psychological and philosophic hedonisms within psychology. This pattern, which seems more clearly rhetorical in character than the other three, will be treated in the fourth chapter.



The comprehensive psychological concept of pleasure at the time of William James's Principles of Psychology (1890) was the bequest of several strands of philosophical and natural-scientific thought in psychology's immediate prehistory. Chief among the earliest sources were several strains of British thought deriving from Hobbes, Hume, and Bentham leading to evolutionary naturalism, and a philosophy of taste arising in Continental sources, as well as in British philosophy.<sup>7</sup> Common to all of these with regard to pleasure--there were of course differences of aim and emphasis between them all--was a positing of pleasure as a conscious phenomenon either resulting from experience, or toward the achievement of which action was to be directed. Classic theories of economic rationality, evolutionary progress, and social progress all flourished in a hedonistic atmosphere.

American psychology, at its inception as a separate discipline in America around 1890, agreed generally that pleasure was a conscious state, that it was essential in any discussion of the action of the will and morality, and that it was moreover a sensory, emotional, aesthetic, and emotional phenomenon. It blended elements of both psychological and philosophic hedonism. True, none of the main psychologies of 1890 were extreme philosophical hedonisms, in the sense that pleasure was considered the sole aim of life. But pleasure was still a worthy opponent in the moral struggle, since it was fused and blended with the aesthetic and emotional side of life which was blended with the psychology of cognition. One could feel pleasure, have it, be conscious of it, and thus be seduced by it.

After 1890, conscious pleasure became less important in psychology's descriptions and explanations of life. Systems in which conscious pleasure played an important part were replaced with others less congenial to a hedonism based on judgments about conscious pleasure experiences. From several quarters, psychological hedonism and conscious pleasure both came under scrutiny, and for a variety of reasons were relegated

to subordinate status. Sophisticated philosophical hedonisms--utilitarian and ethical hedonisms--which relied on conscious, recognizable states of pleasure in humans' free determination of their actions, were pronounced dead by philosophers around the turn of the century, and fell into philosophical disrepute. At the same time, psychologists focussed attention on inconsistencies in the psychological underpinnings of these philosophies, and in the concept of pleasure on which these were founded.

The idea of a simple hedonistic explanation of action--psychological hedonism--received telling blows at the hand of William James. In his Principles of Psychology (James, 1890) he criticized Herbert Spencer's and Alexander Bain's psychological hedonism in a tone close to ridicule. He attacked its simplistic physiology and its blithe assumption that evolution leads to more and better pleasures.<sup>8</sup> In the same part of the Principles, James concluded that pleasure was only a subordinate part of any explanation of human motivation. However, he was not unsympathetic to the concept, believing that there was reason to argue the case for hedonism within the ethical sphere.

In fact, James's approach to pleasure was a characteristic one for American psychology. He acknowledged, as did J. M. Baldwin in his Handbook of Psychology (Baldwin, 1894) four years later, that pleasure had cognitive, sensory, motivational, and emotional elements. But this did not represent a seamless fusion of ideas. Sensory pleasure resided mainly in the domain of aesthetics--still a bastion of philosophy. Emotion was as far separated from the other elements of psychology as it sometimes still is today. And the question of pleasure's function as a motivator, at least in the case of James and Baldwin, was connected with strong criticisms of hedonism. The tentative, though historic, relations between physiological, emotional, sensory, and cognitive elements of the pleasure concept were poised for fragmentation. Under the several pressures of shifts in psychologists' theoretical emphases, the flight of psychology from philosophy, and growing professional specialization, these elements broke apart and were pursued as isolated interests for some time thereafter.

Leonard Troland (1928) described three main types of psychological hedonisms: hedonism of the past, of the present, and of the future.<sup>9</sup> The concentration of psychology, for much of the period after this, was on "hedonisms of the past and present" and an almost complete disappearance, in the body of American psychological literature, of "hedonism of the future"--the ability to visualize and plan for pleasant consequences. The shift toward an "animal" psychology and the effects of behaviorism on the concept of consciousness removed still more of the strength of the concept of conscious pleasure. After 1910, though Titchener and his students still concentrated on finding the sensory basis of pleasure, mainstream psychology turned to behaviorisms of various sorts. Most of these contained some version of a "law of effect" in which the memory or record of past pleasure determined the direction of behavior. Some did not: J. B. Watson, for instance, saw no reason to introduce the "mentalistic" term "pleasure" when describing behavior, saying, in 1914:

To call those stimuli pleasant to which the animal positively reacts, and unpleasant to which he negatively reacts, is making a wholesale gratuitous assumption on a par exactly with the assumption made by the unreflective individuals who maintain that the moth flies into the candle because he likes the light, or because the light is pleasant to him. (Quoted in Troland, 1928, pp. 257-58)

In the same period (1910-1925), William McDougall's "hormism" devalued the search for pleasure in favor of emphasizing the importance of "striving" and placed--equivocally--pleasure among the instincts.

### Hedonism as a Problem

To strive against "hedonism" was to identify with the part of psychology which was most forward-looking and scientifically respectable from about 1920 to 1950. One mark of advanced science in psychology in the period was the maintenance of an anti-

introspectionistic attitude. Hedonism, with its connotation of conscious experience and its connections with the old psychology of cognition, affect, and conation was a visible target. Since learning theory was an extension of the old pleasure-pain psychology, special efforts had to be made to eradicate hedonism in that area.

Because of the "pleasantness" which was said to intervene in the learning process, the "law of effect" proposed by Thorndike (1898, 1911/1965) was a point of contention for forward-looking psychologists anxious to avoid the connotations of hedonism. Several redefinitions of the law of effect ensued after Thorndike's time, most of which relied on rendering the connection between stimulus and response "objective." The result was a variety of psychological theories in which external stimuli and their "effects" were connected together to explain behavioral change during learning.<sup>10</sup>

From the point of view of experimental psychologists, the use of the law of effect as an explanation of learning had two negative consequences. First, the strengthening of a response after it had occurred was troublesome, leading to the postulation of clumsy and unwanted internal processes to explain it, and to appeals to "backward causation." Also, since experiments were usually conducted with animals in a reduced stimulus environment, the explanation of learning usually involved only one response to one sort of reinforcing stimulus. The law of effect, reduced to a correlation between a single reinforcer and single response, appeared to be circular and empty. A reinforcing stimulus was defined by the organism's response to it: if an organism responded to food, then food was reinforcing. But, conversely, food was reinforcing because an organism responded to it. Without further and more detailed explanation of the connection between response and reinforcer, the law appeared to be trivial.

There have been, since Thorndike's times, numerous solutions proposed to the problem of "effect." Psychologists have concentrated on the stimulus properties which make a particular stimulus an incentive to behavior (e.g., Paul Young, J. J. Gibson); they

have simply asserted the fact of the correlation and showed lawlike temporal relations between response and reinforcer (e.g., B. F. Skinner); or they have postulated various internal mechanisms which mediate the animal's performance (Tolman, Hull, and physiological psychologists of all sorts). It is certainly a durable concept in psychology. At a time when these solutions were being developed, Leo Postman reviewed the development of the law of effect in a long monograph in the Psychological Bulletin (Postman, 1947). He noted the problems with the law and the solutions proposed to solve them. Three years later, in his paper "On the Circularity of the Law of Effect," Paul Meehl (1950) quoted some passages from Postman's review. These reveal something of the attitude about hedonism prevalent in psychology at that time. One related to the transition from the old evolutionary hedonism to the modern attitude toward that concept:

Although Spencer and Bain, in whose tradition Thorndike continued, frankly invoked pleasure and pain as agents responsible for the fixation and elimination of responses, Thorndike's law has been a law of *effect*, not *affect*. He carefully defines satisfiers and annoyers in terms independent of subjective experience and report....Although admittedly free of hedonism, such a definition of satisfiers and annoyers has faced another serious difficulty: the danger of circularity. The critic may easily reword the definition to read: "The animal does what it does because it does it, and it does not do what it does not do because it does not do it." (Postman, 1947, p. 496)

The flight from hedonism had unfortunate consequences for the law of effect, said Postman:

In attempting to evaluate the controversy which has raged around the definition of satisfiers one is struck by the key importance of the hedonistic issue. Certainly hedonism is an immediate ancestor of the law, and now that the principle of effect has reached an uneasy maturity it is clear that it cannot deny its origin without sacrificing much of its vigor. When the law is stripped of hedonistic implications, when effect is not identified with tension-reduction or pleasure (as by Thorndike), the law of effect can do no more than claim that the state of affairs resulting from a response in some way influences future responses. (Postman, 1947, p. 501)

Not only within the domain of animal learning did hedonism pose a problem. Experimentation on the relation of pleasantness and memory was a common project in the 1920's and 1930's. It was undertaken by one sect of American psychologists who, it appears, had some objection to the law of effect. In some cases its results were used as part of a general argument against hedonism. In America, those researching the connection between pleasure and memory at that time formed two classes: experimental psychologists interested in an explanation of human memory based on principles of learning, and some Freudians interested in the relation between memory and repression. Of the former group, some continued to establish empirical laws of forgetting and retention along the lines laid down by Ebbinghaus: they were not particularly interested in reinforcement or in emotional effects (though they did include "emotional" variables occasionally). Others seemed more interested in an explanation of memory which corresponded with the law of effect. The repression and law-of-effect theorists would each have appreciated findings showing that more pleasant than unpleasant memories were formed.

The problem with this research, noted both by psychologists of non-psychoanalytic and psychoanalytic orientations, is that historically it has produced only ambiguous results. No clear superiority has been established for pleasant over unpleasant events or situations in memory, although this has often been claimed. The question of the relation of mood, emotion, and memory has continued to entice psychologists. The best field study of the question, Marigold Linton's, is only about ten years old (Linton, 1982). Recently the question was reopened by Gordon Bower (Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981), who published results indicating a statistically significant, though practically weak, relation between mood at the time of learning and the amount of material retained in memory. These results, however, have resisted replication by Bower's group: the question of the relation of pleasure and memory remains an open one.<sup>11</sup>

In 1932, Hulsey Cason of the University of Wisconsin published "The Pleasure-Pain Theory of Learning" in the Psychological Review (Cason, 1932), in which he reviewed the experimental evidence on retention under various conditions of pleasantness and unpleasantness. He summarized the inconclusive results in this area:

*In practically all of these investigations, measures were obtained of the efficiency of learning P and U activities, and the averages of the two groups of measures were then compared with each other. The results show quite clearly that the overlapping between the two groups of measures is much more significant than the slight and generally unreliable differences in the averages. The small differences between the averages and the large amount of overlapping are sufficient justification for concluding that there is little, if any, difference in the efficiency with which P and U activities can be learned. (p. 453, italics in original)*

From this pattern, he concluded that

The most widely discussed statement of the pleasure-pain theory of learning is Thorndike's law of effect, but he did not add any new features that had not already been proposed by Spencer, Bain, and Baldwin. In Thorndike's original study of trial and error behavior in kittens, dogs, and chicks, the evidence against the existence of higher mental processes in animals was just as strong evidence against any regular functioning of the pleasure-stamping-in hypothesis. His attempt to define satisfiers and annoyers in objective terms has not been successful, and the alleged law of effect has continued to include the pleasant and unpleasant feelings. His claim that what comes after an activity has a retroactive influence on the activity is a logical error. (p. 465)

In 1935, one of Cason's students at Wisconsin, Rod Menzies, published the null result of another study on the relative retention of pleasant versus unpleasant experiences (Menzies, 1935). It is clear that the approach of these investigators was not aimed at one theory, but against hedonism generally. It is noteworthy that the paragraph in which the following comment occurs appeared in Menzies's article before any data had been presented:

The results of this study have a bearing upon psychological hedonism--a theory too familiar in the history of psychology to need exposition here. Shop-worn as it is, hedonism persists as a perennially attractive hypothesis, because were its truth

established, psychology would be provided with a simple, fundamental law which would serve as a wide net in which to gather up a thousand and one psychological jetsam. (p. 267)

### Pleasure Hits Bottom

Around 1940, with the transmutation of instinct psychology to drive psychology completed and behaviorism and operationalism in full cry, pleasure was less often regarded as a feature of consciousness. Those areas of psychology which did regard the concept of conscious pleasure as an interesting problem lost importance and became part of the permanent psychological fringe. Motivation became the hallmark of psychology, but its hedonisms differed strongly from those of only fifty years before. By 1940, the leading behaviorisms had effectively written conscious pleasure out of existence. The overwhelming acceptance of the tension-reduction hypothesis, along with psychology's turn to "adjustment" as a theme, rendered conscious positive pleasure nearly mute. By 1954, Gordon Allport, writing in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Allport, 1954), could find "hedonism" a seriously weakened psychological concept.

Allport saw the once "simple and sovereign theory" of hedonism as still important as an explanation of motivation. But the idea of pleasure as conscious and necessary was attenuated, he believed, in several ways. Persons, he said, did not maximize pleasure in the long run. Of conscious pleasure in the cognitive sense, he asked, "How can "ideas" [sic] of future pleasure motivate present conduct?" (p. 12). Pleasure could not be abstractly, but only concretely conceived. He quoted Titchener from 1908 regarding pleasure and pain: "I do not consider that they can be numbered at all among the conditions of action" (p. 12). He turned next to William McDougall, quoting his remark that instincts--the "prime movers"--are at most "guided by the signals of pleasure and unpleasure to select instrumental activities that will fulfill their purposes" (p. 12). Lastly, he appealed to common sense, which, he said, would show that numerous behaviors



could not be fit by a hedonistic explanation. Among these were included the actions of parents, teachers, artists, and "above all, martyrs" (p. 12). Hedonism could be held as a theory only in the face of numerous criticisms. In an era in which "parsimony" was the hallmark of good science, too many exceptions had to be made for hedonism to work.

This sequence of events could certainly be interpreted as showing that the pleasure concept declined in psychologists' estimation during the behaviorist era. Allport, as late as 1954, appeared to believe that criticisms of hedonism which were current at the time of James, Titchener, and MacDougall were still worthy of inclusion in a summary statement about hedonism in a standard psychological reference. One could add to this observations about the shift of interest away from some areas of psychology which seem necessary for investigating conscious pleasure. For one example, Frank Geldard, in 1953, noted the decline in psychological interest in sensation, formerly the preeminent interest of "old" psychology (Geldard, 1953). But it is also certain that this account excludes a great deal of the story. Just the opposite position can be argued, that pleasure, far from declining in importance in psychology, more than held its own. This can be done in two ways.

First, the contention that there was a decline in the strength of the pleasure concept from James's time to the time of Allport's 1954 summary can be accepted. Supposing this to be the case, then the history of psychology since that time--1954--shows a positive rejuvenation of interest in the elements of the pleasure concept throughout psychology. Beginning around 1954, "reduction of tension" as the basic explanation of motivation and of the pleasure associated with it became much less acceptable in psychology generally. It met resistance in a large number of areas, for various reasons. There is multiple evidence that the behaviorist idea of pleasure as epiphenomenal to the drive for freedom from want was in a precarious position in psychology.

In 1953, Harry Harlow called for a return to the "outmoded" notion of hedonism in the explanation of behavior. For some years previous to this, he had been demonstrating

experimentally that his monkeys would act to maximize stimulation even in the absence of classical aversive drive.<sup>12</sup> Also in 1953, James Olds and Peter Milner, in Donald Hebb's laboratory, accidentally discovered regions in the rat brain which caused their experimental animals to demonstrate--in striking fashion--behavior inconsistent with the tension-reduction pattern (Olds & Milner, 1954). The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation for 1955, in its third volume, recognized this sweeping change in the direction of motivational theory. Commenting on Olds's presentation of his results there (Olds, 1955) were two theorists of motivation who were not "rat men" but had been developing theories of motivation based on notions of actualization and growth, David McClelland (1955a) and Abraham Maslow (1955a). So it was not an isolated few who announced the news of stimulation-seeking, but many in the prime of their psychological careers.

Along with this shift in the view of motivation, the evaluation of conscious experience emerged as a vigorous growth at this time. Only a few years before, Harold Schlosberg (1952) had revived Wundt's typology of the emotions and its primary dimension of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Just a few years afterward, in 1957, Charles Osgood and his collaborators (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) published the first of a long series of works employing the semantic differential with its own triadic structure, its primary dimension of "evaluation," and its emphasis on "feeling tone."

Reaction to hypotheses embodying tension-reduction and unconscious, reactive pleasure poured forth. If the years 1953 through 1957 were good, 1960 was golden, as it brought to the fore not only George Miller and colleagues' Plans and the Structure of Behavior (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960), and also introduced Daniel Berlyne, whose fusion of perception, motivation, and aesthetics in his Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity (Berlyne, 1960) led to a widely accepted theory of pleasure today in psychology and elsewhere. These two books proclaimed themes in psychology which had hardly been heard in the '30's and '40's. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram proposed--11 years after

Donald Hebb's pioneering effort--a conceptual neurology of cognition.<sup>13</sup> Berlyne, a British Hullian, brought information theory and psychological aesthetics to Hullian drive theory.<sup>14</sup>

Since that time psychology has witnessed the continual development of ideas which would comfort any hedonist. "Stimulus-seeking" has become almost a popular truism; emotion and cognition draw closer together; theories of incentive motivation and the sensory basis of pleasure develop apace; theories of emotion occupy a prominent place in the journals of management, advertising, and consumer behavior, and the findings of Olds have been extended by the discovery of the chemical nature of reinforcement in the brain. The neurochemicals involved, related to pain modulation and to mood-altering addictant drugs, have drawn physiology and feeling very tightly together.<sup>15</sup>

If the period up to 1955 can be generally classed as the period of the decline of pleasure in psychology, then the period following this can be seen as a period in which the concept of conscious pleasure re-emerged. It is as if psychology spent 65 years dismantling the concept, and 35 years coming back to it. A second account of the history of the concept of conscious pleasure in the 20th century could be written which would show that interest in the concept hardly declined at all. In the same issue of the Nebraska Symposium which contains Olds's report and Maslow's "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation," there is also a paper by Paul Thomas Young (Young, 1955). Young advocated a version of explicitly hedonistic motivation in his textbooks on motivation from 1936 on: it was as a senior investigator that he contributed to the Nebraska Symposium in 1955.<sup>16</sup> If we look further, we see that the continuing presence of a hedonistic *motif* through Young's long career is just one of a number of sources of support for the idea that hedonism remained alive in psychology during the supposed period of decline. During this period, hedonism and pleasure persisted as subjects of interest in three streams of American psychological development: in psychological

aesthetics and its various streams of influence, in the development of Gestalt psychology after its removal from Germany during the 1920's and 30's, and within behaviorism itself, an alleged source of the decline.

### The Continuity of Pleasure: Aesthetics and "Tone"

Psychological aesthetics in America at the beginning of the modern period was the repository of the record of a vast literature on pleasure which had accumulated during the 19th century in Europe. Aesthetics, always able to use pleasure easily and lightly as an explanation of the reaction to beauty, was highly developed even in the nascent separate field of psychology as that had developed by the last third of the nineteenth century. Fechner, long acknowledged as at least the co-founder of the psychophysical tradition, published his Vorschule in Aesthetik in 1876. It became a work to which all psychologists interested in aesthetics had reason to refer (Arnheim, 1985).

Many psychologists since 1890 have been sympathetic to aesthetics. James himself, in the introduction to his condensed version of the Principles in 1892, apologized for not adding chapters on "pleasure and pain, aesthetics, and the moral sense" (James, 1892/1984, p. 1). He taught a course in aesthetics at Harvard in the 1890's.<sup>17</sup> The largest single work on pleasure by an American author in the period was Henry Rutgers Marshall's Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics of 1894 (Marshall, 1894), which James reviewed in the Nation that year (James, 1894). Marshall, trained in architecture at Columbia in the 1870's, eventually served as president of both the American Psychological Association and the American Philosophical Association in the period between 1895 and 1910, and finished up as architectural commissioner for public

buildings in New York. But this idiosyncratic bridging of several fields and careers was not unusual in the early history of psychology.

After this period one can point to a succession of American psychologist-aestheticians, most of whom became known for other things: Herbert Langfeld, better known as the Langfeld of the Boring, Langfeld, and Weld textbook (Boring, Langfeld, & Weld, 1939); C. C. Pratt, better known for The Logic of Modern Psychology (1939); and others.<sup>18</sup> All contributed sizable general treatments of psychology and aesthetics. Within more restricted fields of inquiry, there have been clusters of interest in aesthetic questions. (It is interesting to note that answering aesthetic questions formed a training ground for graduate students, especially women, who went on to careers in other regions of psychology.)<sup>19</sup>

But even though the aesthetic tradition exists, it cannot be said that it has had much effect on psychology or on philosophical aesthetics. There is a division of the American Psychological Association dedicated to "Psychology and Art." There are a small number of psychologists who investigate aesthetic questions, many still in the Berlynean tradition (see, e.g., Day, 1981). But the direct contributions of psychologists to aesthetics are less important for the history of the pleasure concept than the observation that some of the elements which were common to both aesthetics and psychology at the beginning of the modern period persisted in psychology as it drew further away from philosophy. One thing that can be seen, relating to pleasure specifically, is an attempt to relate the easy way aestheticians have of speaking about pleasure and its effects on aesthetic judgments to the various other interests that the new psychology had.

This new psychology wanted to know about feelings and emotions not only with respect to the sensory experiences of awe and beauty which are specific aesthetic concerns, but also in their more general relation to psychic and social experience at the

level of "raw life." The history of one of the terms which originated at the time of that confluence shows that part of the old psychology still persists today.

The term "hedonic tone" is found in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, edited by J. M. Baldwin, published in 1901 (Baldwin, 1901), where it rates a separate entry. Its definition is succinct: "The coloring of pleasure and pain attaching to a state of mind of any kind"(p. 453). After this there is a clear distinction made between various forms of "affective tone" in general, as well as between competing forms of terms specific to pleasure and pain. It is evident that "hedonic tone" was intended to be an autonomous pleasure term: it is separated from definitions and discussions of pleasure, pleasure-pain, and the other terms in the affective series. Baldwin, who along with G. F. Stout contributed the definition, indicated Stout's Analytical Psychology of 1896 and G. Trumbull Ladd's Physiological Psychology of 1887 as sources for the term (Baldwin, 1901/1960). All these sources point back to Wilhelm Wundt as the term's originator, though as Baldwin mentions, in Wundt the term is rendered "Gefühlston," or "affective tone," as Creighton and Titchener translated it in 1901 (Wundt, 1901). H. N. Gardiner's article on emotion in the Philosophical Review in 1896 (Gardiner, 1896) associates the term--in the form "Gefühlston" or "feeling tone"--with Baldwin specifically.

Baldwin's attempt at definitional rigor regarding pleasure appears not to have been entirely successful, as his fine-drawing of the definition in specific pleasure-pain terms did not prohibit similar forms ending in "tone" from proliferating in psychological texts. The balance of the sensory-affective and visceral-emotional levels in the description of pleasure became tilted toward the visceral-emotional side. Variations in use of "hedonic tone" reflect this conceptual shift. For example, Howard C. Warren's definition of the term in his Human Psychology of 1919 (Warren, 1919) shows something of the complicated situation at the time which the old psychology and the new behaviorism intersected:

The term *feeling* is often applied to any indistinct sensation. This is an older use. The use of *feeling* to denote sensations of touch ("to feel the texture of cloth") is likely to cause confusion and should be avoided in psychology. *Hedonic* is used as an adjective for *feeling*; hedonic experience, hedonic quality, etc., mean 'feeling experience', 'feeling quality', etc. *Affective* and *affective state* may be used interchangeably with feeling. (p. 279)

"Use interchangeably, with feeling" might have been a stage direction issued to new psychologists using the pleasure vocabulary bequeathed them by their predecessors: certainly there was no lack of variety in the terminology employed for pleasure. "Pleasantness and unpleasantness" or "hedonic tone" could be applied to sensations, to "feelings," and to emotions, all of which were then separate, distinct, and observable mental entities. The terms "feeling tone" and "hedonic tone," frayed and imprecise even then because of the fineness of definition, conveyed then and still carry with them a vaguely agreeable sense that they have something to do with pleasure, though exactly what it is hard to say.

But, this aside, there is evidence that psychologists found this new term to be of value. Charles Hughes Johnston, a Ph. D. candidate at Harvard in 1905 studying the effects of anesthetics on consciousness, considered the adoption of the term "feeling tone" to have "marked the great advance beyond Herbartian psychology" (Johnston, 1905, p. 163) since it allowed for measurement of emotional states, along Wundtian lines. The pattern of the usage of "hedonic tone" in psychology after 1910 has several strands. It was adopted, in the period 1910-1930, by moderate generalist psychologists interested in keeping pleasure in plain view in their systematic presentations of psychology. At a time when introductory treatises in psychology still served as a means of advancing psychologists' personal systems, the term figured prominently in the texts of H. C. Warren in 1919 (Warren, 1919), R. S. Woodworth in 1921 (Woodworth, 1921), and (as "affective tone") Harvey Carr in 1925 (Carr, 1925). In each of these it functioned as a preliminary definition of pleasantness-unpleasantness, and, especially in Warren, as a means of maintaining thematic continuity in the discussion of emotion and its role in

mental life. Christian Ruckmick, writing on "the psychology of pleasantness" in 1925 in the Psychological Review (Ruckmick, 1925), cited both Warren's and Woodworth's use of "hedonic tone" approvingly--he saw it as a useful term, defining a form of pleasure distinct from both pain and emotion. "Hedonic tone" also supplanted the former heading "Pleasantness and Unpleasantness" in the Psychological Index at the time of Warren's assumption of its editorship in 1911. It remained until that publication's demise in 1935.

The term was in the spotlight for a brief time after 1932, when J. G. Beebe-Center adopted it as the term for the variable he sought to unify his presentation of the accumulated research on pleasure in his Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness (Beebe-Center, 1932). Though the restrictions he placed on the term devalued (though not for him) introspective and phenomenological aspects of the pleasure concept, the book, exemplifying particularly patient and complete scholarship, remained the primary text on the subject for many years thereafter, preserving the term through a period in which overt pleasure terminology acquired new restrictions and negative connotations within mainstream psychology. Other early examples of the use of affective or feeling "tone" as a variable can be found in the applied psychology of that period, for example in A. T. Poffenberger's study of the pleasantness of advertising borders in the Journal of Applied Psychology in 1924 (Poffenberger & Barrows, 1924).

Changed in many instances to "hedonic value," "hedonic tone" marched forward through the 40's and 50's as a term used in the description of the effects of various substances on taste (Pfaffman, 1960), and in perseverations of psychology's experimental aesthetic interests. It figures (as "hedonic tone") in a general psychophysics of preference by Clyde Coombs in 1977 (Coombs & Avrunin, 1977), and as "hedonic value" as a variable in D. E. Berlyne's aesthetic psychobiology (Berlyne, 1971). Charles Osgood alluded to it in his description of the essential nature of the dimensions of activity, potency, and evaluation in the semantic differential (Osgood, 1969). It can be found at



present in many different areas of psychology including personality, memory, and cognition.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, "hedonic value" is found as a variable in current studies in what might be called the "psychology of nutrition," which includes research on taste and obesity. Also, "hedonic" is an adjective in clinical studies of depression and schizophrenia. A history which would posit the decline of the pleasure concept in psychology would have to take account of this late terminological survival of the age of Wundt, at least.

### The Continuity of Pleasure: Gestalt Psychology

A second line of evidence for the continuity of the idea of pleasure in American psychology connects to the introduction of Gestalt psychology, a new external force which shaped a good deal of American psychology after its introduction here around 1925. If one were to posit a "decline" in psychologists' interest in the concept of pleasure in this period, one might deemphasize the contribution of Gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychology did not receive a thoroughly open and happy reception on its arrival in America. Some establishment psychologists treated Gestalt as a curiosity, and the Gestalt position on behaviorism was such that a friendly reception was likely to be denied (see, e.g., Robinson, 1929). One might, from this perspective, see Gestalt as an alternative psychology, not a mainstream one. What actually happened was that, after only a token show of resistance, widespread dissemination of Gestalt ideas occurred throughout psychology, and were taken up particularly quickly by some wings of the behaviorist movement. This argues against a simple rejection of the hypothesis that any pleasure views advanced by Gestalt psychology were dismissed simply on the grounds that they were Gestalt views (see Sokal, 1984).

A second hypothesis could be proposed, that some aspects of the Gestalt program were more consonant with ongoing developments in America. In a manner similar to the way that Wundt's psychology was "Americanized," Gestalt concepts, and imported European concepts in general, proved adaptable to the purposes of American psychology (Sokal, 1984). Not all of the Gestalt psychologists who migrated to America had the same estimation of the importance of pleasure in their psychological systems. Wolfgang Köhler, for example, was positively dismissive of the idea of pleasure in his 1938 work, The Place of Value in a World of Fact (Köhler, 1938). And Kurt Lewin's style of theorizing tended, with regard to pleasure, to soar above the details of individual experience in its description of the structural fields organizing behavior, and to play nicely into the tension-reduction, need-and-drive scheme of motivation then current in American psychology. But most of the other Gestalt psychologists did have specific views on pleasure, expressed in prominent works. Kurt Koffka at least hinted at its importance in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935). Earlier, in The Growth of the Mind (Koffka, 1925) he cited Karl Bühler's concept of "Funktionslust"<sup>21</sup> in a discussion of the causes of play:

Bühler contributes a new suggestion by pointing to the fact that, aside from any consequences whatsoever, all activity brings *pleasure*. I would modify this statement by adding that a *successful* activity--that is, an activity which brings something that I desire, or one that achieves what it should--brings me pleasure, whether the end attained be itself pleasurable or not. We have already met with examples of this fact: Köhler's experiment with the double-stick which Sultan had fitted together, and continued to employ even after he had brought all the fruit within reach. Bühler regards this "functional-pleasure" as the motor which drives a disinterested activity of play. I find here a very suggestive idea, but one which has yet to be developed into a theory; for it is certainly no easy matter to comprehend theoretically the transition from pleasure to action. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the pleasure taken in an achievement operates as an incentive to new achievements. (p. 355)

And Mary Henle, student and associate of many Gestaltists, wrote in 1956 that:

Contemporary motivation theories are theories of striving to reach goals; their interest stops once the goal has been achieved. Even hedonism seems to deal only with the pursuit of happiness and to have little place for happiness itself. (p. 299)

But beyond these hints from Gestaltists more well-known as precursors of modern cognitive, perceptual, and developmental psychology, there are some more protracted discussions of pleasure and pleasure-related topics in at least four other major Gestalt theorists' works. One finds numerous comments on pleasure throughout the large and influential body of work on art and psychology of Rudolf Arnheim, though it is fair to say that he has not been very sanguine about the effectiveness of hedonism as a psychological explanation.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, one finds a sort of backhanded compliment to pleasure as a complex reality, compared to the regnant tension-reduction theories of 1940, in Kurt Goldstein's influential Human Nature in Light of Psychopathology from that year (Goldstein, 1940):

In skepticism we are dealing with a special form of the attempt to exist without taking into consideration the existence of others, with their justifiable demands. Another form is to be found in the hedonistic attitude. This attitude, too, tries to avoid any participation in the difficulties and unhappiness of the life of man and confines the meaning of life to the pursuit of pleasure; it shuns grief and seeks escape in pleasure. This standpoint is close to the Freudian idea that human behavior is understandable on the basis of the pleasure principle, or, to put it another way, that the purpose of drives is to find release from hidden urges. The hedonist tries especially to find a release from tension. I need scarcely recall our conclusion that from such a point of view normal behavior is never understandable. It is not understandable in this case because the hedonistic tendency originates in the abnormal isolation of one attribute of human nature. It is impossible in this way to achieve real self-actualization, to "live" in the true sense of the word. (pp. 227-228)

There is a temptation to say here that the effect Gestalt psychology had on psychologists' pleasure thinking in America was slight, derivative, and tended to reinforce the decline of hedonism. At best, it might have functioned as a running critique of the main action in American psychology. However, two further contributions suggest that thinking about pleasure was highly developed within the Gestalt sphere, and that the

public statements of figures in Gestalt psychology may not reflect entirely the scope of their influence. Karl Duncker's largely-neglected 1941 monograph "On Pleasure, Emotion, and Striving" attempted to provide a complete phenomenology of pleasure. There he constructed a theory of types of pleasure, and noted in it many intimate experiences of pleasure which appear to have been missed in the more generic approach to the subject in American psychology. About this, and about the other important Gestalt contribution to the subject of pleasure, contained in a chapter in Fritz Heider's widely-read The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations of 1958, I will say more in Chapter 3. Here, it can be noted that Gestalt psychology, philosophically acute, kept the concept of pleasure in view within the sphere of its influence, a wide one in America.

### The Continuity of Pleasure: Behaviorism

As in Gestalt psychology, the concept of consciously desirable pleasure had an uneven career within the group of psychological movements known as behaviorism. On this score, behaviorism did not show nearly the unity that it did on other tenets of its program such as determinism and "operationalism." During behaviorism's period of acceleration, in 1908, E. L. Thorndike offered parallel descriptions of "satisfiers" and "annoyers" for humans and animals (Thorndike, 1908):

I shall use *satisfying* or *satisfiers* to mean those states of affairs which, in the case of us human beings, are welcomed, cherished, preferred to exist rather than to not exist, and which, in the case of animals in general, the organism does nothing to avoid, often doing such things as attain and preserve them. I shall use *discomforting* or *annoying* or *troublers* to mean those states of affairs which, in the case of us human beings, are repelled, disliked, preferred to not exist rather than to exist, and which, in general, the organism commonly avoids or abandons. (p. 588)

At that time, Thorndike could make a distinction between generic "satisfaction" and particular pleasure. In a note to the passage quoted above, pleasure is given a place of its own:

Satisfying is, of course, not a synonym for pleasure-giving; nor is discomforting a synonym for painful. States of affairs that do not give any pleasure in its ordinary sense may be highly satisfying, and certain pleasures intolerable. A similar difference exists between the discomforting and the painful. (p. 588)

Here Thorndike managed to capture one essential problem of pleasure: pleasure and pain may at times reverse their roles. This delicacy with regard to the consciousness of pleasure was directly in the spirit of William James, and Thorndike's essay, which appeared in a commemorative volume dedicated to James, is an apt extension of James's critique of pleasure from twenty years earlier. Evolutionary hedonism, both mechanical and moral, was a strong force in Thorndike's proposal of a "pragmatic substitute for free will" (the law of effect). But evolutionary hedonism was a labile concept. During the behavioristic period, the physiological, qualitative, and ethical implications were eroded--the automaticity alone remained.

As criticism of the law of effect increased after 1920 (though, again, hardly anyone really abandoned it), Thorndike adopted a more sober and remote tone regarding pleasurable experience. By 1935, he was using the term "confirming reaction" to substitute for "pleasure" or "satisfaction." As late as 1961, Leo Postman could quote Thorndike on the "confirming reaction" as follows, in order to show that consciousness need not play a part in the operation of the law of effect (Postman, 1961):

It does not act logically or teleologically....Its influence does not pick out the "right" or "essential" or "useful" connection by any mystical or logical potency. It is, on the contrary, as natural in its action as a falling stone, a ray of light, a line of force, a discharge of buckshot, a stream of water, or a hormone in the blood. It will strengthen...to some extent connections which are wrong, irrelevant, or useless, provided they are close enough to the satisfier in the succession of connections. (p. 351)

Thorndike wrote two psychologies, one primarily concerned with animals and the other with humans. In the "human" psychologies, the later ones which are not usually as prominent in our history as the early "animal" ones, he struck a tone that conveyed an appreciation of common pleasurable experience as a measurable matter of fact. In his later career, he investigated value and preference, collecting rankings of environments and activities in terms of desirability (see, e.g., Thorndike, 1935; Thorndike, 1940a).

There were, at the root of the behaviorist tradition, ambiguities about the pleasure concept, ambiguities which surfaced at several points in the years following Thorndike's early work. In the 'teens, physiological analogues were popular. Walter Pitkin (1912), later to become a promoter of consumer confidence during the Great Depression, described the "qualification" of matter by pleasure in his contribution to The New Realism in 1912. Pleasure and pain, he wrote,

are intraorganic additives. Like saliva, they are not an original part of the incoming stimulus nor yet mere products of the assimilating process, but rather a preliminary aid to a selection and a later adjustment. They mingle with the received matter, and genuinely qualify it in such a manner that the organic reaction to the matter is heightened. Thus, they most remarkably resemble the opsonins of the blood, whose specific function it is to 'flavor' bacteria so that the leucocytes will absorb the latter. This resemblance, I admit, may be quite accidental and without much significance; but it is worth some inquiry, for it would be a discovery of no small moment, were we to find that blood reactions and algedonic reactions are generically related. (p. 408)

Floyd Matson, in his excellent work on the scientization of American culture, The Broken Image (Matson, 1966), identified behaviorism as one of the factors contributing to a mechanistic, "dehumanized" American cultural idiom. In it, he characterized A. P. Weiss as one of "not a few orthodox behaviorists whose scientific passion exceeded even that of Watson" (p. 45). Weiss, who conceived of "purpose" in terms of a raindrop rolling downhill, also wrote the following about "happiness" in A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior in 1925 (Weiss, 1925):

An attempt to define happiness in terms of the behavioristic postulates, seems at first, to be contrary to the fundamental assumptions of behaviorism. However, the term is to be used only in an objective sense and refers to the fact that there are certain combinations of responses which exhibit a degree of unity in variety that may be designated an optimum relationship between the innate-acquired components in the behavior life-history of the individual. (pp. 124-25)

Further on, he described the "esthetic response," which he believed was connected to the direct manipulation of aesthetic objects:

The passive character of the esthetic response is largely due to the implicit nature of the reactions. The totality of the stimulating conditions, the shop, the home environment, particularly at moments of leisure, do not release manipulating reactions so much as the internal organic effector processes which occurred...while the user was being praised for his skill or dexterity. This accounts for the so-called pleasant affective tone. The essential condition for the development of the esthetic reaction seems to be a *composite* sensori-motor condition that is independent of the nature of the specific sense-organs or effectors. The different senses involved in the appreciation of music, plastic art, drama, literature, etc., seem to have no specific effect on the esthetic appreciation. (p. 382)

An entirely internal process was to account for pleasure, at least. Weiss's account of emotional reaction--the basis of the "esthetic reaction," drew on a physiological account of "tone":

With the more uniform expenditure of muscular energy under civilization, the internal regulating mechanism does not function between such extreme limits as under primitive conditions, and as a result the emotional responses are apparently becoming less intensive. However, a slight augmentation of the metabolic rate increases the bodily tonus....Digestion may be augmented, respiratory and vaso-motor conditions may be more favorable, the biosocial response to the drama (criticism) is more active and supplements the routine activities, thus adding variety to the behavior. This condition is at the basis of so-called esthetic appreciation. (pp. 377-378)

Though a little less lyric, Weiss's account does not read very differently from G. V. Dearborn's paean to "tone" as a physical and psychic phenomenon in the American Journal of Psychology in 1913 (Dearborn, 1913). Contrasting the vital feelings of "kinesthesia" with abulia, the condition in which will is entirely lacking, Dearborn wrote that

To a sound mind in a truly sound body a normal amount of work is a delight the most reliable, if not the most intense, of human delights, whether it come from the deep action of the diaphragm or from the normal routine of the day's vocation...yet work, unlike virtue (Twain) is not its only reward. Perhaps it is unnecessary to point out that exertion renders its inherent recompense largely through the exercise of the sense of kinesthesia--the music of the feelings of movement, tribute of the rhythm of katabolic expending, the great joy of motion, index of our life. We may properly go a step farther...and say that when this euphoric balance is lacking, bodily activity in general tends to be reduced to a minimum; on the other hand, when the truly metabolic bodily activity is lacking (tonus being the true index of this activity) the euphoric balance is zero or actually dysphoric. (p. 229)

The close relation between Weiss and Max Meyer, often remembered in psychology's history as a pioneer behaviorist, less often as a musicologist, and even less often as a pleasure theorist (see Meyer, 1908), is apparent in these passages. (Dearborn, nearly entirely forgotten, published a long monograph on joy in the Psychological Monographs in 1898.) Other transitional figures between Thorndike and the more systematic behaviorisms of Tolman and Hull which followed were less disposed to keep conscious pleasure in their systems. One in particular, Edwin Holt, took pains to distance himself from any advocacy of pleasure or hedonism in the description of behavior. In his The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics in 1915 (Holt, 1915), for instance, there is a clear minimization of pleasure terminology, remarkable in a treatment of Freudian ideas, especially Freudian ideas in the period before Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Holt in fact coined a term--"adience"--to designate "approach" behavior, distancing the tropistic conception of approach further from any conscious content it might have had. Lawrence Shaffer, in his Psychology of Adjustment from 1936, approved of this coinage (Shaffer, 1936/1944):

The drives so far considered are those of persistent "annoying" stimuli, such as hunger, eliminative tensions and overstimulation. In each of these instances activity is aroused which persists until the stimulus is removed. Psychological literature has unfortunately rather neglected another important type of drive, in which the organism acts in such a way as to *perpetuate* rather than to remove the stimulus. If I scratch a kitten's neck it lifts its head, pushes forward, turns and twists, all of which activities tend to bring the stimulus to bear in a stronger manner. Activity is aroused, and therefore the scratching is a drive-stimulus, but



in this case the resulting activity moves the organism toward the stimulus rather than away from it. Such a drive might be called a satisfaction drive, but this term leads one's vocabulary dangerously close to the "pleasure principle", "feeling tones", and other pitfalls of introspective psychology and hedonistic philosophy. Instead of using at this point a word which has been employed in many confused and unpsychological meanings, it will be well to follow the lead of E. B. Holt and introduce a new one, adient, from *ad eo*, to go toward. (p. 98)

One can speculate on whether it was a perception of insufficiency in their theoretical accounts of conscious experience which caused most of the leading behaviorists to incorporate elements of Freudian psychology, with its complex pleasure system, into their psychologies. It appears, however, that Holt, Watson, Tolman, Dollard and Miller, and O. Hobart Mowrer each took idiosyncratic paths to Freud, and lifted out what would best explain, as Ross Stagner (1988) puts it, "failures of prediction."<sup>23</sup> Conscious pleasure was hardly in evidence in Watson's behavioristic texts, though, as will be seen, he had quite pungent views on conscious pleasure and its measurement. Tolman, in 1932, devoted only a small amount of space in Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men to the concept of pleasure specifically, preferring to see feeling cast, as seen above, on the "scrap heap" of concepts referring to inner experience. As the 1930's progressed to the 1950's, fewer and fewer direct references to pleasure appeared in behaviorism's standard texts.. Dollard and Miller, in 1950, indexed pleasure only once in their Personality and Psychotherapy (Dollard & Miller, 1950): they proposed to substitute "reinforcement" for the Freudian "pleasure principle," because they saw the idea of pleasure as a "slippery" one in psychology (p. 9). Keller and Schoenfeld's 1950 Principles of Psychology (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950), a major behavioristic textbook, captured the shift in psychological language about emotion from 1900 to mid-century. As a contrast to the essentially Skinnerian theory they proposed, they began the chapter on "Emotion" in their Principles of Psychology with the following quotation from G. S. Stout--one of Baldwin's sources for the "hedonic tone" concept--from 1903:

The typical varieties of emotion are each connected with a certain characteristic...trends of activity. Anger involves a tendency to destroy and

forcibly break down opposition....Joy involves what we may call expansive activity....In grief there is a general depression and disturbance of the vital functions....Fear...arises in a situation which demands action for averting, evading, or escaping a loss or misfortune which has not yet taken place. (p. 326)

They ended it with the following analysis of pleasure, cordoned off with single quotes:

When someone tells us that an object, a color, or a design is 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant', he is reporting upon his own reactions to that object, color, or design. A positive, or a negative, reinforcer has been presented or withdrawn; a change in behavior has taken place, including, perhaps, incipient movements of approach or withdrawal; these movements provide the Sd's for his verbal responses--his 'affective judgements'. (p. 350)

As to the value of such judgments, they warned in a nearby section that

some of the Sd's are *private* and one cannot be sure that they always go hand in hand with those that are *public*. In any case, you should appreciate that one's reports of his own emotions are derived initially from the discriminative training given by someone else. Hence, they can hardly be used as the test of any *objective* distinction between anger, joy, and any other states. (pp. 349-350)

Of all the major behaviorists, Hull seems to have been the most immune to concepts of both consciousness and pleasure. As a statement from 1935 shows, he considered the subjective side of satisfaction superfluous in the law of effect--a common antihedonistic posture which had Thorndike had also adopted by that time :

If objectively observable behavior is the real criterion, why complicate the situation with the entanglements of the subjective feelings of 'satisfyingness' at all? If the two are really equivalent why not substitute the former for the latter in the formulation of the law and thus avoid the ambiguity? In that event, the law would read substantially as follows: "When a modifiable connection between a situation and a response is made and is accompanied or followed by a state of affairs which the organism does more or less to attain or preserve, that connection's strength is increased." (Hull, 1935, p. 820)

Hull was not entirely insensitive to the concept of pleasure, however: he mentioned hedonistic systems of ethics briefly in his proposal for an ethics based on need-reduction in 1944 before rejecting them (Hull, 1944).

A. P. Weiss died at age 52 in 1931, at the height of his career. Thorndike's, Holt's, and Meyer's days in the sun were past by 1930, and for the next twenty years, conscious pleasure appeared to some to be on its way out of psychology. So we find E. G. Boring writing, in "Mind and Mechanism" in the Psychological Review in 1946, about the functions that would make a robot human (or the reverse):

We need an inventory of the functions and we have a pretty good one of the main classes with many of the details. In some places we are not sure of the analysis. I have noted such an uncertainty in the case of learning. The existence of intelligence is another moot point, and perhaps also of emotion. It may be that both concepts, resisting rigorous definition, are now on the way out to join the limbo to which the will has been consigned, and whither thought, as a concept independent of learning, is bound. (Boring, 1946, p. 190)

The fate of "emotion" (and the pleasantness and unpleasantness with which it was linked) was seen as sealed by Max Meyer :

Why *compete selfishly* with the poets and the ministers of religion? Why introduce into science an unneeded term, such as emotion, when there are already satisfactory scientific terms for everything we have to describe? Otherwise the question remains eternally: When is an emotion not an emotion? Do I have an emotion when I look up a rare word in the dictionary, find two spellings indiscriminated and reject one in favor of the other? If I had not had 'an emotional set' of preferring one spelling, I should have been in a case as difficult as that of the famous donkey between two bundles of hay. I predict: The 'will' has virtually passed out of our scientific psychology today; the 'emotion' is bound to do the same. In 1950 American psychologists will smile at both of these terms as curiosities of the past. (Meyer, 1933, p. 300)

Yet in 1933, in the same year and in the same place (the Psychological Review) in which Meyer's prediction appeared, Harry Harlow and Ross Stagner found "feeling tone" and "pleasantness and unpleasantness" virtually everywhere in psychology--even in E. C. Tolman.

As we have pointed out...the existence of feelings as distinct and discrete psychophysiological entities can hardly be questioned, since there is abundant evidence to show that they exist as independent conscious experiences and that they are attended by characteristic reaction patterns. These elementary affective states are four in number: pleasantness, unpleasantness, excitement, and depression. (Harlow & Stagner, 1933, p. 184)

The theories concerning the nature of the conscious processes that go to make up an emotion range from the original formulations by James and Lange who hold that an emotion is nothing more than a particular pattern of organic and kinesthetic sensations to those such as given by Wundt, who believed that an emotion was only a pattern of feelings....Intermediate between these extreme views are those which admit that both of these processes are involved. Thus Titchener emphasizes the importance of the feelings although admitting that organic sensations may play some part. James in his later formulations took an opposite point of view, admitting that there is a basic feeling tone but still over-emphasizing the importance of the sensory pattern. The clearest formulations of this 'mixed' view have been made by Allport and Tolman. These writers hold to the very rational opinion that there are feelings, pleasantness and unpleasantness, which give a characteristic tone to all emotions. For both of these writers the 'differentiating factors' of specific emotional experiences are kinesthetic sensations resulting from a particular body set. (pp. 185-86) <sup>24</sup>

Some psychologists conjecture that twenty years is the approximate life span of ideas in psychology. Schools and tastes change, so perhaps the perception of a decline of pleasure is connected to the decline in influence, between 1920 and 1940, of those figures in early behaviorism who were more familiar with the older psychology of consciousness. This may be why Harry Harlow could refer to hedonism as "old-fashioned" in 1953.

#### The Decline of Pleasure? Conclusion

There is some evidence for a continuity of interest in the pleasure concept, although this must be tempered by the realization that the concept was kept in view by some marginal areas of psychology. It did remain an issue in behaviorism, and behaviorism's inconsistency regarding pleasure and feelings was one factor in keeping it from becoming a more respectable intellectual position in psychology than it became. Those figures within the behavioristic mainstream who had views sympathetic to conscious pleasure or happiness were either older figures declining in influence (E. B. Holt, Edward Thorndike), or were not able to leave a lasting impress of their pleasure views, however influential their other theoretical views might have been (A. P. Weiss, Max Meyer). And, within Gestalt psychology, the most detailed and comprehensive phenomenological

accounts of the issue either remained unknown (Karl Duncker's) or were published only after the pleasure tide had begun to turn (Fritz Heider's). All in all, the evidence appears to favor a composite of the two alternatives to a picture of the demise of the concept of pleasure in American psychology. In combination, they show that a large number of psychologists have attended to the concept of conscious pleasure over the whole of its first century.

The question the historian of psychology has to ask is why, given this wide scattering of pleasure across the psychological landscape, the idea of a psychological concept of pleasure or hedonism does not figure prominently in psychology's recent history. Depending on which alternative view of the development of psychological pleasure thinking one adopts, two explanations could be offered. One might hold that the development of a psychological pleasure concept was interrupted, and that it has really only begun to develop fully over the last forty years or so. It is "in its infancy," and one can expect only a fragmentary and tentative collection of approaches to the subject, rather than a grand conception. What did survive through the "dark age" is marked by the influence of a half-century of behavioristic/reductionistic thinking and terminological revision. The basis of conceptual thinking changed so that pleasure came necessarily to be considered as less of an internal experience and more the result of external conditions. Berlyne, after all, derived his essential psychological principles from Hull. The tempering of current psychology by elements surviving from the past made pleasure less conscious, more instinctive, and more automatic in psychological thinking.

Adopting the second alternative account, which posits continuous development of the concept through the century, makes the first one appear too simple an explanation of the current historical view of conscious pleasure in psychology. Methodological behaviorism may have left a permanent mark on American psychology: for a long time psychologists have been willing to concede that some parts of the scientific method and some elements of the behaviorist attitude coincide (see, e.g., Jastrow, 1928). But, as noted above,

behaviorism was and is ambiguous about the place of pleasure, and while there are some reasons why one might find less conscious pleasure in psychology after a bout with insistent operationalism, behaviorism is not the whole reason. If there has always been a hedonistic tendency in psychology, then the reason it is not more prominent in the history of the field may be connected with a more general problem of the relation of psychology and pleasure. If a pleasure concept is not historically visible, even while psychologists in all areas of psychology are involved in investigating pleasure, it is likely that some forces are operating which keep the concept in check throughout psychology. Historians of psychology, since they are for the mostpart members of the culture of psychology, are affected by these forces, and thus attenuate their accounts of pleasure. Some of psychology's methodological and conceptual assumptions about pleasure have weakened the concept of conscious pleasure.

The psychological study of the conscious experience of pleasure took two main forms, forms which can be considered separate streams of development. Psychological hedonism spread out over a wide area of experimental psychology in America. There, pleasure of various grades of consciousness was either quantified or subjected to phenomenological analysis--"qualified." Philosophical hedonism continued on in parallel. Though each of these lines of approach did not exclude conscious experience, and though each is evidence that the concept did not "disappear" during the behaviorist period as is sometimes asserted, each can be seen as contributing to the uncertainty which continues to surround the concept.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE QUANTIFICATION OF PLEASURE

If there is a concept of pleasure in American psychology, why does it figure only weakly and sporadically in psychology's history? The previous chapter gives evidence that ideas about pleasure and areas where pleasure is an object of interest have existed throughout the modern period in psychology. Yet there is uncertainty about the concept. If it is not important enough for the history of psychology then perhaps it is not so important a psychological concept after all.

By some indices, pleasure is a minor concern of psychology. One can turn to the Psychological Abstracts and find, out of approximately 160,000 entries between 1983 and 1988, only 500 which carry the word "pleasure" somewhere in the entry. ("Pain" succeeds somewhat more admirably, with 1000.) An earlier bit of evidence--from 1933 (Jensen, 1933)--suggests that the effort to standardize the definition of pleasurable experience as "hedonic tone" was only moderately successful in promoting the concept. A tally of preference for 403 psychological terms by instructors of psychology from that year shows "hedonic" (# 332) well down in the list, a list headed by such terms as "stimulus" (# 1), "conditioned reflex" (# 4), "learning curve" (# 8), "Ladd-Franklin theory" (# 45), and "pain spot" (# 57). ("Libido" was # 338.) Perhaps, then, there is a general apathy about pleasure among psychologists, a long-standing lack of interest. Perhaps pleasure is a weak psychological concept. <sup>25</sup>

One of the most heralded changes within American psychology during the twentieth century has been psychology's shift from a basis in moral philosophy to a scientific and technological stance. What historians of psychology discern as the fundamental evidence of this shift is the establishment of laboratories and clinics. One guide to judging whether

a subject is important in American psychology is to see if psychology has considered it worth measuring.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the experimenting, quantifying psychology which developed in America after 1890 undertook its studies of pleasure in an intellectual climate in which opinion was turning against quantitative versions of hedonism based on "calculi of pleasure." Psychology on the whole took very little notice of this, and invented a large number of new measures of pleasure, happiness, adjustment, and the other pleasure-synonyms. From the implicit pleasure-gain associated with dissonance reduction, to the incessant, almost reflexive measurement of improvement in mood or psychic state in fields not necessarily clinical, to the vast number of studies in industrial psychology in which "satisfaction" plays a role, the record of psychology's pleasure measurement is a long one.

Some suggestion of the penetration of the measurement ideal throughout psychology can be gained by observing the characteristic methods that it has used to measure pleasure over the past hundred years. The measurement of pleasure in modern American psychology blends together several traditions of measurement. These include:

1. Measurements of physiological response;
2. Psychophysical measurements of sensations;
3. Measurements of instrumental action (behavioral measurement);
4. Measurements of external or internal states by means of surveys;
5. Taxonomic classification; and



## 6. Advanced statistical techniques, especially factor analysis.

Each of these has been used to establish experimental evidence for the conceptual reality of pleasure. An example of how these traditions combine can be seen in the psychology of addiction. Addiction, believed to be (among other things) the continuous search for a pleasurable substance, has received a great deal of attention within psychology recently.<sup>26</sup> This concern with addiction is not only recent, of course: there has been a distinct line of psychological research on the question through the century, since William James, perhaps the most trenchant psychological observer of the pleasurable state, connected pleasure with the use of addictive substances.<sup>27</sup> It is not necessary to give the whole range of the current psychological view of addiction to show how these types of measurement combine in psychological research. Two aspects only need be mentioned: the aspect of incessant search, and the phenomenon of "withdrawal," the psychic state of depression (and, occasionally, terror) which occurs when the use of substances is stopped.

Research on the phenomenon of incessant search draws partly on the work of James Olds, who is associated with the concept of "pleasure centers" in the brain.<sup>28</sup> The idea that pleasure is identifiable with a brain process is an extrapolation from Olds's and Peter Milner's finding, in 1953, that rats in a Skinner chamber would press levers incessantly for electrical stimulation delivered to parts of the brain. This finding ran counter to the regnant drive-reduction motivational hypotheses and is one of the key elements in the history of the resurgence of the pleasure concept in psychology. But for present purposes, the clearness of the analogy between human addiction and rat behavior is the important thing. Knowledge progresses by developing good analogies, and this is one of the strongest that psychological research has offered in the 20th century. This finding is cited not only by those interested in tracing the physiological cause of similar behavior in humans, but by others more interested in the phenomenology of pleasure as well.

The "let-down" following the use of an addictant has found a compelling analogy in the hypothesis of opponent-process motivation, proposed by R. L. Solomon and J. D. Corbit in 1974 (Solomon & Corbit, 1974). An extrapolation from work originally conducted with dogs, the hypothesis has been recognized as being part of the explanation of the dynamics of affective change accompanying addiction in humans. Briefly stated, the hypothesis is that two competing motivational systems are operating in the brain. One motivational process, the "A" process, is associated with the quick gratification of a need, or the rush of pleasure which accompanies this. The other process, "B," is activated along with the "A" process, and is connected to it so that, when the affective tone generated by the "A" process declines, the tone carried by the "B" process--opposite in sign and qualitative character--is then felt. The "B" process, believed to be longer-lasting and productive of more impressive affective effects, is associated with the feelings accompanying withdrawal from addiction.

These two conceptual elements are certainly part of the explanation which is developing regarding the physiology of addictive states, and while they are not the only elements in the explanation of the process which produces pleasure, they have shown promise and durability in psychologists' conception of one part of the subject. These findings, in the form of some discussion of opponent-process motivation along with other theories of motivation, are found in the majority of our textbooks today (along with at least a brief mention of Olds's findings).<sup>29</sup>

If one looks at the combination of measurement techniques used in conducting the experiments which led to these hypotheses, one finds that they all connect to historical streams of measurement of pleasure or affective states. Olds's measurement of responses in the Skinner chamber was made possible by the development of techniques for counting and recording responses in a largely atheoretic region of behaviorism, operant conditioning. Sinking electrodes into the rat brain was possible because of the development of a system for measuring the rat brain volumetrically, in order to allow the

placement of electrodes in a specific region. (Olds. it should be noted here, sunk them in a region different from the one that was intended.) This also depended on the development of accurate stereotactic instruments as well. His conception of "pleasure centers" (he called them "reward centers," expressing his alliances) has its source in hypotheses about enumeration and localization of functions in the brain.<sup>30</sup> (Some modern theorists point to phrenology's raw numbering of superficial cranial areas believed to correspond to brain functions beneath them as a misunderstood and misapplied advance in their science.)<sup>31</sup>

Solomon and Corbit's theory has roots within the tradition of behavioral measurement: they come from a tradition which made strong analogies between, for example, dogs' refusal to try to escape punishing electric shock and human "helplessness." Their conception of the time-course of affective experience, and their graphic representation of it as a sequence of overlapping curves, can be traced back to Wundt at least, who introduced the conceptual representation of neural processes which had developed in German physiology and physiological psychology through the 19th century into what became modern American experimental psychology. The Solomon-Corbit approach is speculatively neurological in character: experimentally, it relies on animal-behavioral techniques. But, in the process of creating analogies between animal and human behavior, phenomenological observations and other measurement techniques historically connected with the measurement of human affective states are employed. Solomon and Corbit's first exposition of the opponent-process motivational theory in the *Psychological Review* begins with a descriptive account of the conscious feelings associated with pleasure and displeasure.

The study of "runner's high" (Carr, Bullen, Skrinar, Arnold, Rosenblatt, Beitins, Martin, & McArthur, 1981), recently faddish in psychology, provides another example of the confluence of measurement techniques in particular areas of pleasure study. The phenomenon of "runner's high" is reported by athletes who report the experience, after a

good deal of pain and negative affect some time into a long-distance run, of a feeling of euphoria. This could be connected to the fatiguing of the long-term "B" process in the opponent-process scheme, which leads to the release of the opposing process, or to some chemical release connected with this process. The measurements used in charting this phenomenon include not only raw measurements of exercise time and other behavioral measures related to affect, but also the direct measurement of physiological correlates of affective experience. Records of this type have a long history in psychology. Following the development of instrumentation in the physical sciences and in physiology during the nineteenth century, the use of durable instruments to record externally-observable physical changes correlated with stimulation had become widespread throughout psychology by 1890. Prominent among the methods applied to the measurement of pleasure was the recording of physiological correlates by means of various newly-introduced devices: the plethysmograph, the hand dynamometer, the ergometer. These were all very current and very obvious in experimental reports emerging from Europe at that time and became a staple in American experimentation as well. William James testified to the state of development of psychology's mechanized measurements when, in 1890, he referred to Féré's manometric measurement of emotion in 1887 in his description of the "dynamogenic" aspect of consciousness in the Principles.<sup>32</sup>

Another means of sounding the internal state of a human subject is to test, by means of questionnaires, the relative strength of various components of conscious experience: happiness, fatigue, pain, and the like. This form of measurement connects to another long tradition of measurement of values and inner experience by means of nondurable survey instruments. Happiness scales, morale scales, satisfaction scales, affect scales, and even specific "pleasure" scales have become standard psychological measuring tools.

There is, then, a tradition of measuring pleasure into which several streams of quantitative practice in psychology feed. Perhaps one reason that pleasure prominent in psychology is that psychological historians have only recently begun to consider the

effects of the development of measurement on psychology in general, and in the development of an eclectic general psychology in particular.

There are some additional reasons why the pleasure concept is not prominent, reasons which also can be ascribed to ideas about the measurement of pleasure. Psychology's estimation of pleasure may be conditioned by some basic tendencies in quantitative thinking about the subject. There are three intellectual forces which are connected with quantification and which may act on the concept of pleasure to make it less visible in psychology. These are: first, a tendency to see conceptual disunity rather than unity when assessing the cumulative results of the measurement of pleasure; second, a tendency to consider pleasure as a "secondary" or "lesser" psychological subject; and third, a tendency to place pleasure in the background rather than the foreground of psychological thought.

#### Does Quantification Lead to a Perception of Disunity?

The historical record of the methods of measuring pleasure poses a problem for the historian of psychology. On the one hand, the pattern of its measurement reinforces the idea that the distribution of interest in pleasure is wide. But the sheer profusion of methods carries problems along with it. The details of the history of the concept have been left to those psychologists for whom pleasure is a subject of interest, and thus primary historical pattern-finding has taken second place to varieties of "research history" accompanying the presentation of research findings. There are two major sources for information on the history of the measurement of pleasure. The first of these is J. G. Beebe-Center's The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness of 1932 (Beebe-Center, 1932). The second is D. E. Berlyne's article from 1973, "The Vicissitudes of Aplopathematic Pneumatology, or, the Hydrography of Hedonism" (Berlyne, 1973), which is the opening chapter of Pleasure, Reward, and Preference, which he edited with

the Danish motivational psychologist and theorist of psychology, K. B. Madsen (Berlyne & Madsen, 1973).

Both of these researchers adopted similar approaches to assembling the historical material. They wrote "literature reviews," in which similar theories each received treatment in separate sections. Beebe-Center's compendium, some 350 pages long, includes material on all the methods current at his time.<sup>33</sup> In the hope of unifying this diverse collection into a coherent whole, he suggested that all of the studies he cited were measuring "hedonic tone," a term he adopted directly from Baldwin's Dictionary published 31 years earlier. The selection of this term appears to cap a developing change in view of the pleasure concept among psychologists. As noted earlier, as early as 1905 it was suggested that "hedonic tone" was a valuable addition to psychology's quantitative vocabulary. By 1932, pleasure was less a feeling than a variable.

For several reasons, Beebe-Center's work did not have a large effect on psychology. Paul Young reviewed it in the American Journal of Psychology in 1934 (Young, 1934). Carney Landis wrote a chapter for Boring, Langfeld, and Weld's introductory textbook (Boring, Langfeld, & Weld, 1939), using "hedonic tone," in Beebe-Center's new comprehensive quantitative sense, to describe the temporal aspects of feeling. Beebe-Center closed his book with the presentation of his own theory of pleasure which, E. G. Boring noted in his necrology of Beebe-Center in 1959 (Boring, 1959), was more or less exactly the theory proposed by Harry Helson as "adaptation-level" theory some twenty years afterward. But, according to Boring, Beebe-Center was a rather reclusive figure who stayed out of the mainstream of research. Boring himself had to bring Beebe-Center's work to Helson's attention, he reports. Beebe-Center's book described the results of many "introspection" experiments as well, and was probably considered old-fashioned even at the time of its publication. Woodworth and Schlosberg, in the introduction to their 1954 revision of their Experimental Psychology (a voluminous standard reference), noted that "most of the material on Feeling and Experimental Esthetics has been dropped,

since there seems to be little recent work in these fields" (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954, p. vi.). Beebe-Center's 1932 book is not in their reference list. And D. E. Berlyne did not find it necessary to refer to Beebe-Center in his thorough compilation of work on psychological aesthetics, Aesthetics and Psychobiology, in 1971 (Berlyne, 1971). Beebe-Center's work may have preserved the term "hedonic tone" among the cognoscenti of sensory pleasure during the '30s and '40s, but his attempt to unify pleasure research under a single heading apparently did not succeed.

Berlyne, by 1973, was a secure and respected researcher, the author of several books elaborating his blend of information theory, Hullian psychology, and Fechnerian aesthetics. In his survey of hedonistic theories of motivation, he also grouped theories together by similarity. He then adopted a superordinate conceptual scheme to describe the pattern of development of the experimental, quantitative approach to pleasure through the 20th century. The concept of pleasure was said to have originated in a "reservoir" of undifferentiated "classical hedonism" around 1890. As psychology developed and specialized, he saw the concept split into the separate streams of the "hedonistic delta," which he represented graphically using the geological analogy of a river arising at a source and branching into "distributaries." Berlyne's distributaries, like Beebe-Center's chapters, each represent not only a conceptual element in pleasure thinking but are distinguished by methodological features as well.

Viewing the history of a field as a collection of separate enterprises, as both Beebe-Center and Berlyne did, represents the concept of pleasure as scattered and diverse. Measurement fragments the concept. Berlyne's metaphor can be extended. American psychologists continue down methodological pleasure rivers into a turbulent sea of general psychology. There, while they are individually free to swim in any direction, collectively they are drawn away from pleasure as a subject in its own right. Two currents originating in common psychological beliefs about pleasure impel psychological

thinking away from the concept of pleasure. The first of these, "hedonic asymmetry," is the subject of the next section.

### Hedonic Asymmetry

"Hedonic asymmetry" is a term used by Nico Frijda in his recent work on emotion (Frijda, 1986), where it describes several contrasts in the phenomenological description of pleasurable and painful experiences. I use it here to describe a historical pattern of thinking quantitatively and theoretically about pleasure in which pleasure is first linked to an opposite conception--usually pain or "unpleasantness"--and then understood as the less weighty or significant of the pair. Various expressions of this asymmetry can be found in general culture: we tend to apply the term "pleasant," as Cowan (1968) notes, to experiences which have limited experiential content or which are considered to be of secondary importance or value in life, for instance "pleasure boating" or "pleasure driving." A more severe rendering of this tendency is expressed by C. S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain:

We can rest contentedly in our sins and in our stupidities; and anyone who has watched gluttons shovelling down the most exquisite foods as if they did not know what they were eating, will admit that we can ignore even pleasure. But pain insists on being attended to. God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pains: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world. (Lewis, 1940, p. 81)

The similarity between the theological and the psychological is apparent in the following excerpt from a discussion of "Euphoria and Tension" by Harry Stack Sullivan:

In our thinking we need, besides biological or human postulates, certain concepts that are borrowed from other fields of human activity, including a few from the field of mathematics. The one I particularly want to mention at this time is the idea of limits, and the notion of the absolute....The two absolutes that I want to present at the moment are absolute *euphoria* and absolute *tension*. Absolute euphoria can be defined as a state of utter well-being. The nearest approach to anything like it that there is reason for believing that one can observe might occur



when a very young infant is in a state of deep sleep. Absolute tension might be defined as the maximum possible deviation from absolute euphoria. The nearest approach to absolute tension that one observes is the rather uncommon, and always relatively transient, state of terror. (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 34-35)

Two paragraphs later, after a discussion of the mathematical reciprocity of euphoria and tension, we read that "while euphoria need not trouble us very much, tensions are a very important part of our thinking" (p. 35).

Pain, unpleasantness, and unhappiness are problems: pleasure is not. On one level these attitudes toward pleasure may not seem particularly closely connected to quantitative methodologies. But on another they express, beyond their philosophical content, a primary estimation of the prevalence of actual and potential consciously pleasurable states. Even a hedonist will admit that this balance may often--perhaps always--be tilted away from pleasure. Yet there are some cultural and psychological opinions which counter this asymmetry. For instance, there is an optimistic line of thinking in culture which intimates that things, while generally bad now, are getting slowly better. One might turn to evolutionary hedonism, to Darwin's Autobiography of 1876, for an expression of the hope of a redress of the pleasure-pain balance:

But pain or suffering of any kind, if long continued, causes depression and lessens the power of action; yet is well adapted to make a creature guard itself against any great or sudden evil. Pleasurable sensations, on the other hand, may be long continued without any depressing effect; on the contrary they stimulate the whole system to increased action. Hence it has come to pass that most or all sentient beings have been developed in such a manner through natural selection, that pleasurable sensations serve as their habitual guides. We see this in the pleasure from exertion, even occasionally from great exertion of the body or mind,--in the pleasure of our daily meals, and especially in the pleasure derived from sociability and from loving our families. The sum of such pleasures as these, which are habitual or frequently recurrent, give, as I can hardly doubt, to most sentient beings an excess of happiness over misery, although many occasionally suffer much. (Darwin, 1876/1958, pp. 88-89)

More recently, some quantitative results appear to indicate that humans are prone to optimism. Investigators regularly find, in population surveys, that happiness is not a rare

commodity. And some laboratory research, for instance that of Allan Parducci (1968), supports the claim that a generally positive emotional tone is the background of life. Nonetheless, pleasure is rarely studied by itself. When pleasure is placed next to other psychological concepts, asymmetries emerge.

### Physiological and Emotional Asymmetry

Within physiological psychology, pleasure was considered asymmetric to pain for a long time. Theories of pleasure contained modifications to the idea of Von Frey, quite current in the 1890's, that pleasure had no clear physiology, in the sense that vision, audition, and other sensory modalities (including pain) did.<sup>34</sup> The earliest and the most visible achievements of the effort to establish the physiological reality of pleasurable and painful states has been achieved by pain physiologists. Sometimes it still seems as if, in the duality of pain and pleasure, pain has the upper hand in psychology. Melzack, for instance, in The Challenge of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1983), gives only the briefest space to Olds and "pleasure centers"--less than one page out of 300. But this originally strong position in psychology has weakened over time, as more evidence has accumulated that pleasant feeling has distinct physiological sources also. The journal Pain is balanced by Appetite, and both sides are involved in the creation of scales to measure the dimensions of painful and pleasurable experience. Theorists within physiological psychology have been proposing some physiological center for pleasurable experience over the whole period. The line of development can be read in the sequence of reviews from Max Meyer's (1908) review of physiological pleasure theories (praised as "entirely behavioristic" by E. B. Holt), through Leonard Troland's several works on physiology and motivation during the 1920's and early '30's, through Beebe-Center. It continues through Hebb's Organization of Behavior in 1949 (Hebb, 1949), in which pleasure rates a small but separate chapter, through Olds's discovery of intracranial self-stimulation in 1954 and

the discovery of the endogenous opiates in 1973 by Pert and Snyder (Pert & Snyder, 1973).

A form of asymmetry still persists: pleasure, physiologically, is still an internal, central, "brain" rather than "body" phenomenon. But on the whole, a gradual balancing of conceptual asymmetry has occurred in this area. A long-standing asymmetry between pleasure and unpleasantness exists in the formulas devised by psychologists to describe emotions. The question of whether pleasure is best described as a sensation or as an emotion was a live one in the early part of psychology's modern period. Active research on the question continued into the 1930's: no clear resolution of this question occurred. One example of these null results has already been seen in the record of the early research on mood and memory, described above in Chapter 1.

Conceptual thinking about the conscious characteristics of emotion was confused as well, as hinted at in the discussion of "hedonic tone." Wundt, as the quotation from Harlow and Stagner in Chapter 1 indicates, believed that pleasantness was a "feeling" distinct from sensory processes. Other psychologists disagreed. Titchener, up until about 1917, did not include pleasure and pain in the domain of effects related directly to sensation, but instead characterized them as nonlocalized "unclear" sensations (for Titchener, clarity was all). But after that time, he joined in the view that an underlying psychophysical process connected with sensory systems was involved in pleasure. His student Nafe, in 1924, declared that pleasure was a synthesis of sensations of brightness and pressure. Nafe's conclusion achieved some notoriety in the standard history of psychology as a final demonstration of the unreliability of the introspective method. It was Paul Young, himself a strong believer in the value and effectiveness of hedonic experience, who conducted the experiments which appeared to prove the ultimate subjectivity of this method, by demonstrating that the reports of his observers and Nafe's did not agree.<sup>35</sup>

At least part of this effort to align the idea of conscious pleasure with sensory processes survived in the tradition of research on synaesthesia. It survived, as well, in the aesthetic and psychophysical wings of psychology, and also in physiology.<sup>36</sup> But the idea of pleasure as sensation, or as feeling, or as sensation-and-feeling, lost power with the abrupt decline of the Titchnerian approach around 1930. Pleasure thinking was left to those whose hypotheses about pleasure assigned emotion, rather than sensation, the major role.

Modern theories of emotion arise out of a confused past. Several types of emotional theory existed during the time immediately preceding the establishment of modern American psychology. It was a generally accepted notion that emotion played a causal--in the various senses that "causal" had before the 1890's--role in thinking, in deliberation, and in action. The phrase "affect-cognition-conation" was a leading *motif* then (and still is, occasionally, today) in psychological thought. In systems which did assign a particular role for affect in the creation of conscious mental life, the sequence of the terms "affect-cognition-conation" was important to notice if discriminations were to be made between them. All sorts of connections were postulated between the mental entities represented by these terms. Affect, for example, was linked with perception in some systems. In others, it was essentially "value added" after the perceptual facts were in. Some systems placed the action of the will (conation) outside of perception and affective evaluation, while in others, affect attended both perception, knowing, and deliberate action. The most important thing to note is that, before William James described what has become known as the "James-Lange" theory of emotion in 1884, emotion was not placed at the end of the sequence by itself.<sup>37</sup>

In the James-Lange theory, it is the accomplishment of action which leads to the experience of emotion. This novel proposal became widely accepted in American psychology. It was the behavioristic formulation of the emotion problem, and still endures as an explanation of emotion in behavioristic theories today. It could be used to

argue that emotion is epiphenomenal, and provided psychologies based on habit or drive one convenient escape from having to discuss a troublesome piece of consciousness in the "business end" of their systems.

Emotion, at the beginning of the modern period (around 1890), was certainly connected with the idea of pleasure and pain, though "pleasure" itself was rarely considered an emotion in its own right. The clearest example of the successful shifting of pleasure away from a position of direct influence to one in which it could be considered only a retrospective epiphenomenon is of course Thorndike's postulation of the "law of effect," linking the change of behavior with the effect of the pleasure resulting from action. A somewhat earlier example of the regard in which pleasure was held in functional psychology, with its emphasis on emotions and instincts, is found in Warner Fite's 1903 article "The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology":

According to the functional view, the motive power of action is instinct, and it is the object implied in the instinct which constitutes the end. In this system there is no room for the motive of pleasure. Pleasure is simply an abstracted phase of the process of satisfaction--an indication that the object is being attained in the presence of a difficulty. In other words, pleasure is not an active force or function, but a *mere phenomenon*. The desire for pleasure, if conceivable at all, would be irreconcilable with the desire for the object; for since pleasure exists only while success is deferred, pleasure as such could be prolonged only by sacrificing the object originally sought. (Fite, 1903, pp. 643-44, my emphasis)

The success of the shift toward viewing emotion as "effect" resulted in pleasure asymmetries. Conscious pleasure was now clearly a secondary phenomenon. It was not necessary to include it in the explanation of learning. Pleasure related to learning was "conscious" only in pedagogical writings, and in older psychologies surviving in the new behaviorist era. A parallel shift occurred in the conception of emotion in comparative psychology and early behaviorism. Emotion was described as "arcusial" or "excitement," both neurological terms pressed into service to describe the behavior of laboratory subjects, ever more of which were rats, dogs, or other less conscious organisms.

One of the more persistent formulations of emotion in American psychology stems from J. B. Watson (1919). His simplified formula for the basic emotions was the combination of "fear, rage, and love." Clearly, from the hedonist's point of view, pleasurable is outnumbered here. And, still surviving in common psychological lore, is the catchphrase from the same era, "fight or flight," where the score is 2 to 0.<sup>38</sup>

There is something intuitively attractive in psychology about an appeal to biological "basics," as Harlow (1958, 1962) demonstrated in his studies on maternal affection and comfort. The most recent psychological proposal of a similar simple scheme for the conceptual organization of the basic emotions is Jaak Panksepp (1982), who divides these up into four groups: fear, rage, panic, and expectancy. Though he is interested in "joy" and "sorrow," and has mentioned how difficult it is to get physiological psychologists interested in analogues to "joy" and "playfulness" in animals, the perception of imbalance (3 against 1 for painfulness, in this scheme, along with only one ambiguously "pleasurable" term--"expectancy") still exists.

Slogans have effects, especially when they are widely disseminated. These simplified formulations have the appeal of common sense, and are easily remembered. Basic-level asymmetries of this sort, in which aversion "outnumbers" appetite, are not confined to the domain of emotion. In the basic operant conditioning scheme, "negative reinforcement," "positive punishment," and "negative punishment"--all of which have a direct connection to negative consequences--outnumber situations in which "positive reinforcement" ("good" consequences attending a behavior) occurs. Asymmetries of this type are particularly effective in distancing psychology from pleasure because they are parts of psychological lore. Some less strident asymmetries connected with the study of emotion will be described in the next chapter.

### Value Asymmetry

The measurement of values has been carried on by psychologists generally sympathetic to some form of the pleasure concept. The development of sophisticated mathematical methods for conducting preference research was well under way by 1930. Several measurement streams converge on the concept of "quality-of-life." Around 1930, Thorndike began a series of studies of preference in which rank-ordering (without the additional mathematics of factor analysis) was used to determine preferences in jobs, in places to live, and other dimensions which relate to the quality of life (see, e.g., Thorndike, 1940b). (These continue on in popular literature today in the form of polls whose summary results are said to determine, among other things, which cities are the best or worst to live in.) The Gestaltist George Katona, in the 1940's, gave form to a subdiscipline of psychology called "consumer psychology" (Katona, 1959) in which economic statistics on consumption--a primary economic measure of value--was introduced into psychology's measurement armamentarium. Studies such as these succeeded and supplemented economic research devoted to questions of consumer satisfaction, a trend which was old at the time Robert Lynd reviewed it in Knowledge for What? (1939).

Psychologists have also been involved in the creation of survey instruments for the measurement of national happiness. These happiness scales, often cited in works outside of psychology, include those of Philip Veroff, Norman Bradburn, and Angus Campbell.<sup>39</sup> The approaches of these investigators define them as a more "sociological" wing of psychology. Sociology has generally taken a somewhat dim view of pleasure in corporate American society. However, these psychologists all appear to have marked themselves off from the rather gloomy view expressed, for example, in William Whyte's The Organization Man and other sociological works of the '50s.<sup>40</sup>

One aspect, then, of psychology's value quantification is markedly economic and social in character. It is an open question whether this area is measuring conscious pleasure. Some prominent current theories of emotion in which there is a strong component of conscious pleasure are prominently featured in journals such as the Journal of Consumer Research. Cognitive social psychologists of high standing in psychology are currently on the editorial board of that journal.

Not all meldings of economics and psychology, however, can be said to support a conscious pleasure concept. Standard economics has little room for concepts such as consciousness or emotion, and recently, operant behaviorism and economics have joined forces (see, e.g., Schwartz, 1986). Economics and behavioral analysis fit together well because of their common emphasis on the measurement of external events, but their common tradition is aligned against assigning a role for (fully) conscious pleasure in explanations of behavior.

The other side of psychology's quantitative approach to value is aligned with ethics rather than with economics. Psychologists attempting to discover the dimensions of ethical life have utilized similar measurement techniques to isolate moral rather than economic values. Psychological research on moral values dates from at least the mid-1930's. Figures in its history include Gordon Allport, Henry Murray, and Hadley Cantril, along with their associates and students. Philosophers cognizant of psychology were also involved: Charles Morris, S. C. Pepper, and R. B. Perry (James's student and colleague.) These figures were all at least tolerant of pleasure and happiness as a concept. Allport, who like his conceptual ancestor William James was ambiguous about the role of pleasure, included an "aesthetic" dimension in his value scale. Murray believed strongly that happiness was undervalued in psychology. Cantril supported a dissertation on the concept of happiness by Alden Wessman in 1956.<sup>41</sup>

The important figures in value research represent a spectrum of pleasure views, from Allport's restrictive one to Hadley Cantril's complex fusion of affect and cognition in his



"transactional" theory of brain-mind. Recently, this tradition of value quantification has led to a clear quantitative asymmetry. The evolution of the Allport-Murray-Cantril approach to value has led to a very prominent value scale in psychology today, that of the recently-deceased Milton Rokeach (1979). Its approach to the quantification of value, employing factor-analytic description of the dimensions of value, reflects the steady development of advanced statistical techniques in psychology. Rokeach's two 18-question scales investigate "instrumental" and "terminal" values: "instrumental" values are alike to character traits or classic virtues and are believed to be useful in obtaining or establishing "terminal" values, which describe possible modes of life, for example, "a life with great personal freedom." Leaving to one side the question of whether freedom and other terminal values are incompatible with pleasure, the published results of surveys conducted using this scale consistently separate "pleasure," characterized as a "comfortable life," off from the rest of those values. The charts of the factor analyses consistently show values similar to "pleasure" in a small, distant quadrant, and the rank-ordering of these values places "pleasure" last.<sup>42</sup>

A parallel to this moral ordering can be seen in Kohlberg's (1981) seven-stage moral development sequence. In this, the second stage--associated with adult immaturity--is clearly identified as a stage of "instrumental hedonism." So far as a stage sequence is considered a quantitative psychological approach, this form of ordering which places pleasure at a lower and more immature pole is not infrequently found in psychology. There is more to be said about the influence of Freud on the concept of pleasure in American society. For now, it can be observed that though Kohlberg--through Piaget--was a distant relative of psychoanalysis, there is clearly a similarity between this approach and the Freudian, which decidedly associates a series of very interesting and scientifically unelucidated pleasures--defecation and urination among these--with immaturity.

### Counter-Asymmetry

The "hedonic asymmetries" described above represent various grades of thinking about pleasure. Placing pleasure or hedonism lower on a moral scale may represent a moral judgment rather than a statement of fact. Identifying four basic emotional systems, three of which have a "negative" aspect, may represent a physical reality. Panksepp's formulation seems particularly plausible. Such a scheme does not exclude pleasure from scientific consideration. However, the description of natural imbalances between pleasure- and pain-producing systems may link up with the moral judgments, and the cumulative effect may be seen in the general devaluation of pleasure as a subject of psychological interest.

"Hedonic asymmetry" is counterbalanced in several ways in psychology. I have already mentioned that physiological research has redressed the balance between pleasure and pain over this century. Within the psychology of the emotions also, the tendency toward hedonic asymmetry has been mitigated in recent years. D. E. Berlyne formed his conception of conscious interest and aesthetic appreciation around a basic motivational theory incorporating, among other elements, physiological arousal as a measure of emotional involvement. Another figure who can be mentioned here is D. O. Hebb. Hebb also incorporated an arousal theory of emotion in his psychology, while at the same time giving pleasure a specific "conceptual-neural" characterization and giving at least some support to the idea of the conscious--if determinate--nature of mental life.<sup>43</sup> One might recall, also, that James Olds uncovered the "pleasure centers" while in Hebb's orbit in Montreal.

As noted, much of the psychology of value can be read as sympathetic to pleasure. Additional relief of hedonic asymmetry comes from fields in which the study of pleasure is a central feature. Pleasure measurement's division of labor spreads over a number of psychological specialties. There are three main points at which pleasure measurement

clusters today. Within each of these clusters, pleasure, as a conscious and desirable experience in its own right, is quite visible as a subject of psychological interest.

First, there is the study of consumer behavior, an extension of the tradition of advertising psychology and mentioned above in connection with the measurement of values. Theories in consumer psychology today rely heavily on psychological theories of emotion.<sup>44</sup> Second, there is the study of taste, in which a variety of historical trends in the measuring pleasure coexist. The study of taste--represented now by its own journal, Appetite, founded in 1981--combines studies of the differential behavior of animals fed different concentrations of flavored solutions (the tradition of the measurement of isohedons founded by P. T. Young), of the study of taste aversions (in the Skinnerian tradition *via* John Garcia), of human physiological response to flavored substances (in the general physiological-psychologic tradition), and of the psychophysical investigation of the subjective effects of different concentrations of odorants and flavorants. The study of taste combines two traditions in psychological hedonism, the psychophysical-aesthetic and the motivational-physiological.<sup>45</sup>

Finally, not least, the variety of approaches to the measurement of sexual pleasure should be noted. Early sex research was largely anthropological and sociological in character. An early suggestion that psychology might become more interested in the more ethological and less aesthetic pleasures, and bring its plethysmographic and manometric technique to bear on this, is found in a comment by John B. Watson from 1913. In a discussion of the behavioristic approach to affect, in which Watson addresses the question "why the affective processes seem to be such constant companions of other processes" (Watson, 1913, p. 426), the following passage occurs:

What I shall have to say in answer to these questions will not be surprising to any one who has followed the recent Freudian movement. I may preface my remarks by saying that I do not follow this movement into all of its extravagances. I nevertheless feel that they have made good their main point concerning the sex references of all behavior. Since my first study of the movement I have been rather surprised that no one has connected pleasantness with the activity of the

receptors stimulated by tumescence and unpleasantness with those stimulated by a shrinkage of the sex organs. To those who have inherent objections to admitting that the esthetic, artistic, and religious sides of life are at bottom sexual, this view will not sound convincing. I shall not attempt to develop the point further at the present time. I find in the hypothesis, however, sufficient reasons for taking the theoretical views (1) that "affection" is mediated by enteroreceptors, as is hunger, thirst, etc.; (2) that there should be two well-marked groups of such sense processes which possess the solidarity, distinctness, and unity claimed for them by those who hold the affections are elementary; (3) that one or the other should usually be present--actually serving as "personal evaluators of experience"; (4) that their observation should be easy at times and difficult at others.

This view makes them open, as are all other forms of behavior, to objective investigation. You will tell me that expressive methods have already failed to show any constant physiological processes occurring in conjunction with the examination of "pleasant" and "unpleasant" objects. I have worked for years upon the expressive methods and no one will admit their failure in the past more readily than I. My present feeling is that we have taken our plethysmograms from the wrong organs. Whether there are too many technical difficulties in the way of the objective registration of the many delicate changes in the sex organs (circulation, secretion, etc.) remains for the future to decide. (Watson, 1913, p. 427)

Current historical discussion of Watson and sex contains statements regarding Watson's actualization of this potentiality. These range from near-innuendo to defenses of Watson's virtue.<sup>46</sup> I think that, in the present context, the statement can be taken at face value, as an indication of the inroads that measurement had made on pleasure by that time, as well as a reflection of the ethological context into which most of modern psychology's conception of pleasure had moved. Subsequent to this time, one finds the development of conceptualizations of the sequence of pleasurable events in sex. A variety of fields contributes to this: Reichian Freudianism, anthropology (Kinsey), survey research and physiological measurement (Masters & Johnson). An interdisciplinary "sexology" has gained some prominence in psychology. The American Psychological Foundation's award of its Gold Medal for Scientific Contributions to John Money in 1985 recognizes psychology's ratification of Watson's suggestion. Research on the particulars of the sensory experience of sex brings theoretical conceptions of pleasure as a temporal, durational process into sharp focus. This emphasis on sequencing and duration ties in nicely with the findings of motivational psychology about the ebb and flow of pleasurable experience.

There are some signs that pleasure is moving from provisional and uncertain status within psychology and is now coming into its own as a measurable phenomenon in its own right. Yet asymmetry still remains. Considering the behavior of "hard-science" psychology in the past, there is a good probability that the synthesis of consumerism and advertising, quasi-aesthetic approaches to taste, and sex will still be considered marginal to the main interests of psychological science.

I have so far emphasized the aspect of asymmetry which makes "something less" of pleasure. Asymmetric thinking about pleasure has other dimensions as well. There is an asymmetry in which pleasure is unconscious rather than conscious. Behaviorism, "sociobiological," and Freudian approaches are all ambiguous about the status of pleasure as conscious: unconscious pleasure appears to be more important than conscious pleasure in these approaches.<sup>47</sup> There is also an asymmetry which makes "something lower" of pleasure morally. This variety of ways in which asymmetric thinking can be carried on insures that asymmetry will find its way into numerous other aspects of psychology's considerations of conscious pleasure.

### Pleasure in the Background

Two reasons connected with the quantification of pleasure have been proposed so far to answer why the concept of pleasure is weakly represented in psychological history. Surveys of the pattern of quantification lead to the picture of psychological pleasure research as a loose bundle of disparate approaches. Historians may conclude that pleasure, since it lacks coherence, is not a developed or important psychological issue. The pattern of asymmetric thinking about pleasure which renders it less weighty or serious a subject as others in psychology confirms this perception. Another result of the quantification of pleasure buttresses the view of the pleasure concept as unimportant and peripheral in psychology. What results from this massive quantification is a situation in

which so many measurements of pleasure are made that pleasure becomes part of the "background noise" of psychology. While perceptions of disorganization and inferiority fragment the idea of pleasure and reduce it, other quantitative assumptions about pleasure dilute it.

One reason for this dilution is that psychologists do not worry much about nice philosophical points regarding hedonism. Hedonism, or the pleasure connected with it, is considered, by psychologists unaccustomed to splitting philosophic hairs, an undifferentiated manifold. Whatever sort of hedonism one prefers--one in which conscious pleasure experiences are had, one in which pleasure is an unconscious motivating force, one in which both of these concepts exist, or one in which pleasure is not to be had except in the teeth of constant and reiterated pain or frustration--psychology can furnish support for it. Another reason is simply that there appears to be an unwritten law in psychology that pleasure (or surrogates for the term) shall be measured whenever possible.

One example of the result of this can be found in the 1975 report Work, Productivity, and Job Satisfaction published by the Psychological Corporation (Katzell & Yankolevich, 1975). In the introduction to this composite of twenty studies on the subject conducted under the auspices of the National Science Foundation, there is a lamentation about the loss of conceptual force that indiscriminate measurement can produce:

In other words, there exists a wide array of methods available for improving workers' job attitudes or performance, but each of them characteristically tackles some partial aspect of the workers' relationships to their jobs--their financial incentives or their control over their work or their working conditions or their social relationships or their labor-management relations. No one of these, we have learned, is ordinarily enough to affect both productivity and satisfaction significantly, although in some instances improvements in one or the other objective may be realized. (p. 13)

In some research areas, it is a near-reflex to attach an "affect" questionnaire to the other instruments used in a study. This makes a good deal of studies "affect" or "pleasure" studies, even if their prime aim is not the study of pleasure as such.

There is, of course, an antidote to thinking that all psychology studies pleasure, or at least measures it in conjunction with other measurements. Whole fields of psychology have no tradition of measuring affect in this offhanded, reflexive way. This is what gives cognitive psychology, for instance, its reserved and sober character, except when it investigates mood or social phenomena (it is then rechristened "cognitive personality" or "social cognition"). On the whole, though, there are (at least within the fields where affect can be discussed) many "affective" measures and much "affective" measurement.

Multiple measurements have a number of different names. What results is a profusion of measurements which are all pleasure-like or pleasure-related, yet are not pleasure itself. One measures affect, or positive affect, or affect-gain, or affective equilibrium, or blunted affect; one measures satisfaction, achievement, mastery, self-esteem, the "warm glow"; somewhat less frequently one measures things really close to pleasure: joy, elation, euphoria. Occasionally even "pleasure" itself is measured, usually in clinical contexts where its lack in the subjects is conspicuous.<sup>48</sup>

The problem of pleasure's "euphemization" is not a new one: the problem of multiple names for happiness is well-known among researchers in that field (see, e.g., Freund, 1985). Psychology need not worry about pleasure if virtually everything measured is pleasure-related. An examination of the process of measurement within the psychology of the emotions shows more reasons why pleasure becomes rarefied in psychology. Here, one can observe that both hedonic asymmetry and conceptual homogenization result from quantifying emotion.

Modern systems of classifying emotion, like the instinct catalogs of older psychology, disagree about the number and kind of emotions which can be experienced. There are few, if any, systems in which those emotions which could reasonably be

assumed to be pleasurable dominate. In some of the cruder formulas (mentioned above) there is a strong bias toward the disagreeable. Turning aside from this and from other elements connected with the felt experience of emotion (I will say more on this in the next chapter), there are three important conceptions which have defined the measurement of emotion in the 20th century in psychology: physiological arousal (which has already been mentioned); taxonomies of emotional expression; and "dimensional" hypotheses.

At the beginning of the modern period, psychology had, along with the intellectual heritage of the idea of a pleasure calculus, numerous systems of taxonomic classification of the emotions. Emotion taxonomies are of great antiquity: their classic formulations appear in Descartes and Spinoza. Psychology around 1890 could at least count and order the different manifestations of affective experience. One finds, at the very beginning of this period, well-developed systems for describing complex conscious affects as composed of varying amounts of simpler sensory or affective elements. These various experiences--fear, joy, and the like--were placed in lists or taxonomies. Taxonomy of emotional expression reached a high point of development with the publication of Darwin's The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals in 1872 (Darwin, 1873). There, the emphasis shifted from the conscious experience of emotion to the overt expression of emotion in behavior: taxonomies of mentality were accompanied, through the 20th century, by those of physiognomy. From this has descended a modern ethological approach to emotion, whose main proponent is Paul Ekman (see Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). Of these "physiognomic" systems, interesting as they are, I will have little to say here: the main result of this approach is that the expression of emotion shows commonality across cultures--a valuable result! Its list of emotions is similar to those in the classic taxonomies.<sup>49</sup>

Psychology in 1890 had more sophisticated mathematical tools for conceptualizing emotional experience than mere counting or categorization. The leading quantitative system in emotion theory was Wundt's, in which emotion is considered to be the result of



the combination of three dimensions of affective elements: strain-relaxation, excitement-calmness, and pain-pleasure. This way of thinking about affective experience was quite modern by our current standards. Many modern theories of emotion are dimensional. Some are tridimensional, like Wundt's: a current example is the system of Albert Mehrabian (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Some are multidimensional (Plutchik, 1968; Russell, 1980). These systems are quite effective in categorizing emotions: for example, Mehrabian and Russell's three-dimensional system (pleasure-unpleasure, dominance-submission, and high/low arousal) appears to capture virtually any emotional reaction to an environmental stimulus or scene.

The result of this sort of thinking about emotion is twofold. First, the already-swollen lists of conscious emotional experiences are afforded vast powers of expansion. Psychology, one is led to think, can characterize any state by a simple numerical combination, a dimensional triad. Second, since pleasantness is a dimension common to all, not some, of the emotions derived from this mathematical model, the impression is given that pleasure is everywhere.

Of course, there are the empirical results to consider. For example, Osgood's semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957), a tridimensional system for characterizing "semantic space," places words in a dimensional matrix whose axes represent activity, potency, and evaluation. Use of this technique would not uncover many persons who would evaluate a "negative" word (e.g. "fester") highly. The success of the semantic differential as a personality instrument, for instance, depends on its efficacy in uncovering deviations from social and cultural norms. But from a purely theoretical, measurement-based viewpoint, the important thing about such dimensional systems is that they make pleasure potential across all experience.

Another aspect of the dimensionalization of emotion has had important quantitative effects. Reduction of the number of elements in emotional experience allowed the amount of pleasure, arousal, tension, and the like to be easily represented on graphs. One

sees, in the history of the measurement of pleasure, several variations of what is called a "Wundt Curve." Wundt represented the relation between arousal and pleasantness/unpleasantness on a Cartesian plane in which the ordinate represented arousal, and the abscissa pleasantness/unpleasantness. The curve, in its original formulation, had no negative lobe on the ordinate: arousal started at zero and increased positively. Pleasantness/unpleasantness, however, were represented on the abscissa as a continuum passing through zero--a "neutral point."

The "neutral point" between pleasantness and unpleasantness was a point of contention for psychologists in the 1890's. It is sufficient to note that there were several views: some thought that there was always some degree of either pleasantness or unpleasantness attached to an emotional experience. Others--those who carried the day--held that there were experiences in which neither pleasure or pain could be experienced.<sup>50</sup>

As arousal increases, pleasantness increases on the Wundt curve to a point, after which it decreases and eventually drops below the ordinate (through the neutral point and into unpleasantness) as arousal continues to increase. The "inverted U" shape of the curve represents a way of thinking about maximum pleasure as related to an optimum level of arousal. The form of the curve is similar to other famous "inverted U" curves in psychology, whose history has been traced back much further than Wundt (see Coombs & Avrunin, 1977).

As the twentieth century progressed, variations of the Wundt curve appeared regularly in American psychology. David McClelland (1955b), for example, extended the ordinate in the negative direction to represent a dimension of frustration--excitement. Low levels of frustration, as well as lower levels of excitement, he maintained, would result in maximal pleasurable affect. A more sophisticated descendant of the Wundt-curve type of representation is the graphic representation of the opponent processes in motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1974). There, the ordinate represents time, and the two

opponent processes are superimposed on each other to show the temporal variation in affect caused by the two antagonistic processes.

The introduction of this graphic method had several results for conceptual thinking about pleasure in psychology. It supported the idea that maximum pleasure was connected with optimality and, by extension, with efficiency. It inured psychologists to think of pleasure in terms of a small range of optimality. If one was at the optimum point, then any movement along the arousal direction would also move one away from pleasure. It reinforced asymmetric conceptions of pleasure in that it linked pleasure inseparably with pain or unpleasantness, and it allowed a 2:1 ratio to emerge--unpleasantness and "neutrality" against the small optimal-pleasure range.

The dimensionalizing of affect (and the pleasure bound up with it) has had, then, mixed effects on the concept of pleasure as a valuable conscious experience. The use of graphic methods of representing pleasurable experience has allowed certain dimensions--the temporal ones--of the pleasure experience to be captured succinctly. On the other hand, the turn toward dimensionality homogenized pleasure and made it an indistinct psychological presence, rather than a series of distinctive experiences. And some aspects of the Wundtian approach supported claims that experience is predominately neutral in character. Pleasure could only be a small part of experience. The position of pleasure in theories of psychology became at once extensive yet unidimensional, massive yet homogeneous. The pleasure/unpleasure continuum became a staple psychological concept. During the height of the behaviorist period the continuum occasionally lost its original connection with the old terminology of pleasure. For instance, under the Lewinian influence, the hedonic dimension changed its name from "pleasantness-unpleasantness" to "valence," which removed pleasure further from common experience, maintained the conceptualization of undifferentiated pleasure, and added elements of asymmetry and unconsciousness.<sup>51</sup>

### The Quantification of Pleasure: Conclusions

What conclusions about the place of the concept of pleasure in the history of psychology can be drawn from the story thus far? Pleasure is undeniably woven into psychology, yet it is not well-characterized historically. One set of reasons for the comparative invisibility of the idea of pleasure to historians of psychology stems from a great yet largely unremarked fact about modern American psychology, its commitment to the quantification of conscious pleasure. This continued in full force in psychology in the 20th century, in contrast to economics, where conscious hedonism was dethroned early and replaced by abstract mathematical theory. Psychologist-historians who were also pleasure-quantifiers attempted, but failed to give an account of the concept which emphasized unity over diversity. No single school or system can be associated with pleasure. The generalist historians of psychology, faced with a scattered concept, had no easy means of incorporating it into their accounts.

Historically, the effort to quantify pleasure resulted in two forces which reduce the importance of the idea of pleasure. One line of thinking converged on the idea that pleasure is a "lesser" idea among psychological ideas. "Hedonic asymmetry" emerged as a pattern of psychological thought. Other pleasure-quantifiers adopted ways of quantifying pleasure that rendered it a part of the psychological background, widely distributed yet only weakly perceptible. The history of psychology to date is, ironically, an accurate record of the impact of, if not the actual presence of, the idea of pleasure in psychology.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE QUALIFICATION OF PLEASURE

In Chapter 1, a history of the concept of pleasure--as psychological hedonism--was offered, which shows that the concept spread over many fields of American psychology through the modern period. In the second chapter, it was suggested that some of the abstractions resulting from the quantification of pleasure constrained the way psychologists and historians of psychology conceptualized the term. These constraints--multiplicity and asymmetry--have diluted the concept. To understand the phenomenological aspects of psychology's pleasure concept, a good deal more resistance must be overcome, beyond the silence of history and the forces of quantification. Quantification implies qualification: measurers must measure something. But in the case of pleasure, that something appears fragmented, shadowy, and without substance. Why this is so can be seen by noting some additional effects of applying the quantitative methods of experimental psychology to the study of pleasure.

Some important conscious aspects of pleasure have been bypassed by experimental psychology. It is particularly noteworthy that the sensory aspect of pleasure has been left mainly to sex research, which is not, despite its recent growth, a central province of psychology. We know comparatively little about just what makes eating, drinking, defecation, urination, and sex the physical pleasures that they are.<sup>52</sup> In the case of sexual pleasure, for example, it is only very recently that some of the obvious features of the female sexual organs have been described and associated with the pleasure that they give when stimulated (Sevely, 1987). Perhaps, though, this lack of concentration on the mechanisms which produce sensory pleasure can be ascribed to the relative importance

which these sensations seem to have in psychology. The twentieth century has witnessed great progress in explaining how basic sensory mechanisms operate: perhaps the twenty-first will be a more genial time in which to investigate the "ornaments" of sensation. The real impediments, however, to finding out about the characteristics of pleasurable experience are found at a more abstract level.

### Theory Masking Pleasure: Information Theory

A greater hindrance to finding a biology and phenomenology of conscious pleasure in psychology is that pleasure is almost invariably bound up with large-scale theory. Pleasure/pain, approach/avoidance, and other bipolar terms are part of the skeleton of theories whose aim is not to elucidate pleasurable experience only, but all possible experience. Theorists in psychology have not had tame aims: they have wanted total explanation. This concentration on theory has resulted in pleasure being assumed, rather than scrutinized.

One example of how concentration on theory impedes the understanding of pleasure is found in examining D. E. Berlyne's "hedonic delta" once again. The delta, it may be recalled from the last chapter, was an analogy Berlyne employed to show the paths of various quantitative approaches to the study of pleasure. The "delta" has its source in "classical hedonism," the various hedonistic psychological theories current around 1890. As quantification developed, several streams branched off from the source: behavior theory, scaling theory, and introspective experiments on "feeling," according to the model. These branched off further into "distributaries," which from behavior theory flow into reinforcement, incentive-value, and feedback theories, and from scaling theory into the fields of decision theory, social evaluation, and Berlyne's self-created field, experimental aesthetics.

In "experimental aesthetics," Berlyne developed a fusion of several psychological theories: adaptation-level theory, Hullian drive theory, and information theory were the chief components. Using this approach, he was able to distinguish experimentally between patterns that subjects called "interesting," for example, and "pleasurable," relating these judgments to measured amounts of stimulus complexity and measured arousal. Berlyne himself represented a confluence of some of the streams of his model: his aim, as he put it, was to see the separate streams of the delta "debouch into the Ocean of Truth and Illumination" (Berlyne, 1973, p. 28).

The theoretical streams from which Berlyne drew were not specific about pleasure, even though they included pleasure/pain synonyms as structural elements. Dimensional scaling approaches, as mentioned in the previous chapter, are neutral about the specific qualities of pleasurable experiences. Likewise, reinforcement or feedback theories do not specify in detail which experiences are pleasant or unpleasant. Some parts of "reinforcement theory" have at times appeared positively hostile to conscious pleasurable experience. Tolman's rat, for example, was to experience pleasant feeling--so far as a non-introspective organism could experience this--when satisfying "fear, rage, lust, extreme food-hunger, extreme fatigue, extreme excretion-hunger" (Tolman, 1932, pp. 263-64), the only actions mentioned at the beginning of the section on "The Emotions" in Purposive Behavior. However, the combination of naming emotions in terms of their hedonic value, pleasure as the aftereffect of experiencing powerful unpleasant emotions, and a non-introspective observer is difficult to imagine as a hedonism of any sort.

Though essentially a Hullian, Berlyne also drew on mathematical information theory which developed during the '30's and '40's, forming the basis for modern computational theories of mind. Information theory as such is neutral as to any pleasure/pain content: several cognitive theories incorporating information-theoretic approaches have a hedonics of a sort added on, for instance, the work of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram mentioned in

Chapter 1. But the motivational component of such theories is probably some version of a system in which pleasure has no explanatory value or explicit quality. Karl Pribram, discussing the place of hedonism in physiological theory in 1960, observed that it need not be included in a comprehensive motivational theory:

Taken together, the neurophysiological and behavioral evidence seems to add up to the view that both an equilibratory and a directional component characterize drives, and that selection, activation, and equilibration are all important. However, hedonism need not be invoked, nor need one consider the selective or cue properties of stimuli as the sole directional components of drive. (Pribram, 1960/1969, p. 422)

Pribram proposed a "homeostatic" regulatory system comprised of receptors operating on feedback principles. His pleasure view appears to have been one in which "pleasure" was still equated with "equilibrium" or "quiescence." In describing how a coordinated system of self-adjusting receptors produces drive, Pribram explicitly excluded hedonism:

No simple hedonistic rule can be applied, i.e., behavior is not always guided toward some pleasurable consequence. Selection of stimuli depends on the state of the receptor. Activation shifts biases. Equilibratory homeostasis in the classical sense (and thus need-reduction) is seen as only one phase, the equilibration, of a rather more complex process. Basic to this process is the up-to-date neural homeostat constituted of a receptor, negative feedback, and bias. (p. 423)

Although some recent computational theory has intimated that a pleasurable experience can emerge from the componentry of the brain or mind (see Klopff, 1982), the technical language employed is usually quite far from a description of conscious experience. Another line of the information-theoretical stream is more directly connected to ethical and valuational concerns. Some information-theoretical psychologists, for instance Herbert Simon (1979), have treated questions of pleasure more in terms of economics rather than as an expanded version of stimulus-response motivational



psychology. Economic theories in general have little interest in conscious pleasure. Models of economic decision-making and related models of human choice are neutral, like the information-theoretical models from which Berlyne constructed his theory, as to what sort of experience they explain. These models are efficient explanatory tools. But without a clear concept of pleasure attached to them, they may also become very efficient at promoting an asymmetric view of pleasure.

For instance, in Behavioral and Social Science: Fifty Years of Discovery, published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1986, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky give this account of pleasure:

In contrast to the large amount of research on decisionmaking, there has been relatively little systematic exploration of the psychophysics that relate hedonic experience to objective states. The most basic problem of hedonic psychophysics is the determination of the level of adaptation or aspiration that separates positive from negative outcomes. The hedonic reference point is largely determined by the objective status quo, but it is also affected by expectations and social comparisons. An objective improvement can be experienced as a loss, for example, when an employee receives a smaller raise than everyone else in the office. The experience of pleasure and pain associated with a change of state is also critically dependent on the dynamics of hedonic adaptation. Brickman and Campbell's (1971) concept of the hedonic treadmill suggests the radical hypothesis that rapid adaptation will cause the effects of any objective improvement to be short-lived. The complexity and subtlety of hedonic experience make it difficult for the decisionmaker to anticipate the actual experience that outcomes will produce. Many a person who ordered a meal when ravenously hungry has admitted to a big mistake when the fifth course arrived on the table. The common mismatch of decision values and experience values introduces an additional element of uncertainty in many decision problems. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986, p. 170)

Here, in the only part of their chapter in which hedonic experience is specifically mentioned, is a mixture of several strands of the pleasure concept. Pleasure is, for these researchers, a psychophysical (or aesthetic) problem. It is not absolute but relative. It is conditioned by events external to the person. And it is fugitive and weak, as a phenomenon--many things can intervene to destroy it. Pleasure is a treadmill. Information-processing models are effective in quantifying reality, but that reality is

colored by the asymmetric biases connected with pleasure. It is worth noting, in connection with this combination of information theory and economic models, that many models of animal behavior now include reference to its cognitive dimensions. The range of these theories is from the more strictly economic to the more "psychological." This range appears to map onto the degree of consciousness the researcher is willing to attribute to the organism under study. Thus "hedonism" in modern variants of operant theory is aligned with the study of indifference functions, while in theories with ties to classical conditioning, "hedonism" appears to mean an expectancy of positive consequences. There is a division between the two schools, neatly captured by William Timberlake from the operant side:

Animal learning has a long history of carefully expunging mentalism and instincts from its world view; it is now in the odd position of attempting to integrate aspects of these viewpoints into a coherent whole. This time around, these viewpoints are much more solidly based in research and theory, but we should not forget entirely the excesses and foibles of their origins. Ultimately, we cannot ground psychology in common sense, hedonism, cognitions, instincts, or enlightened rational behavior. All of the mechanisms referred to by these concepts must operate within evolved structures related to stimulus sensitivity, decisions, and amount and type of behavior. It is these structures that we are after. (Timberlake, 1983, p. 119)

Only in a very broad sense can these theories all be said to be "economic." Psychology has a tendency to use economic metaphors in many different situations. "Economic" may signify "equilibrium," or "consumption," or simple "exchange." It will take a thorough examination of this dimension of psychology's history through the lenses of economic history and theory to sort this out. Theories have to have experiential content added to them. As seen here, Berlyne, who desired to know something about a specific aspect of pleasure--aesthetic pleasure and taste--was able to use these content-neutral theories. Most psychologists working "from theory outward" have not, however, resisted the pressures toward asymmetric thinking about pleasure. Psychologists'

expositions of comprehensive information-processing and economic theories take on the characteristics of their *milieu*--in this case, hedonically asymmetric psychology.

### Theory Masking Pleasure: Theories of Emotion and Cognition

Since 1945, human cognition has been a central theme in psychology. Accompanying the growth of this field has been a steady stream of findings that link "feelings" with "knowing." These arise from many of the trends which arose as "movements" within the study of human cognition over that period: the "New Look" in perception in 1947, the introduction of information theory, and the full assimilation of Gestalt ideas into American psychology.

Mainstream modern cognitive psychology does not possess a pleasure concept, but has provided some findings that color it: the idea of affect preceding cognition, Osgood's dimensional semantics, and the continuation of the experimental search for the relation of mood and memory. It appears that the main effect of cognitive psychology has been to "cognitivize" many domains of psychology which formerly did not take the mind into account. The domain of emotion has been, over the last thirty years, affected by this shift in view. From the publication of Silvan Tomkins's Affect, Cognition, Consciousness in 1962 (Tomkins, 1962/1963) to the recent appearance of DeSousa's The Rationality of Emotion (1987), and DeRivera's recent work (DeRivera, 1985), the idea that affective states are part of a rational system has gained ground. Models integrating emotional experiences--experiences in which pleasure may play a part--into complex hypothetical brain information-processing systems are quite common and are found in many domains of psychology: the psychology of consumer behavior; emotion study proper, and theories of social cognition. These have tended to reinforce the idea that consciousness and

rationality are involved in decisions which have feelings as consequences. So far as they provide the framework for pleasurable consciousness, they counteract whatever still exists of the old psychology of reactive, epiphenomenal emotion.

In Chapter 2, some of the cruder asymmetries related to the emotions was noted. To the "outnumbering" of "positive" by "negative" emotions can be added the observation that, within taxonomies of emotion, the pleasantness and unpleasantness (hardly ever the pleasantness alone!) of the emotions is described rather patly. "Rage," "fear," "hate," and "anger" are "unpleasant emotions" by definition in most systems. This makes it difficult to explain the proverb that hatred is "the longest pleasure." (Here is the point at which the Freudian approach, with its insistence on the equivalence of opposites, seems at a most definite advantage over the American one.)<sup>53</sup>

The linkage of emotion and cognition shows, in its development, some subtler elements of hedonic asymmetry. Since 1975, the theme of "emotion and cognition" has become a strong one, implying that a real merger is in the offing. The two traditions which are merging each have some strong disaffinities for pleasure, however. The state of "pleasantness" and its relation to cognition around 1920 is nicely summarized in the beginning of the chapter on "The Feelings" in R. S. Woodworth's Psychology: A Study of Mental Life (1921). "Feeling," he said,

is subjective and unanalyzed. It is conscious, and an "unconscious feeling" would be a contradiction in terms. But, while conscious, it is not cognitive; it is not "knowing something", even about your subjective condition; it is simply "the way you feel". As soon as you begin to analyze it, and say, "I feel badly here or there, in this way or in that," you *know* something about your subjective condition, but the feeling has evaporated for the instant. In passing over into definite knowledge of facts, it has ceased to be feeling. (Woodworth, 1921, p. 172)

Since 1920, the relation between cognition and affect has undergone nearly a complete reversal. Feeling is no longer unanalyzed. The amount of the shift can be seen

in the way in which the relation between emotion and cognition was rendered in Lindsay and Norman's popular cognition text from 1977, Human Information Processing:

There is a large list of experiments that have now been performed which generally support these main points: emotional states are manipulable by the combination of three different factors--*cognitive processes* (expectations), *physiological states*, and *environmental influences*. To say that cognitive factors play an important role in the manipulation of emotional behavior does not mean that we are necessarily consciously aware of our cognitions. When we become angered or threatened by someone's remarks or actions, our logic may tell us there is nothing to be concerned about, while our internal responses may tell us differently. In this case, we can have a large discrepancy between our rationalizations of our behavior and the actual behavior....To translate the active interpretive theory of emotion into a working system means that we must have several interesting interactions among the processes controlling behavior. First, we need an ongoing system that creates an internal model of the world to provide the expectations that are so important for emotions. That is, a central feature of the system must be cognition: the active development of a picture of the world, including the past, present, and expectations about the future. In addition, we need an assessment of how well things are coming along. How well are our expectations being met? What predictions can we make for the future if things continue along in the same way? (Lindsay & Norman, 1977, p. 687)

The psychology of the emotions has at its root a link between "feeling" and "pleasantness and unpleasantness." From 1921, Woodworth again:

No one has ever been able to break up the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness into anything simpler. "Pleasure" and "displeasure" are not always so simple; they are names for whole states of mind which may be very complex, including sensations and thoughts in addition to the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. (Woodworth, 1921, p. 173)

And further, in the next paragraph:

How, then, do the elementary feelings differ from sensations? In the first place, sensations submit more readily to being picked out and observed, and in fact become more vivid when they are brought into the "foreground," while feelings grow vague and lose their character when thus singled out for examination. (pp. 173-174)

Woodworth's comments are a good example of asymmetry and, as well, psychology's uncertainty about the consciousness of pleasure. Also, the old equivocation about the place of pleasure among the emotions, feelings, and cognitions can again be seen.

Feeling--the basis of which is pleasure and unpleasure--is firmly declared non-cognitive on page 172. By page 173, pleasantness and unpleasantness may be parts of "complex" states which include sensations and thoughts. Recall that Woodworth was one of the group of psychologists for whom the term "hedonic tone," a vague generalization about pleasure, was a useful expression.

Added to this uncertainty about the strength and vividness of pleasure in the psychology of emotions and feelings is the strong asymmetry attaching to the taxonomy of emotional states. The shift to modern information-processing theories in which emotion is strongly linked with cognition brings with it some new problems for a concept of pleasure. Lindsay and Norman introduced the concept of "emotion" in Human Information Processing in a chapter entitled "Stress and Emotion." On the second page of this chapter, under the subheading of "stress," we read that:

Words like *expectations, uncertainty, disruption, discrepancy, dissonance, and conflict* are key words in the experimental analysis of human emotion and motivation. In many types of motivational situations, the organism acts as if something were monitoring the ongoing cognitive processes, watching for potential trouble spots in dealing with the environment, and signaling when difficulties arise. The comparison mechanism is primarily concerned with the results of cognitive processing. So long as things are within sensible limits, it remains quiet. But when something is encountered that is new or discrepant from what is expected or potentially threatening, it acts like an interrupt mechanism, alerting the organism to the potential problem and mobilizing resources to deal with it. The result is a change in the general level of arousal or activation. It can range from high levels under stress and fear to low levels when the environment makes no demands at all on the organism. (Lindsay & Norman, 1977, p. 668)

In the rest of the chapter, "pleasure" (as such) is not mentioned (although there is a brief mention of "euphoria" in connection with their description of Schachter and Singer's experiment on the manipulation of an undifferentiated state of arousal by external stimulation). In these two influential texts in psychology, separated in time by fifty years, some of the shifts in the pleasure concept over the century can be seen. From the time of Woodworth, when it was natural to assume that "pleasantness" was a basic element of

feeling yet not essentially cognitive, some parts of cognitive psychology have moved toward an integration of emotion and cognition in which both cognition and asymmetry have been amplified.

The continuing confusion over the status of emotional experience (conscious vs. non-conscious, and "aesthetic" vs. "visceral") is only part of the reason why the cognition-emotion relation bypasses the actual experience of pleasure. Some further reasons why theory impedes the knowing of pleasure can be seen in a more recent development of the theme of "emotional cognition." Here, some examples are taken from a theoretical paper by Seymour Epstein, in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation for 1982, "A Research Paradigm for the Study of Personality and Emotions" (Epstein, 1982). From the point of view of understanding hedonic experience, his approach is praiseworthy. He proposed to assess, by self-report and by questionnaire, the dimensions of emotional experience and their environmental and sociocultural correlates. He also proposed to assess the relation of "basic emotions" to a series of "self-esteem needs," and to investigate the relation between objective behavior and subjective emotional experience. Then, after establishing what he termed a "nomothetic" taxonomy of emotions, he applied this to the "idiographic" analysis of a single case, comparing correlations between various emotional states of a single individual with the intergroup correlations.

A few illustrations from this study illuminate the problem of understanding pleasure *qua* pleasure from the standpoint of emotion theory. The first example is a table containing the raw data for a factor analysis of the dimensions of emotion. The names he proposed for of the subdivisions of affective experience are shown in the first table on the next page--"positive" affective experience can be subdivided into nineteen subordinate terms:

	Positive	Negative
Primary Emotions	Happy Secure Affectionate	Sad Frightened Angry
Self-esteem Variables	Worthy Competent Likable Moral Powerful	Unworthy Incompetent Disliked Guilty Helpless
Arousal States	Calm Energetic Alert Energetic Alert	Tense Tired Unreactive
Cognitive States	Directed Clear-minded Free	Conflicted Disorganized Blocked
	Intensity Pleasantness Duration	Intensity Unpleasantness Duration

(Epstein, 1982, p. 113)

Following this, some pages later, is the summary of a factor analysis of positive feeling states.alone. Here are two of the factors:

Factor 1 (Self-esteem)	Factor 2 (Positive affect)
Competent	Affectionate
Powerful	Happy
Clear-minded	Calm
Directed	Likable
Moral	Alert
Worthy	Free
Secure	Secure
Energetic	Moral
Free	Energetic
Alert	Worthy
Likable	Directed
Calm	

(p. 134)



It is difficult to see why any of the "self-esteem" affects or the "positive affects" are not members of a superordinate class called "pleasure." In the first chart, there is a typical separation of positive and negative experiences, with no apparent allowance for mixed feelings. "Pleasantness," as a separate element, is classed with two abstract variables, "intensity" and "duration." There is an implication that there is something called pleasantness associated with an opposite, unpleasantness, but beyond this there is no further examination of the pleasantness (or unpleasantness) with regard to any dimensions which they themselves may have. Here, pleasantness is swamped by its correlates.

Some further examples show some more vagaries of the pleasure concept in this area. Epstein describes, in the introduction to his study, what he describes as a "personal theory of reality" which is constructed "unwittingly in the course of living" (p. 96). There are three elements to this cognitive construction:

A personal theory of reality does not develop for its own sake, but is a conceptual tool for solving life's problems. It consists of a self-theory, a world theory, and concepts relating the two. The theory has three basic functions, which are to assimilate the data of experience, to maintain a favorable pleasure/pain balance over the foreseeable future, and to maintain a favorable level of self-esteem. (Epstein, 1982, p. 96)

What would make a pleasure/pain balance favorable is not explicitly stated: presumably, the amount of pleasure/pain is left open to the individual's determination. But, reading further, it is a mixture of internal and external effects which determine the pleasure/pain balance:

When a personal theory of reality is unable to fulfill its functions, the system is placed under stress, which is subjectively experienced as anxiety. If the stress cannot be defended against, the theory ultimately collapses, which corresponds to an acute schizophrenic reaction....On the other hand, when the theory succeeds in fulfilling its functions, or the individual anticipates their fulfillment, a state of pleasurable affect is experienced. Thus, just as unassimilable experiences are accompanied by anxiety, assimilable experiences are accompanied by positive affect. (p. 97)

If expectations are being met, then pleasure seems inevitable. Also, just *which* pleasurable or positive affect will be experienced is not specified. "Pleasure" and "positive affect" are interchangeable. Presumably one might react calmly, or energetically, or directedly--or, since the factorization combines all of these qualities into one generalized factor, perhaps in all of these ways at once. Later in the study, the primary emotions from the first table--happy, affectionate, and secure--are described with relation to some other variables in the study. Here is the description of the relation between a "basic emotion"--affectionate-- and its correlates.

**Affectionate...is significantly correlated with all feeling states and with Intensity and Pleasantness. Its strongest correlations are with the feeling states Likable, Calm, Alert, Happy, and Free, in that order. Affectionate is significantly correlated with the situational variables Love and Affection, Helpfulness, and Affiliation, and with the behavioral impulses Nurturance and Affiliation. Thus, people who describe themselves as more affectionate than others report that they are more happy, more secure, have higher self-esteem, and are higher on all other positive feeling states, particularly alertness and feeling free, than others. They also report that they are more sociable, that others like them and are helpful to them, and that they, in turn, are more helpful to others....(T)he above findings indicate that a stimulus-induced state of feeling affectionate is associated with increased feelings of happiness, security, and self-esteem, and with increased engagement with the environment....The construals of stimulus conditions that instigate affection are that someone has demonstrated that he or she cares for the individual, that someone has provided pleasurable physical or social stimulation, or that someone has demonstrated that he or she considers the individual to be a good person. Self-acceptance by the individual of his or her own morality was also reported to be an instigator of affection. The findings on pleasurable stimulation are consistent with Spinoza's view that "love is happiness with the object known." (Epstein, 1982, p. 127)**

The problems with emotional theory and pleasure come to the fore. First, undifferentiated pleasure is a dimension of the experience. How much pleasure attaches to any particular experience in life is not made explicit. The language of emotion theory is culture-bound: one can imagine styles of life in which the affection described in the example above might be too exuberant and showy. Theories of emotion, like theories of behavior-in-general, attempt to cover all of the contingencies. They are adaptable to any imaginable state, and a description of any combination of variables is theoretically

possible. But though they have this protean potential, they also reflect cultural linguistic conventions and psychological beliefs which make their picture of emotional life less interesting. A sad affection, as might be experienced at a parting or a grave, appears an unlikely event in the sketch of affection above. The chief advantage of modern theories of emotion is that they mitigate the preponderance of negative over positive emotions. Epstein's approach is remarkable in that it makes security a basic emotion, which is a step forward in understanding the empirical bases of happiness. But in making pleasure equal, large-scale theories also make it indistinct.

Among the emotions, pleasure has a place. But the continuing effects of asymmetric thinking about pleasure and the vague "dimensionality" which underlies modern models of emotion make pleasure a difficult thing to see or know. The adoption of portmanteau descriptions such as "positive affect" blend distinctive features of pleasurable experience together indiscriminately. The widespread convention of using "positive affect" to describe pleasure contributes to the spreading of a vague "hedonic tone" over much of the psychological literature.

### Theory Masking Pleasure: Pleasure as Part, not Whole

The range of pleasurable things that psychologists have measured is quite wide, though, as has been noted, many interesting facets of pleasurable experience (especially sensory aspects) are so far untouched. Should one like to be tickled, tickling is employed as an example of an experience corresponding to a point in the continuum in David McClelland's (1955b) Wundt-curve based motivational model. Frank Geldard theorized and experimented on tickle and itch from the 1940's until his recent death in 1984.<sup>54</sup> And a recent experiment in Italy (Ruggieri, Milizia, & Angeli, 1985) employed college women and cotton swabs (fresh swabs were used for each tickle). There are few other tickling

experiments. At the other end of the range, there are the thousands of studies on play (ambiguous as to its pleasure content) and on alcohol (less ambiguous as to its hedonic qualities).

Only one example of psychology's piecemeal approach to the experimental study of pleasure will be described here. It carries all of the essential hallmarks of psychology's twentieth-century laboratory approach to pleasure. It stems from experimental social psychology. Many theories in social psychology embody a pleasure variable, usually expressed as a more neutral term rather than as "pleasure." Examples of such terms are "self-esteem," "positive affect," and other terms familiar from the example from emotion theory above. In many cases today, theories of emotion are presented in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Additionally, many studies which have no particular "social" or "personality" character end up there, since it is a journal with many subdivisions.

In 1976, Deborah Davis, Hal Rainey, and Tim Brock of the Ohio State University published, in that journal, a study entitled "Interpersonal Physical Pleasuring: Effects of Sex Combinations, Recipient Attributes, and Anticipated Future Interaction" (Davis, Rainey, & Brock, 1976). The study was similar, in its essential methodology, to Stanley Milgram's famous study on obedience and other experiments on aggression in the early 1960's. Subjects were to utilize a device to give the experimenter's confederate a physical jolt. This was demonstrated to the subject beforehand, and then turned off during the experiment so that no jolts were actually received by the confederate--a classic "deception paradigm" study. Davis et. al.'s study had an important twist, however: the confederate was to receive graded jolts of *pleasure*. Of the apparatus used, the "Brock Pleasure Machine," a large upholstered chair fitted with a pulse generator which delivered stimulation to the buttocks and thighs (something like a vibrating bed, one presumes), they wrote that it was "essentially a modified aggression machine by means of which

subjects gave a recipient short intensity graded waves of pleasure" (p. 91). Their stimulus was clearly conscious physical tickling and interpreted as such by their subjects, college students both male and female. (The tickling of buttocks and thighs was in fact interpreted as "sexual pleasuring" by several subjects, rather than as an operationalized neutral pleasuring.) They varied the sex of the giver-recipient pairs, the attractiveness of the confederate, and the amount of expectation of future interaction the subjects could expect to have with the confederate. Thus there were four different sets of results in one study--a not uncommon occurrence in modern experimental psychology!

This study describes in miniature many of the themes of pleasure research in psychology today. First, the use of specific apparatus to deliver "pleasure" as a stimulus, or to measure it as a result. There have been a number of such devices in social psychology (to say nothing of sex research).<sup>55</sup> The authors' modification of an "aggression machine" parallels the theoretical modifications which they had to make to justify the study. They reported that they found little else to go on, theoretically, than theories of altruism and, most prominently, aggression. Altruism and attraction are two phenomena which social psychology considers central to the production of cognitive experiences of pleasure. Aggression is quite another matter: they maintained that there were strong differences between the results of their study and those predicted were aggression a variable. Of course it is difficult to answer whether aggression, in psychology, is pleasurable or unpleasurable (hatred is the longest pleasure). Remarkably, although "attribution" appears in the title of the article, these researchers did not cite Fritz Heider. Heider, originator of what is now a central idea in social psychology, attribution, devoted a full chapter of his 1958 work The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations to an analysis of interpersonal interpretations of pleasure (to be described further below).

The citation path of the study in recent years shows that it has suffered the fate of many individual pleasure studies--it has remained interesting, and isolated. On the other hand, other contemporaneous studies by Davis and her colleagues which investigated

more neutral dimensions of social interaction than actual physical pleasure are often cited today. The fate of pleasure, as considered by experimental psychology, is either to be too large a concept to comprehend, or else to reside in individual events such as the one constructed by Davis and her colleagues. The abstract tendencies toward asymmetry and diminishment of the concept described in Chapter 2 link up with these more specific results of theorizing and experimentation to make pleasure an elusive phenomenon in psychology.

What is most evident is that most of the approaches mentioned so far have considered pleasure as an accompaniment to larger and more important theoretical elements, rather than as a phenomenon in its own right. Pleasure is encrusted with theory. Yet there have been some attempts to cut through this crust and examine pleasure itself. These attempts form a phenomenological counterpoint to the analytic experimental theme of American psychology.

### Pleasure as Many in One

In 1894, William James reviewed Henry Rutgers Marshall's Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics for The Nation. James described the predecessors of modern psychology's pleasure views at the beginning of his review, observing the beginning of the fragmentation of "classical hedonism":

A better day, it is true, has begun to dawn of late, since the high-priori road has been less travelled, and the Kantian, Hegelian, Schopenhauerian, Herbartian, and other Teutonic efforts to reduce the life of aesthetic feeling to some single essential conception, have begun to yield to the more modest study of minute particular effects. But either through hollowness where ambitious, or where solid then through triviality, the outcome of aesthetic theorizing has not been such as to puff one up with pride. Everything that is subtle in our preferences escapes from the accounts that are given; the nature of the pleasure and pain-processes in the nerve-centres still remains unknown; and the student concludes that the experience of a single strain of melody or verse of poetry, of a single square foot

of genuine color, is more important to the soul than all of the books on beauty ever composed. (James, 1894, pp. 49-50)

Introducing Marshall's treatise, James offered ironic praise:

Now it cannot be said that Mr. Marshall's book quite puts an end to this state of things. No philosophy, however wide its sweep or deep its dive, will ever be a substitute for the tiniest experience of life. But, all allowances made for this necessity, it may well be said that Mr. Marshall's essay is the most successful of all yet published attempts to conceive our pleasures and displeasures under something like a single point of view. (p. 49)

Marshall's theory involves a continuum of pleasure and pain upon which all experience is placed: it is essentially a dimensional theory of pleasure. James took issue with the theory's reduction of individual experience to a dimensional point on a single scale of feeling. Regarding the obverse of pleasurable experience, James asked:

Is not his whole attempt to find a single formula a vicious one? Are the various forms of displeasure of which we are susceptible, rightly to be gathered up under the single name of "pain"? Have such diverse disagreeables as toothache, nausea, nervous anxiety, grief, and the perception of ugliness, anything in common except their common intolerability? (p. 50)

And soon afterward, he gave form to the central problem in giving a good description of the phenomenal experience of pleasure, as aesthetic experience:

Is not also the conception of "Aesthetics" far too wide for any profitable treatment in general terms? Have the classically beautiful, the interestingly ingenious, the emotionally exciting, the neatly accurate, the grotesquely unreal, and the humorous, anything in common except that they are *welcome*, and is it likely *a priori* that the welcomeness is in all cases due to the same kind of process being aroused? (p. 50)

Pleasure is a multitude of experiences, a fact that fascinated James the pluralist. True, James in his Principles tried to subsume all of these experiences under one name himself. There, four years earlier, he suggested a single term to unify pleasure and pain-- "interest":

The 'interesting' is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the painful, but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and even the simply habitual, inasmuch as the attention usually travels on habitual lines, and what-we-attend-to and what-interests-us are synonymous terms. (James, 1890, Vol. II, pp. 558-559)

James's comments represent two impulses in psychology's study of pleasure. In adopting the portmanteau term "interest" (a term which also has had a long career in psychology since James's time) to unify pleasurable experience, he followed the first impulse, that of the "dimensionalizers," conceptualizing pleasures as a global, undifferentiated entity. The other impulse is to attack the problem of the diversity of pleasurable experience by examining this plurality directly. Historically, this has opposed phenomenological analysis to abstract quantification. James represents the tension between experiential and the observational-analytic approaches in psychology, which are sometimes regarded as polar opposites.<sup>56</sup> In the case of pleasure, these approaches prove are complementary rather than competitive.

The phenomenology of pleasure which emerges from attempts to quantify pleasure is sparse. There is a "metaphenomenology" of pleasure in the set of abstract tendencies toward asymmetry and indiscriminateness, as noted in Chapter 2. Pleasurable experience is, in the abstract, secondary and less important. Paradoxically, pleasure is everywhere--deeply embedded in theory as well as experience. Precise descriptions of pleasurable experience in experimental and theoretical psychology are not often as florid as that of "affection" in the preceding section. The analysis of pleasure, paraphrasing Einstein, need not convey pleasure. But if pleasure is the basic dimension of experience that it appears to be, perhaps the lack of detail is an impediment to psychologists' interest in studying it.

Most experimental reports and theoretical descriptions are not written in fine literary style. The characters and situations are usually stock--"for illustration only." Gunnar



Myrdal's comment in 1928 about illustrations of hedonic models in economic theory applies to psychology as well:

The unquestioning faith of the marginalists in rationalistic hedonism as a substantially correct account of human behavior, and their blindness to its difficulties, became most glaring in their unhappy choice of examples: boys swapping apples and nuts, horse-dealers in the market, Robinson Crusoe shipwrecked on an island where he must adjust himself to a situation without any social relations. One wonders what insight and wisdom an analysis of such situations could yield. A modern psychologist who wanted to refute hedonism could probably choose no better examples to show how absurd the notion of rational motivation is. The illustrations, like the theory which they illustrate, can hardly be said to be the result of observation. If ever there was an armchair theory, this is it. (Myrdal, 1928/1954, p. 95)

In his review of Marshall, James expressed similar sentiments:

It is written with an extreme dryness, for hardly a concrete example adorns its pages; but one does not feel (as in so many German essays) that this is the dryness of an irreclaimably inartistic nature on the author's part. It seems rather the respect of an artistic nature (which is also philosophical) for facts to which it knows in advance that philosophy must be inadequate; and the deliberate preference, while philosophizing, to be as abstract as it can, and to leave particulars, with their subtlety, to be disposed of by the concrete man. Beauty, indeed, must be dissected; but the dissecting-room is no place for the living body of her to come in. (James, 1894, p. 50)

One thinks of Skinner's examples: giving candy to a baby; a man who gets caught out in the rain.

Occasionally some vivid examples of pleasure as conscious and knowable emerge. In 1890, no great gap intervened between the formation of an idea and the formation of emotional attachments to it. James, following Mill and Bagehot, maintained that the best thoughts were the simplest, and the most compelling were those that had in them a component of pleasure or of pain. One of the decisive criteria for perfect belief was aesthetic:

After the emotional and active needs come the intellectual and aesthetic ones. The two great aesthetic principles, of richness and of ease, dominate our intellectual as well as our sensuous life. And, *ceteris paribus*, no system which should not be rich, simple, and harmonious would have a chance of being chosen

for belief, if rich, simple, and harmonious systems were also there. (James, 1890, Vol II, p. 315)

The development of the psychology of thinking has led to more sober appraisals of the phenomena of belief. As cognitive psychology has developed, the content of beliefs has become less important than the logical structure which produces or underlies them. Among the persistent remnants of pleasurable belief experiences, one can count the "insight" or "discovery" experience. Max Wertheimer's (1925/1938) described insight abstractly, as an element of logic, but there has been a strong tendency to associate the experience with pleasure. Even E. G. Boring, at the height of the operationalist period (1946) could say simply that insight was "pleasant," with no qualifications; a curious statement from one who saw emotion heading into a limbo of psychological terminology (Boring, 1946). The appreciation of the pleasure of knowing has found expression recently in the emotion-neutral territory of information-processing. Seymour Papert, well-known in computer and cognitive science, described the reactions of nonmathematicians learning mathematics in a paper in the volume Aesthetics in Science:

All subjects who have become more than very superficially involved in the problem show unmistakable signs of excitement and pleasure when they hit on the last equation. This pleasure is not dependent on knowing (at least consciously) where the process is leading. It happens before the subjects are able to say what they will do next, and, in fact, it happens even in cases where no further progress is made at all. (Papert, 1978, p. 111)

Papert sees mathematical thinking as pleasure-producing: that it is conscious pleasure that is meant is unmistakable. Yet its source, says Papert, is not conscious to the subject. "It is highly unplausible that this actual equation was anticipated here as a preset goal. If the pleasure was that of goal achievement, the goal was of a very different, less formal, I would say 'more aesthetic' nature than the achievement of a particular equation" (p. 111). Papert ultimately concludes that there is, beside an aesthetic dimension to pleasure, an erotic one as well. "Does this allow us," questions Papert, suggesting Freud, "to conjecture that mathematics shares more with jokes, dreams, and hysteria than is

commonly recognized?" (p. 112). Insight has again become a focus of argument in cognitive psychology, and decried as a "myth" (Weisberg, 1986). It is, however, a persistent one.

Later in the same book, Howard Gruber draws on Miller, Galanter and Pribram, Kenneth Boulding, and Ulrich Neisser in his examination of imagery in scientific thought. Scientific work is not only aesthetic, says Gruber, it is erotic:

The issue of number has a bearing on what we may call the erotic side of scientific work. In some general sense, every scientist may form an emotional cathexis with the whole of nature, or better, with his *idea* of the whole. But in actual work we see that every person must make severe choices. This is not merely a matter of the time it takes to get the work done or to learn enough to do it. Much of the time goes into forming a deep enough cathexis with some particular set of natural objects or ideas to permit the steady engagement of the person's whole effort. Such love is not formed in an instant. In matters of work the scientist may be polygamous but not promiscuous. (Gruber, 1978, p. 138)

Freudian depth metaphor mixes here with elements of Gestalt psychology (Ulrich Neisser) and two synthetic products of the early cognitive revolution (Miller et. al., and Boulding).<sup>57</sup> Scientific knowing--highly cognitive--is fused with emotional knowing, and may even be a carnal form as well.<sup>58</sup>

J. J. Gibson, in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, described another form of wholistic, emotional cognition:

When the constant properties of constant objects are perceived...the observer can go on to detect their *affordances*. I have coined this word as a substitute for *values*, a term which carries an old burden of philosophic meaning. I mean simply what things furnish, for good or ill. (Gibson, 1966, p. 284)

Thirteen pages previous to this, he drew on Woodworth to suggest that clear perception of the entire environment might be generally reinforcing:

A perceiver is a *self-tuning* system. What makes it resonate to the interesting broadcasts that are available instead of to all the trash that fills the air? The answer might be that the pickup of information is *reinforcing*. This is essentially the answer that Woodworth suggested twenty years ago....Clarity in itself, he asserted, is good, is valued. A system "hunts" until it achieves clarity....We know

something about the adjustments--for example, the accommodating of the eye where the clarity of detail is somehow "satisfying" to the ocular system. We do not know much yet about the neural action of resonance at higher centers, but it too may prove to be the reaching of some optimal state of equilibrium. If the neurophysiologists stopped looking for the storehouse of memory perhaps they would find it. (p. 271)

And later, drawing on Kurt Lewin, he revealed the depth of his connection to Gestalt psychology: "The hypothesis of 'invitation qualities' of objects, their valences, or what they afford, was central to Gestalt theory, especially as developed by Lewin" (p. 274).

Here, also, there is a shift from the consideration of pleasure as a part of experience toward a more wholistic view. The traditions that Gibson quotes from both saw affective experience as a part of life in general, not connected with any particular experience. The tradition of thinking of pleasure as "hedonic tone" (Woodworth) saw pleasure as a "coloration" of experience. The field-theoretic approach of Lewin linked with whole-field perceptual philosophy of Gibson to imply that valence or valuation are intrinsic to objects and forces which surround the individual. Here the ambitious scope of American dynamic psychology, Gestalt psychology, and Gibson's unique approach merge with the "dimensionalizing" trend in the measurement of pleasure. But the question of whether individual pleasures are unique is left open.

### Systematic Phenomenology of Pleasure

James's collation of "welcome" aesthetic experiences is a forerunner of some solutions to the problem of finding order in the plurality of pleasure. The extension and development of this rudimentary and unstructured phenomenology forms one historical trend. It developed during the reaction to behaviorism, and was due mainly to transplanted Gestalt psychologists.

Apparently pleasure was a large question for psychologists in the Gestalt tradition. I have mentioned already that Heider, in The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations in 1958, proposed a theory of pleasure in his exposition of "attribution theory." In Chapter 5 of that book, Heider summarized the relation between desire and pleasure in this set of postulates:

Desires or personal wishes are to be distinguished from induced motives, though the distinction is not always clear.

Desires are not invariably coordinated with actions.

The fulfillment of a desire is thought to be invariably coordinated to pleasure, though not vice versa.

When necessary, re-evaluation of conditions and effects occurs in accordance with the desire-pleasure postulate.

Desires and pleasure may conflict with other requirements perceived by the organism. Harmony may be restored through re-evaluation.

Conceptually, there are two relations between the person and the object to which the desire and pleasure are directed, namely, value and distance.

The value relation is designated by the sentiment, p (a person, ed. note) likes x (an object, ed. note). It is uncoordinated to conditions of distance between p and x.

The distance relation between p and x pertains to the distance as perceived by p. It is a psychological distance conceptualized as a spatial relation between p and x.

The conditions of distance between p and x differentiate the affective reactions of p. Desire, pleasure, hope, fear, the frustration of a near success, the relief of a near miss are examples.

Control of pleasure in another person may be accomplished by manipulating the distance between o and x-o (Note: "o" = another person, ed. note.) may be correctly or incorrectly informed of wish-fulfillment or wish denial; he may be teased by manipulations leading to near successes.

The attribution of desire and pleasure to the underlying subject and object poles has far-reaching consequences. It is essential for understanding. Through attribution an experience leads to further beliefs important for prediction and control.

Adequate attribution requires an adequate data pattern of condition-effect changes.

Attribution to the object or to the person can depend on whether experiences of the self or those of another are being considered.

Attribution of enjoyment to the object provides the basis for one kind of egocentric attribution.

Personal wishes and propriety may also lead to egocentrically determined incorrect attribution.

Enjoyment has certain aftereffects. These may be the ends sought by p in bringing about pleasure. (Heider, 1958, pp. 161-162)

The lineaments of the Gestalt approach to pleasure are apparent here. Foremost is the idea that a theory about pleasure alone can be created (within the compass of a generalized theory of behavior). Pleasure and desire are discussed together: they form a tight, interwoven system. Time and space, and the presence of other persons, are essential in understanding pleasure. The taxonomic, quantifying approaches which attempt to categorize things as pleasant and unpleasant are not in evidence: pleasure is not linked to particular things, situations, or expressions, but to relations between things.

There is, moreover, in the text of the chapter, a sensitivity to the variety of situations in which pleasure may be experienced. Heider describes the variety of interpretations which we might put on another's enjoyment:

When a person says, "I don't enjoy that at all" we do not always believe him, especially when it is clear from his face and behavior that he just loves it. When in addition we have reason to believe that o (the other person) wishes to hide his enjoyment, our grounds for suspicion become firmer. Perhaps liking x (an object) is not quite proper, or it may imply that o is obligated for the benefit, or it may signify a giving in, a confession that o was in error in anticipating dissatisfaction. (Heider, 1958, p. 137)

Heider, a contributor to the rapid cognitivization of psychology in the mid-1950's, was particularly sensitive to misappraisals of pleasure. His theory is more a theory about the conditions under which pleasure can be perceived than it is a comprehensive phenomenology of pleasure. But even this heavily theoretical piece affords a richer view of the complexity of pleasurable experience than one commonly finds in theory. In Heider's theory, there is a realization that pleasure cannot be accounted for by a single

theoretical or conceptual idea. Heider, commenting on theories of enjoyment, remarks that a theory based only on consumption is incomplete:

According to this analogy, enjoyment but not desire involves some kind of consummatory process. This model is obviously taken from the consumption of food in which the goal activity implies the destruction of the object involved. It is questionable, however, and especially alien to the thinking of naive psychology, that consumption is an adequate general term. What is consumed when a person takes pleasure in benefiting someone he likes or buying something attractive? There may be many wishes that involve another person or thing but where nothing is really consumed. With food, as it happens, the most typical activity is consumption, but even there, other activities are possible. A person might enjoy cooking food. Does he consume the cooking? (p. 139)

The theory of consumption as indiscriminate "eating" which underlies much of the earlier psychological thinking about motivation and much economic theory as well is considered demonstrably insufficient. For Heider, pleasure is not only eating, but cooking; not only ownership, but also admiration; not only success, but the anticipation of success. A person can experience, says Heider, "the pleasure of an event that has virtually occurred" (p. 139). Pleasure is not accounted for by a unified, streamlined theory. It is multi-theoretical.

Heider's approach has a parallel in an earlier phenomenological analysis of pleasure, one which is quite obscure in psychology, and one which he did not cite directly in that chapter. Many of the ideas that Heider expressed in his postulates appear in Karl Duncker's 1941 article, "On Pleasure, Emotion, and Striving" (Duncker, 1941). This is truly a remarkable piece by any standard: most remarkable, from the standpoint of the history of psychology, is how little known it is.<sup>59</sup>

Duncker, well-known for his monograph on productive thinking and problem solving, has taken a place in psychological history as a theorist of cognition (Newell, 1985). His work on ethical relativity, like other Gestaltists' ethical theories, is not well known in psychology. In proposing his solution to the problem of the non-coherence of

the pleasure concept, he revived a disagreement in psychology which was livelier about 25 years earlier. Much of Duncker's article is cast as a debate between "hedonists" and "hormists," whose positions on pleasure he represented with two quotes from Aristotle. The hedonistic position, he said, was captured in this phrase from De Anima: "Desire is craving for the pleasant" (Duncker, 1941, p. 392). The hormist position, represented best, he said, by William McDougall, could adopt this phrase from the Nicomachean Ethics: "Pleasure is the consummation of activity" (p. 392).

Recall that the main current of psychological thinking in America had shifted, from 1890 to 1920, toward viewing pleasure as an emotion, as an effect peripheral to action, and as less conscious. Duncker quoted McDougall--who himself acknowledged the consciousness of pleasure--to show that pleasure was clearly a by-product, independent of the more important strivings, urges, or instincts which were said to be the real motivators of behavior:

Pleasure and pain result from the conation, are determined by the striving; pleasure, when the striving attains its natural goal, or progresses toward it; pain, when striving is thwarted or obstructed and fails to achieve, or progress toward, its goal. (McDougall, in Duncker, 1941, p. 393)

Duncker proposed that pleasure could be understood both ways: as a goal, and as the result of attaining a goal. Desire and pleasure were interrelated, Duncker maintained:

We are now ready to summarize the findings of our phenomenological analysis of desire: A (positive) desire consists of an act of anticipating--or putting oneself into--an as yet unreal situation which is aglow with an empathetical feeling-tone of pleasantness and which shows a tendency to become the real situation. This tendency may either be yielded to--in purposive action or in daydreaming--or it may be blocked by holding down (or aloof) the total anticipation. The real situation in desire is likely to be charged with an actual unpleasantness of want, which gives rise to a negative desire for relief. This unpleasantness of want may be a displeasure of need or a sorrow of want or both. If, however, there is likelihood of fulfillment, the situation becomes charged with a pleasant feeling tone (be it a joy of anticipation or a pleasant foretaste or both), which resides in the very process of looking forward to the anticipated enjoyment. Desire is not to be confused with "pursuit of enjoyment" which latter is directed toward pleasantness, which is not forefelt but only known. Pursuit of enjoyment seems to



be incompatible with the unimpaired existence of a sentiment for the object whose enjoyment is pursued. (Duncker, 1941, p. 425)

The concept of pleasure included both "hedonoid" and "hormoid" pleasures, arranged along a continuum.

In view of all the facts which have been mentioned, I propose to acknowledge the existence of a continuum extending from a "hedonoid" to a "hormoid" pole. If the case of the enjoyment of beefsteak and wine is a pretty "hedonoid" one, the case of sentiment is by all measures less hedonoid. In proportion as C (the cause of the pleasure) is my own present concern, so that I cannot well be expected to be able to "wait at the other end" for the pleasure derived from it, we shall call the case in question a "hormoid" one. In proportion as C and "I" belong to two different systems, so that I am able to "graze off the pleasure that grows on C," we shall speak of a "hedonoid" case. Now, the more hormoid (or the less hedonoid) a case is, the greater is the motivational and conscious prevalence of the qualitative or neutral side over the hedonic side. It may be counted as another confirmation of the existence of this polarity or dimension of difference that the hedonists have invariably tended to draw their examples and models of thought from the pole of sensory or aesthetic enjoyments, while the hormists have shown an equally marked predilection for cases that lie at the other end of the continuum. (p. 428)

Conceiving of pleasures sought in and for themselves, Duncker said, rested on a physiological or neural base which itself was not directed toward "pleasantness". The cause of pleasure was removed from the cognition of the pleasure. "It is of great import, however," he said, "to note that the underlying cause C, the organic or neural condition itself, is not in any sense directed toward pleasantness or away from unpleasantness" (p. 426). Motive, for Duncker, was neutral--an example of how far the present removal of "hedonism" from motivational mechanisms had come by 1941. But what the cause C instigated, as a cognitive phenomenon, was real:

For in desire, pleasure is part of the very objective or goal. (And if we raise at all the question of whether the hedonic component of the goal is more of a "goal" than is the other--the neutral or qualitative--component, we should probably have to admit that it makes less sense to say that we seek the pleasantness for the sake of the flavor in which it inheres, than to say that we seek the flavor for the sake of the pleasantness inhering in it.) At any rate, the outer object is here clearly sought as a means toward pleasant experience. When we come to "pursuit of enjoyment", however, the picture becomes a decidedly hedonistic one. For in this

case even C itself is sought as a means toward pleasant experience: we fan the appetite in order to enjoy the morsel. (Duncker, 1941, p. 426)

Duncker's phenomenological analysis of the "hedonoid" pleasures anticipates the theories of stimulus-seeking and intrinsic motivation which characterize the reaction against tension-reduction theories. "And why," Duncker's hedonist questioned his hormist opponent, "do we often accept as a substitute for one pastime another that has nothing in common with it but pleasure, i.e., one that is derived from a totally different source? The other day I met a little girl crying sadly because she was not to go on a ride. She accepted my piece of candy and was happy again. She might have forgotten the ride, but we ourselves often behave similarly without forgetting" (Duncker, 1941, p. 394).

Duncker's description of the "hormoid" pleasures corresponds well with the list of objections to hedonism which Allport presented in his brief history (mentioned here in Chapter 1). One of the points raised by Duncker's hormist in the debate closely parallels a similar point raised by William James in the Principles:

And then, are there not cases in which it is not only a hypothesis, but also an observable, a phenomenal fact that the pleasure springs from the very success of striving? There is what James has called a 'pleasure of achievement,' a joy that we have accomplished the thing, that we are making headway, that the obstacles are being surmounted, a joy of victory--and, corresponding to it on the negative side, there is a sorrow of failure, of defeat. I willingly admit that sometimes, in play, we strive and act for the joy of winning. But this does not do away with the fact that the pleasure comes from the very success of the striving. (Duncker, 1941, p. 396)

For Duncker, as for James, cases in which pleasure could not be seen as the absolute aim of action--reflexive behavior, behavior aimed at preserving life, acts of duty (altruistic or not)--were not arguments aimed at removing hedonism completely as a psychological phenomenon or as an ethical stance. These phenomena were, for both of them, intimately bound with whatever system produces feelings of pleasure and satisfaction. Duncker's analysis appears to make even sheer duty at least potentially

pleasurable. Only at the farthest extreme of the "hedonoid" end of the continuum, perhaps, does feeling cease to enter into the picture of behavior at all.

Duncker provided numerous observations, in the course of his article, on the psychological views of pleasure current at that time. At one point, he dismissed peremptorily the monotonic "tension-reduction" view in the same breath with the cranky and unreliable introspective analysis of feeling:

There have been attempts to interpret all pleasure as pleasure of relief from some unpleasantness or pain. Plato, in the dialogue Philebos, admitted at least one exception, the pleasure derived from beautiful colors, shapes, tones, etc., because one could forego them without pain; while von Frey, having discovered sense organs for pain, and not seeing how the same service could be rendered to pleasure, allowed himself to be carried away to the sweeping assertion that pleasure is nothing but relief from pain. Such theories belong in the same class as the theory that pleasure is nothing but a tending toward the object, or Nafe's statement that pleasure is--is, mind you, not goes with--a bright pressure in the upper chest region. Statements such as these are incompatible with elementary phenomenological observations. (Duncker, 1941, p. 419)

The study of pleasure usually fixes on the individual. Indeed, Howard Mumford Jones, in his survey of pleasure and happiness in American culture The Pursuit of Happiness (1953), held that modern psychology, in making individual comfort and ease a central focus, missed a central point. Happiness in culture, Jones believed, was bound up with social stability and harmony, things to which individualistically-oriented psychology did not contribute. As the history of the concept shows, psychology does have a tendency to concentrate on the individual animal or person satisfying personal desires. But in both Heider and Duncker, there is a recognition that at least some pleasures depend on the social relations of individuals. A further example of a "hedonoid" state from Duncker shows that social thinking, in terms of Lewinian fields, flowed in all levels of Gestalt theory:

Suppose you are invited to a party with other people who are all good friends among themselves. You are the only newcomer, and, as it happens, not at your best. You make attempts to join the group, to be a part of it, but somehow you

don't succeed. Gradually the situation becomes rather unpleasant for you. The natural way of getting out of this disagreeable situation would have been to succeed in your desire to join the party. But you don't succeed. And what do you do? You 'go out of the field', as K. Lewin would say; you destroy the very desire to join in, in order to escape the displeasure of being left out. I don't deny, mind you, that, speaking in the language of the hormist, the unpleasantness was the outcome of the frustration of a desire. All I want to say now is that it is also the origin of another, and totally different, desire which aims at nothing but relief from the unpleasantness caused by the first one. Our present case is in a strict sense opposite to the gourmet. The gourmet builds up an appetite in order to enjoy the pleasure from its satisfaction. In the present case it is a matter of destroying an appetite in order to escape the displeasure of its frustration. (Duncker, 1941, p. 395)

Since McDougall was interested in social phenomena, he may have had reason to devalue individual pleasure. It may also be that there is a pleasure asymmetry contained in psychology's conception of social versus individual behavior. It is noteworthy that today pleasure, when it is considered in social psychology, is considered usually in the situation of either the individual against a larger entity (either making an impression on a group, or selecting a commodity on the basis of social interaction) or within dyads or small groups. The most common phenomena studied in social psychology have a fairly negative tone: crowding, mass behavior, antipathy to helping, aggression, competition are examples. Even Duncker's example here focusses on the individual's experience, though it depicts a situation much more personally engaging than those depicted in other "social" approaches to the subject (e.g., Davis's study above.) Duncker's and Heider's analyses might represent another reason why pleasure is not frequently considered among the main concepts of psychology. The tone of their theoretical and phenomenological studies runs counter to the usual negative view of social behavior in American psychology.

Duncker's monograph is similar to Heider's theoretical analysis of pleasure in another way. Although the descriptions are sometimes terse, the variety of examples of pleasant experience that Duncker provides is extremely rich. One short example gives a hint of the density of Duncker's depiction of experience. Describing "joy," Duncker classified it into three types. Joys depending on sentiment were first distinguished from those which did not:

Whenever there is a sentiment, a devotion, a love for something, we respond with joy to any enhancement of the object. Its progress or victory is an enhancement of the loved cause, its thriving, happiness, and handsomeness is an enhancement of the loved child, its being successful or victorious is an enhancement of the loved self. Thus any sentiment is a potential soil of joy. Of all pleasures, the joys that spring from sentiments are the most "personal" ones. Examples of joys that do not, or need not, presuppose a sentiment are the so-called *joys of desire*, such as the joy at getting the good thing (joy of attainment), or the joy at the good thing's drawing nearer or being certain (joy of anticipation). (Duncker, 1941, pp. 402-403)

Then, joys which included the self were distinguished from those which do not, for which Duncker draws an example again from James:

A self-containing joy that contains the self in a more receptive way is the joy of being loved or recognized. The most notable species of self-containing joy is the *joy of success* (what James has called "pleasure of achievement"). This kind of joy is of particular significance for our discussion of the relationship between pleasure and striving, for it is the one case in which "success of striving" figures in the very object of the joy....It is unwise to merge into one generality such conspicuous differences as (1) the joy of *success*, in which my success in attaining the thing is enjoyed, (2) the joy of *attainment*, in which it is the attainment of the desired thing that is enjoyed without any active effort of mine having played a part, and (3) the joy of the very *thing* attained. (p. 403)

Finally, he drew a distinction between

the cognitive-emotional joys so far primarily considered and the *dynamical* joys. While in cognitive-emotional joys the pleasantness resides in an emotional consciousness that something we value has come about, dynamical joys are based upon a kind of experience that lies somewhere between emotion proper and sensation: the tensions, excitements, thrills, and reliefs of acting and resting. Here belong the delights of driving at high speed, of fishing and hunting, of playing games, of following a plot (e.g., in reading a good detective story), etc. It was not without some basis in observation that Wundt regarded excitement-quietness and tension-relaxation as dimensions of feeling (besides pleasantness-unpleasantness). They contain too much objective reference--excitement "about", tension "toward" something--and also too immediate an involvement of the self to be reduced to masses of organic sensations after the fashion of the James-Lange theory. (pp. 403-404)

"One cannot kill a difference" was Duncker's constant theme. Pleasure is not a single experience variable only in quantity and intensity, but a variety of unique, complex episodes of life:

All pursuit of ends lies somewhere between a sentiment's real absorption in the end itself, and the playful make-believe where, in Pascal's words, "on aime mieux la chasse que le prise." In joys of sentiment the experience is never the aim. In dynamical joys the experience is the aim of action, but while in progress, the activity demands the aiming at some objective end. In sensory pleasure the experience is the aim in every respect. Hedonism is prone to overlook these fundamental differences. (Duncker, 1941, p. 404)

Beautiful and elegant as they are, Duncker's and Heider's phenomenological and theoretical analyses of pleasure remain in the background of psychology. Other attempts to make sense of the diversity of pleasures may be more familiar to Americans. Abraham Maslow's psychology is most familiarly referred to as a "heirarchy of needs." One could also call his scale of behaviors a "heirarchy of gratifications" or "heirarchy of pleasures." In the appendix to a 1948 article in the Journal of Personality, Maslow included, in a list entitled "Some Phenomena Which Are In Part Determined By Basic Need-Gratification":

1. Feelings of physical sating and glut--food, sex, sleep, etc., and, as *by-products*, well-being, health, energy, euphoria, physical contentment;
2. Feelings of safety, peace, protection, lack of danger and threat;
9. Satisfied beauty need, thrill, sensuous shock, delight, ecstasy, sense of symmetry, rightness, suitability, or perfection;
14. Improvement in values. Improvement in "taste" ;
15. Greater possibility of and greater intensity of pleasant excitement, happiness, joy, delight, contentment, calm, serenity, exultation; richer and more positive emotional life. (Maslow, 1948, p. 414)

Satisfaction of basic needs, Maslow reasoned, would cause higher needs, and consequent higher gratifications, to emerge in humans. The higher gratifications, some of which are mentioned above, seem to fit the criteria for a collection of pleasures. From the vantage point afforded by the Gestalt phenomenologies, Maslow's system looks similar,

although it does not map onto Duncker's system--the closest fit of the two Gestalt theories of pleasure described here--exactly. There is a similarity in that both of these bipolar systems seem to place aesthetic concerns at one end, and motivational ones at the other. But Duncker was, it appears, more interested in the degree of "hormoid" and "hedonoid" character that situations presented to consciousness, while Maslow's system, especially in its later version, relied more heavily on the distinction between tension-reduction and its opposites, a distinction that did not seem important to Duncker. (Later, by 1954, Maslow had divided the hierarchy into "deficit needs" and "growth needs".)<sup>60</sup> Also, Duncker's system does not make a firm distinction between "higher" and "lower" pleasures in the moral sense, which is a second way in which Maslow's scale can be read. Maslow's system describes types of behavior, rather than states of consciousness, and ranks them in terms of their acceptableness in a society.

Maslow was influenced by Gestalt psychology, if not by Duncker particularly. In the same paper, he argued against the diminishing effect of gratification over time, citing a list of Gestalt figures in support of his claim:

Furthermore, not only do gratification phenomena flout the "laws" of exercise and effect in spite of the fact that they are acquired changes in adaptation, but examination also shows that arbitrary association is not involved except in a secondary fashion. The task of need-gratification is almost entirely limited to intrinsically appropriate reinforcers. In the long run there can be no casual and arbitrary choice. For the love-hungry there is only one genuine, long-run satisfier, i.e., honest and satisfying affection. For the sex-starved, food-starved, or water-starved person, only sex, food, or water will ultimately serve. This is the sort of intrinsic appropriateness stressed by Wertheimer, Kohler, and other younger Gestalt psychologists, such as Asch, Arnheim, Katona, etc., as a central concept in all fields of psychology. (Maslow, 1948, p. 405)

"Gratification" and "satisfiers" are the keynotes of Maslow's 1948 version: at one point he remarks that "students of emotion have too long confined their studies to the affective effects of frustration" (p. 412). Some further evidence indicates that Maslow's system is a scale of pleasures, and that a conception of hedonism lies behind it. In 1942,

Maslow appeared to be unconvinced of hedonism, much as Kurt Goldstein was in 1940 (see Chapter 1, above). "I have no doubt," Maslow wrote then,

that one by-product of modern motivation theory and research will be the overthrowing once and for all of classical hedonistic theory. This is true for many reasons, but it is not necessary to be exhaustive. We need cite here only 2 points. The first is that drive fulfillment does not necessarily mean pleasure. To cite extreme examples we may use the compulsive-obsessive neurotic who is forced to do what he does, but gets only pain from doing it and who loathes himself to the bargain....A general point which is important, however, and needs to be stressed, is that the ultimate purpose that we know anything about is that of self-actualization, and we must point out that this strong desire will override all sorts of sacrifices, all sorts of pain. Any pleasure that is involved is epiphenomenal, incidental.<sup>61</sup>

Handwritten at the bottom of this typed note is the following remark: "Only a dog or a psychopath is controlled by reward and punishment alone. Stop feeding a dog & he disappears".

A brief note from around 1950 (judging from the typescript) entitled "Hedonism" comments on the lack, in psychology, of a phenomenology of pleasure--an interesting comment both on the status of the needs in the 1948 paper and on the obscurity of Duncker's analysis:

Failing phenomenological or other evidence that the different pleasure types (or need-gratification types) are subjectively different from each other (and not only *pragmatically* different) I shall postpone consideration of this question by speaking of pleasure as *only* subjective, and qualify it by specifying the nature of the need satisfied, basic-need-gratification-pleasure, etc. We know the *consequences* of these pleasures to be different; perhaps the pleasures themselves are also different.<sup>62</sup>

Maslow turned more toward seeing pleasure as connected with healthy existence. Those who had fulfilled basic needs could experience better-quality pleasure:

In general the main vulnerability of hedonism lies in the easy demonstration that some pleasures are obviously bad for the person, that some are bad for others, that some goods do not bring the pleasure they should bring, etc. But it seems to this



writer that this amounts ultimately to saying no more than that hedonism fails to work in sick, neurotic people. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that whatever knowledge the writer has about healthy people indicates that for sick people these easy criticisms do not work. In a work, for healthy people, pleasure, desire, taste, seems to be a pretty good and efficient guide to needs and to the organism's tendency to self-actualize. In a word although hedonism may not work for sick people, for neurotic people or for people living at a low reality level, it may yet work after suitable modifications for healthy people living in a good world. (Eupsychia), to a degree far greater than now suspected.<sup>63</sup>

What appears to have occurred during the 1940's was Maslow's shift from a negative to a positive valuation of pleasure. In 1942, he was referring to Kurt Goldstein, who was somewhat antihedonistic. Maslow cited, in his 1948 paper, Erich Fromm, who supplied an unsystematic catalogue of pleasures in Man For Himself (1947), along with a strong argument against conscious, rational evolutionary hedonism. Maslow appeared to be more friendly to non- or anti-hedonistic Freudian and Gestalt interpretations of pleasure at the beginning. But those theories' implicit equation of hedonism with tension reduction moved Maslow, over time, to postulate a complementary concept. One handwritten note (undated) compares the Freudian "low Nirvana" of "blankness" with the "high Nirvana": in the "low Nirvana," "all one can hope for, the best one can get, is an absence of pain, of fear, danger, upset, etc."<sup>64</sup>

Maslow's later view of pleasure was linked to his distinction between b- and d-values in life generally. In a draft series of twelve postulates about hedonism in February, 1951, postulates six through twelve indicate the conditions under which true pleasure might be experienced:

6. In order to avoid means-end confusion to know which are in fact the ends of the organisms as defined by its own choices, if it is healthy and permissive under permissive Taoist conditions.
7. This involves definitions of a) health and b) permissiveness as well as knowledge of the self choice experiments.
8. It is necessary to establish that the healthy organism under Taoist conditions wants (desires, needs) what is good-for-it.

9. The ultimate pleasure is self-actualization, expression, leading up to this is basic need-gratification.

10. Self-actualization theory must rest on reworking of frustration theory (different kinds of frustration for different kinds of needs and only basic need frustration --> psychopathology)

11. It must also rest on positive motivation theory contra need as tension-reduction, homeostasis.

12. Criticism of reward-punishment theory in favor of per se intrinsic reward is supplied by self-actualization theory so Hedonistic pleasure must be intrinsic.<sup>65</sup>

Point 8 is a recurrence of one of the tenets of the old evolutionary hedonism, a focus of Fromm's attack in 1947.

Maslow devoted effort to identifying individuals who represented the higher points on his pleasure scale, the "self-actualizing" individuals on whom he kept records and from whom he derived many of his ideas regarding the conditions of growth.<sup>66</sup> The next person to be mentioned here, currently active, has studied similar individuals and has reached a variety of conclusions about the psychological conditions which produce and maintain their activities. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, of the University of Chicago, has for the last twenty-five years been interested in the behavior and experiences of persons who are engaged in what he calls "autotelic" behaviors.

Csikszentmihalyi's approach is similar to Maslow's later work with "self-actualizers" in that he has chosen specific individuals working in professions conducive to the kind of behavior which he wants to study: that of artists (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1965), surgeons, rock climbers, and others whose activities involve a mixture of concentration and good feeling. He proposes that these individuals achieve, through the full extension of their learned skills and their attentional capacity, an experience which he calls "flow," an attunement to the task or activity which leads to the desire for more of the same experience. The sources from which Csikszentmihalyi draws his theory are familiar from earlier chapters here: he cites work on play which conceives of it as self-motivating and

enjoyable (not from those parts of the literature on play which consider it a preparation for something more valuable). To this he adds theories of "optimal motivation" including those of D. O. Hebb and D. E. Berlyne. Next, he cites the work of various social and motivational psychologists on the concept of "intrinsic motivation". Included among these are some experimentalists whose work he sees as miniaturized and laboratory-bound, as well as some of the foremost phenomenologists in psychology, including Maslow.<sup>67</sup>

Csikszentmihalyi's research is notable in that it blends quantification of experience with phenomenological study. He has pioneered the use of telemetry to monitor the ongoing process of thought in "autotelic" behavior, paging subjects by means of a "beeper" to ask them to fill in records of their mental life at random times during the day. His phenomenological approach involves, as did Duncker's and Maslow's, isolating dimensions of experience which contribute to its enjoyability--finding out which processes are more salient in individuals experiencing different types of "flow," his term for the state beyond pleasure in which a person is fully engaged in a life task. He and his co-workers have extended this approach to study not only "classic" autotelic behaviors but all sorts of behaviors which might be classed as "leisure" activities: one of his collaborators in the recent volume Optimal Experience (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) provides a phenomenology of sailing (Macbeth, 1988). Additionally, Csikszentmihalyi is one of the few researchers who has something positive to say about adolescence (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). He has adapted his "experience sampling" approach to identify those parts of adolescent life where this consuming interest in things might begin.

Certainly there are differences in each of these approaches: Duncker collated experiences from the middle range of pleasures, Maslow saw pleasure as ranging from very automatic and unconscious processes to highly developed skills and tastes, while

Csikszentmihalyi has focussed on one dimension of pleasurable experience, "captivation" or "fascination." But from the viewpoint of the history of the pleasure concept, their similarities outweigh their differences. All turned to phenomenological study to answer, in effect, James's question about the range and diversity of pleasurable experience. Thus they all adopted a method which has had less than an honorable reputation among psychologists. The experiences which they investigated (and in Csikszentmihalyi's case, still investigate) are not among those which are considered the most stirring: sailing is not a demanding problem, nor is driving. From the point of view of a concept of pleasure, they have indicated that it is possible to pursue pleasure as a subject of interest and find ordered diversity in it, rather than a undifferentiated motivating or emotional force.

The psychological phenomenology of pleasure, whether sporadic or systematic, forms a contrast to the view that pleasure is a secondary, unconscious, "merely motivating" presence in psychology. Pleasure can also be understood as the result of rational decision, and pleasurable experiences can be chosen out of a range of experiences at different levels of life. The phenomenological study of pleasure has added texture to the Gibsonian ground of pleasure as an inherent environmental invitation. Pleasure has a wide range. To this, American psychologists have added great depth.

### Pleasure as the Basis of Life

The concept of pleasure as rational and differentiable in experience may not seem particularly portentous. Pleasure, after all, is secondary, for many reasons, in psychology and probably in life. It may be interesting that psychologists have maintained that pleasures are of different kinds, and a connoisseur might appreciate another way of looking at experience, another way of obtaining some extra pleasure. But on the whole, it

does not seem that pleasure need be any more than a background consciousness, occasionally present at certain points in life, but more often than not submerged.

Motivational theory has come, over the century, to support certain observations made by connoisseurs about the movement of their emotions or thoughts, but has also moved psychology far away from simplified statements such as "pleasure is the aim of all behavior." It is clear, after all, that chemicals and neural interactions cause behavior. Pleasure, as a motivator, is a dying issue. So much may be quite true. Some form of hedonism as a way of life seems attractive only to a few connoisseurs who have either the natural talent or the trained skills to appreciate aesthetic experience or participate in it. Intellectual pleasures--insights and discoveries--are nice stories, and may be pleasant when they occur, but in general they occur rarely, and loom large perhaps only in the consciousness of psychologists. Sex may be reliably pleasurable when it occurs, but the general rule is that it becomes less pleasurable with time, that it's more trouble than it's worth, and that it is generally an unreliable experience on which to base one's life--except for connoisseurs, who are rare, and more often than not mistaken for immoral characters. It is right that lower stages of development be characterized as hedonistic. Morality depends on it. And so on. Another line of development in the American psychological approach to pleasure leads to a conclusion which makes these truisms seem less tenable. Since the beginning of the modern period, a number of psychologists have converged on the idea that pleasure might be connected with the reason for living.

Sometimes it seems that everything in American psychology begins with William James. This is of course not the case, but with regard to this part of the pleasure concept James is a most appropriate figure. James, it is now known, suffered from a bleak depression lasting a number of years when he was in his twenties. This condition became so acute that he was hospitalized for it in Boston in 1870. Four months afterward, in a manner similar to the way John Stuart Mill's depression over his perceived failure in life

lifted, James discovered a reason for living in Renouvier's philosophy (and, probably as Mill did, in Wordsworth's poetry).<sup>68</sup>

For the rest of his career, James made reference to depressive states as a contrast to states of high cognitive acuity. In the Principles (James, 1890), in the chapter on "Belief," he quotes Griesinger to amplify the point that the failure to achieve a state of real conviction may lead, not only to doubt, but to a failure of the whole system by which ideo-motor action is supported.<sup>69</sup> Dread and emptiness characterize the soul without belief.

In 1902, James published The Varieties of Religious Experience (James, 1902), a phenomenological analysis of religious states of consciousness. There, in a chapter on the "sick soul," he revealed the depth of the experience that compelled him to seek treatment. In the Varieties James introduces the term *anhedonia*, a coinage, he said, of Theodule Ribot. Specifically, it means "lack of pleasure," or the lack of the ability to feel pleasure. It is distinct from both *abulia*, or "lack of will," and *acedia*, "lack of striving." James made certain a description of this experience of cognitive rootlessness was introduced early in the chapter on "Belief" in the Principles. In the Varieties, the term is introduced and defined only sixteen pages before the supposed translation of the experience of a French patient who suffered "panic fear"--James's rendition, at one remove, of his own experiences.<sup>70</sup>

The term is found again in the Varieties, in the last chapter. There, James is searching for an expression of the source of vitality, or the motive of life. In the last chapter, James asked, regarding religious feelings:

To what psychological order do they belong?

The resultant outcome of them is in any case what Kant calls a 'sthenic' affection, an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, 'dynamogenic' order which, like any tonic, freshens our vital powers. In almost every lecture....we have seen how this emotion overcomes temperamental melancholy and imparts endurance to

the Subject, or a zest, or a meaning, or an enchantment and glory to the common objects of life. The name of 'faith-state,' by which Professor Leuba designates it, is a good one. It is a biological as well as a psychological condition, and Tolstoy is absolutely correct in classing faith among the forces *by which men live*. The total absence of it, anhedonia, means collapse. (James, 1902, pp. 504-505)

**Anhedonia** is a technical term, introduced for a specific purpose. On my reading, this passage clearly equates "pleasure" with "living," and non-pleasure with a group of experiences connected with the loss of mentation or the loss of life. Considering the other places where descriptions of the same symptoms appear in other places in the Varieties and in other places in James's works, it seems likely that "suicide" is one interpretation of the alternative to "zest," "lack of meaning" another, and "dread" still another.

The term anhedonia shifted over to psychiatry, in which it persisted through the period of doubt in psychology about the efficacy and consciousness of pleasure. There, its two main proponents were the Boston psychiatrist Abraham Myerson, and the psychoanalyst Sandor Rado. Myerson wrote about "the constitutional anhedonic personality" in articles in the 1920's, with a culminating statement on this in 1946 (Myerson, 1946). Rado introduced the term in a discussion of addiction in 1928, and continued to emphasize it into the 1960's.<sup>71</sup> It reappears in psychology in connection with another complex figure who stands on the border between three psychological traditions: learning theory, statistical analysis, and clinical psychology. This is Paul Meehl, an uncategorizable figure in the history of psychology. Early in his career, he published widely in the philosophy of science and the logic of learning theory (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948; Meehl, 1950). Somewhat less often, Meehl is remembered for his important 1954 work on clinical interpretation versus actuarial prediction in psychiatric diagnosis (Meehl, 1954). He authored a paper on the relation between personality or hereditary factors and schizophrenia in 1962 (Meehl, 1962). In this paper, he identified

one of the main characteristics of the "schizotypic" personality as "anhedonia"--the inability to experience pleasure.

The lack of pleasure connected with anhedonia has been referred to many clinical syndromes--James's and Ribot's original formulation of a global loss of meaning has been applied to phenomena in addictive behavior, in schizophrenia, and depression. It has become a modern clinical diagnosis, and, as such, does not enter into the non-clinical literature on affect or cognition.

In 1975, Meehl published a paper on anhedonia alone.(Meehl, 1975) in which he argued for a broader interpretation of the term. Anhedonia, the lack of ability to feel pleasure, while a clear feature of clinical presentations, is actually a personality variable, he said. For evidence of this, he appealed to observations of "organisms" whose fears, he said,

are insufficiently softened, attenuated, or, I may even say, impeded by adequate pleasure. Still, at the anecdotal level, people totally unlearned in technical psychodynamics are well aware that if you want, for instance, to discuss an emotionally-charged topic with a potential enemy, among the things you are well-advised to do is feed him and sex him and otherwise make him feel good, with the purpose of generating an overall psychological state that will be more or less incompatible with anxiety or rage. But, there is also the old "Wild West" maxim: "Some men are just born three drinks behind." (p. 298)

Clinical observation and statistical models converge, as Meehl demands that they do, on a trait which Meehl identifies as "hedonic capacity," which, when and if measured, he says will differentiate out those who are "born three drinks ahead" (compare James, "l'âme bien née") with those who cannot get a "kick" out of life. It is a personality variable, Meehl maintains, that is general, not limited to clinical populations. It has relatives in other personality inventories: Meehl equates it with Cattell's trait of surgency, which describes personalities which are optimistic, outgoing, and cheerful.<sup>72</sup> Persons who have low hedonic capacity, he conjectures, will often appear in clinics. Meehl considers these cases to be a form of what I term here "pleasureblindness," in the



same way that "colorblindness" relates to normal color perception. His solution to this is a plan of awareness training for individuals with a low hedonic capacity, so that they will realize that they are at risk for depression or other clinical effects of the condition, and so that they will more actively seek out experiences which will boost their hedonic level.

Other psychologists not mentioned by Meehl corroborate the claim that pleasure is associated with the highest grade of conscious experience. G. Stanley Hall, in his neglected late work from 1920 Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct, waxed Jamesian in a section on "morale and health":

The most universal greeting the world over consists in mutual inquiries about our health and perhaps even that of those nearest to us, if all assume its cardinal importance. Now, real health is not merely keeping out of the doctor's hands but its cult aims at keeping each at the very tip-tip of his condition so that he feels full of the joy of life (euphoria) and capable of doing or suffering anything if called to do so. Most of the world's work is done on a rather low hygienic level, but its great achievements, the culminating work of the leaders of our race, have been the product of exuberant, euphorious, and eureka moments, for a man's best things come to him when he is in his best state. (Hall, 1920, p. 31)

The pleasurable quality of the "best states" is affirmed by the use of a clear pleasure synonym, **euphoria**, a pleasure-term which often does not have positive connotations in psychology (see Chapter 4, below). Incidentally, the term "morale" was a predecessor of modern quantitative expressions for quality-of-life (e.g., "job satisfaction") especially in industrial settings. Karl Duncker included, in his phenomenology, a synopsis of Max Scheler's classification of feelings. Sensory feelings could be classified in seven ways, but they were only one class, and not the most important one. Duncker continued:

Scheler is right in assigning these sensory feelings to a relatively peripheral place or *stratum* within the total make-up of the emotional life. He is also right in differentiating them (as we have done) from what he calls the "vital feelings," e.g., vigor, fatigue, etc., which possess an immediate (phenomenal) reference to one's biological well-being and thus may be said to represent a less peripheral stratum of feelings. Both of these strata again are rightly distinguished from a still more

central, or "personal," stratum containing the joys are sorrows (cf. our cognitive-emotional experiences), as well as from that most central and least manageable stratum of happiness (Seligkeit) and despair. (Duncker, 1941, p. 407)

Earlier in his essay, Duncker described happiness as "pleasure which takes possession of one's whole being" (p. 405). And even Gordon Allport, not particularly friendly to the concept of pleasure or hedonism, had this to say after reviewing a number of disparate systems of motivation in connection with the concept of "functional autonomy" in his Personality in 1937:

If the dynamic psychologist finds in such a pluralistic system a displeasing lack of unity, he may, without damage to the principle of autonomy, fall back upon the elemental home. All motives--diverse as they are--*may* be regarded as so many channels of the original Will-to-Live. (Allport, 1937, p. 205)

Anhedonia, a concept founded on clinical phenomenological observation, adds depth to the breadth of observations such as Gibson's that the phenomenal world may be a thoroughly reinforcing one. Lose the ability to sense pleasure, and one loses the world and its meanings.

#### Summary: A Developing Concept of Conscious Pleasure

What may be said in summary about the phenomenal reality of pleasure which has been described by both the quantitative and qualitative sides of American psychology? First, it should be noted that there are very many impediments to the development of a phenomenology of pleasure. Psychology has been interested in explanation mainly, not description, over this first century of its development as science. It has cast its statements in general, lawlike terms, and has been sparing of illustrative examples.

Psychological theorizing about conscious pleasure has generally not emphasized the details of pleasurable experience. Pleasure has been placed in the background. There is a strong tendency to use portmanteau terms when defining pleasure. James's "interest" has

had a long career in psychology, and other terms have acquired a similar cohering function: reinforcement, gratification, satisfaction are examples. While such terms indicate the presence of a coherent concept of pleasure, they are not much help in describing it. In much cognitive-behavioral psychology, for example, "delay of gratification" is an important conceptual pillar. But gratification is meant to cover all sorts of gratifying experiences: what these are is left up to the interpreter of the theory. Psychological theory in which pleasure is a component--psychological hedonism in a broad sense--often leaves the experiential consequences open and undefined.

A provisional solution to the problem of the quality of the experience of pleasure emerges the combination of quantitative and phenomenological approaches to pleasure. Psychology, especially its quantitative side, has emphasized that conscious pleasure is knowable, in several ways. The person experiencing pleasure will experience it dynamically. Contrasts between experiences will be important. Interpersonal and intrapersonal considerations of expected value and other situational determinants will need to be taken into consideration. It has economic aspects: it demands decision and choice. Emotion and cognition have grown closer together: the management of emotions has become a cognitive affair. Along with this, the scale of pleasurable experiences has proved amenable to orderly psychological classification.

This combination of ideas is not greatly different from the combination in Plato or Epicurus. A workable personal philosophy of moderation and enjoyment--should one choose that as one's hedonic attitude--is certainly compatible with these elements. But American psychology has offered one new dimension also, which makes the choice of hedonic style appear much more important and basal. The repeated theme of anhedonia, the lack of pleasure as the lack of life, has grown steadily in our soil over the past century. Clinical testimony suggests that pleasure is the basis of meaning; lack of it means not unpleasantness, as the classic continua of emotion indicate, but psychic

abandonment and emptiness. This biological dimension, along with what has been discovered in the past century about the real relation of pleasure and addictions, and the natural causes of pleasure, provides a ground of fate and power on which this rationality rests.

Conscious pleasure is a concept on the verge of appearance in American psychology. An important development regarding pleasure over the past century is its slow detachment from the old bipolar formula of "pleasure-pain." Both pain and pleasure can now be considered as separate systems (and separate sets of phenomena), without the necessity of postulating painfulness in the absence of pleasure, or the reverse. As mentioned, pain research carries on in relative independence of the work on appetite. The work on anhedonia suggests that the failure of the systems which support pleasurable experience to deliver this result not in pain, but in a global effect which weakens the structure of cognition in general. The findings of central dimensions of pleasure in the analysis of semantics (both in the semantic and emotional traditions) supports the idea that some affective level is operative in all apprehension. Some recent work on the biochemistry of affective disorders supports older ideas of pleasure having two phases, an appetitive and a consummatory one, an idea on which the findings of phases in sexual enjoyment, artistic and aesthetic contrast, and appetite all appear to support. Additionally, pleasure itself is at least bipolar in structure. Duncker's "hormoid-hedonoid" distinction, the division of pleasures into "deficiency" and "growth" classes by Maslow, and various blends of arousal, interest, and intelligence lead to the essential idea that pleasure is "getting" and "having," or perhaps "achieving" and "appreciating," in a succession of phases.

This, in rough outline, is the concept of conscious pleasure which lies underneath the schools and systems of our psychology. Considering these first three chapters as a summary of the progress of the development of psychological hedonism, we see that as a historical phenomenon it is not easy to include in our history. For it really does not

represent any one school's thinking, nor does it represent a "strong paradigm." Scientists from the ultraquantitative to the ultraqualitative have been involved, although on balance it appears that those who treat pleasure seriously as a subject appear to be integrators and not easily placed in "fields." The constraints sketched in Chapter 2 seem not to have affected the development of a concept so much as they have affected its diffusion into psychology. The exact process by which ideas diffuse is not known: one knows only that constraints of a general nature have existed.

Closer examination of the texture of the results of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches reveals that pleasure has been considered a problem worth solving by many groups of psychologists. From the side of the history and theory of psychology only, this is a significant finding. For we are still accustomed to think of psychology in terms of divisions or systems, and unused to thinking of psychology working as a whole on common issues. Undoubtedly our other psychological problems have this same broad distribution, and what they really are will become clear when the disciplinary lines are erased and the problems alone are considered.

The most available reason for this concept not figuring more prominently in the history of psychology is that the developments which have coalesced to form it have all grown into maturity since 1954. And the pattern for our history was set a long time before this. As things are developing in psychology at present, we may not be able to label all of the hybrids that are emerging. So the history of this concept is in a sense the history of what psychology has become after a hundred years, an interlocking set of studies of phenomena, very much a science--so far as we are able to focus on one phenomenon at a time.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE PROMOTION OF PLEASURE

In Chapter 1, two dimensions of hedonism were introduced: psychological and philosophical hedonism. Through Chapter 3, aspects of the development of the concept of psychological hedonism were traced. So far, the other dimension of the concept of pleasure--the estimation of its value--has been only obliquely touched. The tendencies toward making pleasure less significant and less clear in psychology certainly imply a general negative valuation of the concept. What psychology chooses to study, and the degree of emphasis it gives these choices, are indirect indicators of value. So psychological hedonism and philosophical hedonism are already linked in one way within American experimental psychology.

The few psychologists who have treated the history of the pleasure concept have usually assumed that psychological and philosophical hedonism split apart after 1890. Henceforth, it is implied, discussion of philosophical questions about hedonism was carried on in areas outside of "technical psychology". Thus Allport, in 1954, observed that questions about pleasure inevitably became political questions. Speaking about Utilitarian ethics, he said:

Our point is that laissez-faire was in part the consequence of a psychological theory, and in part a product of a prevailing social ethos. The thinking of Bentham, Mill, Spencer, and other hedonists was inevitably molded by the prevailing practices of the era of the industrial revolution. Their psychological theory meshed into the social situation of the day, and became to some extent what Marx and Engels and Mannheim called ideology. (Allport, 1954, p. 11)<sup>73</sup>

The comprehensive psychologies--philosophical psychologies, actually--of the nineteenth century may have diffused more easily into general intellectual culture. The concept of pleasure in American psychology in this century appears to have had less success in migrating into other fields. One can find some discussion of ideas emerging from American psychology within philosophy. For instance, there is some interest, in philosophy, in Kohlberg's and Piaget's theories of moral development. There is not much discussion of hedonism by psychologists in philosophical journals. Philosophers seem content to carry on without psychology in their discussions of the components of the good life.

The discussion of philosophical hedonism by psychologists is not found in philosophy. Can it be found in other fields, such as economics, political science, and other social sciences? To a certain extent, yes, although it appears that, if anything, these fields have affected psychology more than psychology has affected them. Each of these fields has a "pleasure problem" similar to that in psychology, yet even less visible, since they are all at one remove, at least, from a consideration of individual conscious experience. In fringe areas of economics, for example in the study of tastes and their relation to consumption, some borrowing occurs. The best extended example of this is found at present in Tibor Scitovsky's The Joyless Economy (Scitovsky, 1976), in which a combination of opponent-process motivational theory and Berlyne's reinforcement-based aesthetics is used to examine the dynamics of consumer choice and taste.<sup>74</sup> And there are some other figures in economics who care less for academic boundary lines than do most psychologists.<sup>75</sup> For several decades there have been institutionalized interdisciplinary efforts in the social sciences in which psychologists have taken part.<sup>76</sup> The question whether psychologists speak more forcefully about pleasure in their interdisciplinary presentations than they do within their own field is an interesting one, which I cannot answer fully at present. For the most part, however, interdisciplinary cooperation is a new idea in psychology. Collections of work that result from interdisciplinary

cooperation are usually aggregates, not integrated wholes. Psychology has expended much effort in drawing its boundary lines, and once set they are not easily crossed.

Recently, Jill Morawski (1982) has described one way in which psychologists' valuations of pleasure have been disseminated. Psychologists have created literary Utopias which form a parallel to their scientific efforts. This utopian writing served, in the early part of this century, as a vehicle for conveying of their hopes and concerns about the direction the application of psychology would take. From the point of view of a concept of pleasure, there is nothing more clearly a statement of a pleasurable life's dimensions than a positive Utopia. And psychologists did not write negative ones.

Morawski's thesis raises some questions about the pattern of the dissemination of psychological ideas. For one thing, Morawski clearly indicates that these Utopias are "forgotten" ones. This is evident: in Howard Segal's recent Technological Utopianism in American Culture (1985), notable for the completeness of its bibliography, none of these contemporary psychological proposals are discussed, or even mentioned. It may be that these Utopias served the function of a "confessional" for psychologists committed to maintaining a non-philosophic, value-free, rational scientific stance. Then, too, Morawski's thesis prompts the impression that psychologists, in expressing their values, choose forums outside of disciplinary practice. Psychologists' Utopias, and perhaps a good part of their applied efforts as well, do not form part of the "scientific" literature and data of psychology. While this may be true of many of the utopian writings she mentions, it is not true of all psychological Utopias, nor of applied psychology. Indeed, it is over "applied" issues that the internal politics of psychology has turned for the past seventy-five years, at least. Science and practice are closely associated in psychology, as they must be in any scientific endeavor. Science and practice hold many values in common, and differ on some others, but the important thing is that they are each value-laden. Their interpermeating literatures reflect this. Psychological science, perhaps closer to its applications than other sciences, is not value-free in this part, at least.



Expressions of valuation may exist in psychologists' literary works, in their "extrapsychological" works, and in applied psychology. But this may be as far as psychologists go in expressing their views on conscious pleasure's desirability. Psychologists' extracurricular activities may be the outlet for statements about pleasure which cannot be made in their formal publications as research scientists.

Suppose for a moment that the primary activity of psychological research scientists is the discovery of facts and laws, and that any interest they may have in values is incidental. On this view, experimental psychology is largely value-free. What is communicated in its research reports and theories is information, not evaluation. Turning to the subject of pleasure, one finds that this picture is not an accurate one. There is valuation implicit even in the communication of the research results. The study of pleasure is subject to a preliminary dampening by the forces of asymmetry and homogenization implicit in experimental assumptions about it. Beyond this, the communications of "fact" which emerge after this prior filtering describe a considerable range of "hardness" or believability. For example, the phenomenal facts of the ebb and flow of pleasure in consciousness are paralleled reasonably well by psychophysiological and psychopharmacological findings. They are firm, if not hard, facts. Other pleasure facts, while interesting, are less strongly supported. Meehl's "hedonic capacity," for example, is an interesting conjecture which appears ultimately verifiable. But it does depend on one's belief in the phenomenon of anhedonia, and some clinical phenomena, hypnosis for example, are still barely accepted as evidence in some regions of psychology. A fact connected with a phenomenon which must, as William James described it, be "felt to be believed,"<sup>77</sup> may find an indifferent reception among unbelievers. Research such as Davis's work on physical "pleasuring," Epstein's and others' taxonomies of emotion, and sex research in general have varying degrees of statistical support. They are interesting also, but like most psychological experimentation

represent provisional findings in need of further work. There are gradations of believability and strength in what is accepted in as "fact" pertaining to pleasure.

"Fact" in psychology is of course not absolute. Some former pleasure facts, or at least strongly argued hypotheses, have become less tenable over time. For example, tension-reduction, once considered a basic fact, is no longer the widely-accepted assumption that it was in 1935. Much of psychology's presentation of fact, even in the research literature, rests on provisional data. So, one cannot say that quantitative results are simply a report of the facts. Reports of experiments suggest improvements or promote dissension. Provisional findings are persuasive enticements, and persuasion is a species of rhetoric: the implicit valuation of pleasure in the presentation of experimental results bends psychological thinking toward or away (most often away) from pleasure.

There are more direct ways to speak about the value of a philosophy or a style of life. Classical hedonism blends psychological and philosophical hedonism together: it is both behavioral theory and moral exhortation. Psychology's relation to pleasure is the same: pleasure is equally a physical phenomenon and a moral issue. Psychologists do not often become moral philosophers and speak to psychology "from outside." What psychologists say about pleasure in a moral and valuational sense is not an external commentary on its experimental work. Rather, it is embedded in psychological practice and ordinary psychological discourse. The presentation of results and theory is not entirely free of moral suasion. Occasionally, the language used in presenting or commenting on "findings of fact" leaves the bounds of scientific sobriety and ascends to rhetorical heights. Other psychological writings are more clearly exhortative. Pleasure is praised (or damned) without reference to specific facts. But, since psychologists' more clearly rhetorical discourse remains within the discipline as well, many of these valuations are expressed in psychology's internal literature--in its generalist journals, in textbooks, and in theoretical statements. The line between psychological and philosophical hedonism in psychology is a fine one, and easily crossed.

### Public Psychological Pleasure Promotion

If there is little movement toward other fields by psychologists, there is certainly a movement within psychology to expand psychology's influence outward into society. Psychology's "applied" side, clinical and non-clinical alike, has come to outgrow its "scientific" one. Along with this an official commitment to social action has developed throughout the modern period. The charter of the American Psychological Association in 1968 expressed psychology's impetus toward "improvement" (American Psychological Association, 1968):

The objects of the American Psychological Association shall be to advance psychology as a science and as a means of promoting human welfare by the encouragement of psychology in all its branches in the broadest and most liberal manner; by the promotion of research in psychology and the improvement of research methods and conditions; by the improvement of the qualifications and usefulness of psychologists through high standards of professional ethics, conduct, education, and achievement; by the increase and diffusion of psychological knowledge through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications; thereby to advance scientific interests and inquiry, and the application of research findings to the promotion of public welfare. (p. xii)

It is clear that psychology's institutional stance is directed toward making the world a more pleasant place, at least as far as the term "welfare" can be construed as equivalent to "pleasure." This passage was quoted by George Miller, in his presidential address to that association in September, 1969. In that address, Miller proposed "giving psychology away" to fulfill the charter's aims:

Our responsibility is less to assume the role of experts and try to apply psychology ourselves than to give it away to the people who really need it--and that includes everyone. The practice of valid psychology by nonpsychologists will inevitably change people's conception of themselves and what they can do. When we have accomplished that, we will have really caused a psychological revolution. (Miller, 1969, p. 1071)

Revolution aside, it is apparent that Miller envisioned no small part for psychology as an influence on society. He sketched two images that scientific psychology could have of its social role. His first image was of a psychology based on behavior control through reinforcement.

The first image...has great appeal to an authoritarian mind, and fits well with our traditional competitive ideology based on coercion, punishment, and retribution. The fact that it represents a serious distortion of scientific psychology is exactly my point. In my opinion, we have made a mistake by trying to gain acceptance for science within the framework of this ideology. (Miller, 1969, p. 1069)

His second image was, he said, much less clear:

The second image rests on the same psychological foundation, but reflects it more accurately; it allows no compromise with our traditional social ideology. It is assumed, vaguely but optimistically, that this ideology can be modified so as to be more receptive to a truer conception of human nature. How this modification can be achieved is one of the problems we face; I believe it will not be achieved if we continue to advertise the control of behavior through reinforcements as our major contribution to the solution of social problems. I would not wish to give anyone the impression that I have formulated a well-defined social alternative, but I would at least like to open a discussion and make some suggestions. (p. 1069)

His suggestions, based on Douglas McGregor's conception of the polarities of motivation, followed:

My two images are not very different from what McGregor once called Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X is the traditional theory which holds that because people dislike work, they must be coerced, controlled, directed, and threatened with punishment before they will do it. People tolerate being directed, and many even prefer it, because they have little ambition and want to avoid responsibility. McGregor's alternative Theory Y, based on social science, holds that work is as natural as play or rest. External control and threats are not the only means for inspiring people to work. People will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which they are committed; their commitment is a function of the rewards associated with the achievement of their objectives. People can learn not only to accept but to seek responsibility. Imagination, ingenuity, and creativity are widely distributed in the population, although these intellectual potentialities are poorly utilized under the conditions of modern industrial life. (pp. 1069-1070)

These passages from Miller's presidential address demonstrate some aspects of psychology's concept of conscious pleasure as translated into action. Miller depicts reinforcement theory--whose pleasure, as we have seen, was only ambiguously conscious--as a "bad" alternative. To this he opposes a "good" one, one in which the thing which is sought is vague, yet optimistic in character. Had he been writing in 1909 instead of 1969, he might have contrasted his two alternatives in terms of their general "hedonic tone." Instead, he described his second alternative in terms of a group of pleasant alternatives: inspiration, reward, achievement, ingenuity, and creativity. All of these form a "positive affect" scale similar to Epstein's in Chapter 3 above, and have all been associated with pleasure in the history of psychology. That these pleasures ought to be conscious ones are supported by a remark earlier in the address, in which Miller quoted Nevitt Sanford:

If the assumption that behavior control is feasible in some precise scientific sense becomes firmly rooted in public psychology, it could have unfortunate consequences, particularly if it is coupled with an assumption that control should be exercised by an industrial or bureaucratic elite. Psychologists must always respect and advocate the principle of *habeas mentem*--the right of a man to his own mind (Sanford, 1955). If we really did have a new scientific way to control human behavior, it would be highly immoral to let it fall into the hands of some small group of men, even if they were psychologists. (Miller, 1969, p. 1068)

In 1985, in his contribution to the Koch and Leary volume A Century of Psychology as Science, Miller (1985) termed consciousness "the constitutive problem of psychology".

Statements like Miller's are not infrequent within psychology: not only in utopian literature are utopias proposed. J. G. Beebe-Center introduced The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness with an appeal to welfare:

An adequate understanding of the conditions of pleasantness and unpleasantness would constitute not merely an advance of psychology, but a contribution to human welfare. However diverse they may be, all systems of ethics agree that some form of well-being should be the lot of mankind.... True, mere knowledge of the conditions of pleasantness and unpleasantness would be far from sufficient to

bring about universal well-being. Pleasantness is in all likelihood but one aspect of well-being. Besides, there would always remain the problem of application. Acquisition of this knowledge, however, would undoubtedly constitute a definite step toward the achievement of this end. (Beebe-Center, 1932, pp. v-vi.)

A much later and more public position on the pleasure issue shows the growth in psychologists' confidence in their pleasure concept. In 1988, the American Psychological Association, rife with internal tension, split into two groups, which may be roughly characterized as "scientists" and "practitioners." The new "scientific" offshoot formed its own association, the American Psychological Society. Its May 1989 newsletter, the APS Observer, contained a two-page spread entitled "Psychology's Funding Priorities: Advice for the Bush Administration," which contained statements by "well-known research-oriented psychologists" (p. 6) who were questioned about government funding priorities for psychology. Here is one of the replies, by Lewis Lipsitt:

The Behavior Sciences should now be center-stage in funding priorities. More young people die now or become debilitated from behavioral misadventures, like accidents, suicide, and homicide than from all diseases combined. Such behavioral events occur from a confluence of causes including excessive drinking, drug-taking, dangerous sex, driving fast, or through group hostilities like warfare. Preventing such public health scourges requires a finely-honed psychological research base. We must truly soar in knowledge about motivation, learning, emotional development, *pleasure promotion* and avoidance of annoyance, memory, decision making, and other processes relating to impulsivity, antisocial functioning, self-esteem, inhibition, and all forms of behavior control. (Lipsitt, 1989, p. 7, my emphasis)

Lipsitt's comment is interesting, from the standpoint of the concept of pleasure, not only because of its overtly promotional tone but also because it contains a good deal of the "hedonic asymmetry" described in the preceding two chapters. Here, pleasure seems to be a thing to be investigated so that better ways of avoiding it can be found. Fast driving--which Karl Duncker (1941) called a "joy," which Mary Henle (1956) considered an "activity in the goal region," and to which Bertrand Russell compared thinking (Matson, 1966)--is a "destructive drive" here.

The psychological pleasure concept--provisional as it is--is to figure in psychology's applied efforts. There appears to be some conviction on the part of psychologists that such a concept exists, so far as the application of psychology is concerned. Both Lipsitt's and Miller's statements indicate that part of psychology may be responding to what Edward Shils (1974) called a "populistic progressive hedonism," which he saw as one of the foundations of the popular faith in science. Psychology has reacted to this impulse in several ways. It has created fields which answer cultural pressures for a comfortable and enjoyable life and thus contributes to the spreading of this "hedonistic" umbrella over American culture. No one will argue or vote against improvement, betterment, health, and other terms which carry pleasant connotations. Psychology has responded by associating with established fields which promote health, comfort, job satisfaction, and other improvements in the quality of life. In some cases, it has created its own fields--health psychology and environmental psychology, for two examples.

The direct contribution of academic psychology to this generalized hedonism is not easily estimable. Studies of motivation, reward, and other pleasure-related subjects are conducted in settings outside of the psychological establishment. They have effects there, as well as on psychology's internal community. In research reports, there is little restraint in the use of "pleasant" to describe all sorts of situations and effects. But most of the experimental reports are read only by psychologists (if at all). Miller, from 1969, again:

Lectures suitable for graduate seminars are seldom suitable for laymen, and for a layman facing a concrete problem they are usually worse than useless. In order to get a factory supervisor or a ghetto mother involved, we must give them something they can use. Abstract theories, however elegant, or sensitivity training, however insightful, are too remote from the specific troubles they face....The techniques involved are not some esoteric branch of witchcraft that must be reserved for those with PhD degrees in psychology. When the ideas are made sufficiently concrete and explicit, the scientific foundations of psychology can be grasped by sixth-grade children. (Miller, 1969, p. 1073)

Whether the results of pleasure study contribute more to the development of a pleasure concept within psychology or to a pleasure climate outside of it is not clear. As far as a pleasure theory goes, some fields enter the applied arena with more developed concepts and measuring instruments than others. For instance, in the field of environmental design, concepts stemming directly from research on informational aesthetics have occasionally been put to use.<sup>78</sup> And numerous attempts to change behavior for the better have been made "in the field," which rely on self-reported happiness or positive affect as a dependent measure of success (along with the major behavioral measures). Psychology says that it can improve things, but evaluation of this improvement is always difficult.

Parts of the psychological pleasure concept have occasionally detached from the comprehensive concept and have entered "real life," usually in the form of popular and semi-popular books which promote a single aspect of the concept. Thus Olds's work on positive reinforcement centers was followed by Delgado's The Physical Control of Behavior (Delgado, 1969) and Campbell's The Pleasure Centers (Campbell, 1973), and the growing literature on addiction was accompanied by Positive Addictions in 1976 (Glasser, 1976).<sup>79</sup> Some other works collate all sorts of pleasure phenomena, pleasure theories, and pleasure advice into texts aimed at the "self-help" market, always a prominent one in America. Manuals for the improvement of self-esteem, sexual response, and other parts of the spectrum of pleasurable experience proliferate.<sup>80</sup> Possibly owing to this unsystematic dissemination of leading ideas in the concept of conscious pleasure (and to a good deal of luck), there might be, as Gardella (1985) has noted, more pleasure in America now than 150 years ago. And, perhaps there might be some influence of psychology on the pleasure concept in American culture in general. But measurement of this is practically impossible.



The popular hedonistic faith in science and technology is mirrored in the relation seen by psychologists between pleasure and technology. Miller expressed psychology's strong technological spirit in his address:

We are in serious need of many more psychological technologists who can apply our science to the personal and social problems of the general public, for it is through them that the public will eventually discover the new paradigm that psychologists are developing. That is to say, it is through the success of such practical applications that we have our best hope for revolutionizing public psychology. (Miller, 1969, p. 1072)

Connections between the idea of psychological technology and pleasure or happiness are frequent throughout the modern period. James McKeen Cattell expressed his vision of the usefulness of psychology at a dinner of the Society of Arts and Sciences in February, 1930:

The placing of individuals in the situations in which they act in the way most desirable for them and most useful for society is surely an undertaking the value of which can scarcely be overstated. If everyone, from the feeble-minded child to the man of genius, were permitted to do the work that he can do best and were trained to do it in the best way, happiness would be increased on a scale for which we have as yet no units of measurement, the annual production of wealth would perhaps be doubled. (Cattell, 1930/1947, p. 489)

The connection between technology and pleasant life is very apparent in the work of B. F. Skinner, who up until this point has been a marginal figure in this story. The conscious quality of Skinner's "pleasure" is, like that of other behavioristic pleasure concepts, ambiguous. Skinner has been a figure in psychology for the last sixty years, and his concepts have undergone evolution. In the '30's, "pleasure" seldom appeared in Skinner's work. In 1953, his tone was the same as Keller and Schoenfeld's from 1950 (see Chapter 1):

An alternative approach (to the redundancy of describing a pleasant thing in terms of its reinforcing qualities--author's note) is to define "pleasant" and "unpleasant" (or "satisfying" and "annoying") by asking the subject how he "feels" about certain events. This assumes that reinforcement has two effects--it strengthens behavior and generates "feelings"--and that one is a function of the other. But the

functional relation may be in the other direction....In any case, the subject himself is not at an especially good point of vantage for making such observations. "Subjective judgements" of the pleasantness or satisfaction provided by stimuli are usually unreliable and inconsistent. As the doctrine of the unconscious has emphasized, we may not be able to report at all upon events which can be shown to be reinforcing to us or we may make a report which is in direct conflict with objective observations; we may report as unpleasant a type of event which can be shown to be reinforcing. Examples of this anomaly range from masochism to martyrdom. (Skinner, 1953, p. 82)

Here Skinner invoked the "unconscious" to explain the basic unreliability of subjective reports of pleasure--the same explanation, interestingly enough, that Erich Fromm used to argue against rational hedonism in Man For Himself (1947). By 1986, however, Skinner was able to report that feelings are not outside of the purview of a science of behavior, and that the distinction between the "pleasing" and "strengthening" effects of reinforcement were important factors to consider in designing a culture--a reflection of the ideas of Thorndike from fifty or more years earlier (Skinner, 1986).

Skinner has been inconstant about pleasure's consciousness, but he has always held that the goal of psychology is to establish a "technology of behavior," a phrase often seen in his works. Skinner's Walden II (1948) is one of the most successful Utopias of modern times, although it is often seen as a dystopic vision. In his implicit meliorism and his overt espousal of a technological psychology, Skinner has ties to earlier figures in the history of psychology. Skinner's meliorism, like his latter-day conception of "pleasing" feeling, has a parallel in E. L. Thorndike's fusion of evolutionary hedonism and William James's pragmatic meliorism in his "Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will" (Thorndike, 1908). Thorndike's technological side was expressed, as that side was by very many early psychologists and as it has been by Skinner, in a movement toward education.<sup>81</sup>

Another connection between technology and pleasure is found in Leonard Troland's conception of "complete technology." Troland, whose psychological hedonism served as the basis for Tolman's antihedonistic critique (Chapter 1), proposed to integrate

psychology and ethics through "complete technology." In his Fundamentals of Human Motivation (1928), he used an analogy based on bridge-building to illustrate his conception of the relation between technology and higher ethical purposes:

It is apparently characteristic of technological work that each purpose is subordinate to another purpose which is more comprehensive. All of the details in the design and construction of the bridge are thus subordinate to its general plan, while the general plan is subservient to the demands of maximal economic utility. Each of these phases is characterized by a relationship of instrumentality to its superior, and each superior phase governs a number of inferior phases, so that the system tends to converge from below upwards.....Now the regressus toward the ultimate purpose is characterized, not only by an increase in the comprehensiveness of the members, but also, unfortunately, by a proportional decrease in their clearness. The "demands" or the "happiness" of the community are much more difficult to observe, localize, or even define than is the detailed sketch of a particular portion of the bridge. (Troland, 1928, p. 487)

Present technology, Troland said, is *incomplete* because it lacks a comprehensive goal which can be specified mathematically, and to which all formulas of that technology should ultimately lead. This quantified goal Troland called the **dominant desideratum**, defining this as follows:

The hypothetical primary or ultimate purpose of complete technology may be designated as the *dominant desideratum*. If we conceive the latter in harmony with engineering tendencies, we must regard it as a quantitative fact or concept which can be treated as a mathematical variable. The function of technology in all of its ramifications must be to bring this variable to a maximal value. It presumably has some definite value in every case--whether or not technologically controlled--so that the sole duty of technology consists in increasing it, or in raising the efficiency of human effort, as measured by the degree of attainment of this desideratum. (Troland, 1928, p. 488)

Troland saw the desideratum of his "complete technology" in mixed Kantian and Utilitarian terms:

Now this conception of complete technology evidently bears some resemblance to that of ethics, as the latter is conceived by thinkers of the instrumentalist type. It contemplates a system of deductions and practical imperatives based upon a dominant purpose and the conditions which limit the realization of this purpose. Our "dominant desideratum" may be regarded as analogous to the familiar conception of the "summum bonum" or ultimate value. "Right" conduct is that

which is demanded by technological deduction in order to realize the fundamental purpose to a maximal degree. (Troland, 1928, p. 489)

"Technology," Troland wrote, "is not a perversion of pure science but is rather its fulfillment" (p. 491). It is also, he said, to be conceived of as a "substitute for ethics" (p. 490). The aims of this "complete technology" were typical for its period:

Complete technology is concerned with all possible means of realizing the dominant desideratum, regardless of whether they are sociological, psychological, physical, or what not. The invention and propagation of moral principles may turn out to be one of its essential tasks, but this will have no different status from that of such methods as changing human nature by eugenic control, suppressing disease, building bridges, and doing an infinite number of other things which will undoubtedly be required in the pursuit of its general purpose. (Troland, 1928, p. 489)

Like most psychological proposals for the promotion of pleasure, the aims are as broad and wide as the underlying concept. Troland did not see a separation between the ideal of "complete technology" and its scientific base:

Complete technology evidently resembles ethics further in that it appears to be concerned primarily with things which do not exist, namely, with standards, things to be done, or achieved, etc. Nevertheless, it should be noted that--as we have defined it--complete technology is a deductive system the foundations of which are exclusively existential. Applied science is not based at any point upon *a priori* premises, universals, or any other transcendental ideas. The processes of building a bridge are logically developed from two realities, first, the data of mechanics, and second, the purpose to have a bridge. The latter is a psychophysiological fact in the minds or brains of certain real individuals, and has as satisfactory an empirical status as have the facts of mechanics. If all of these individuals were to be killed, there would certainly be no bridge-building purpose in any sense whatsoever, and the technology of bridge-building would become impossible. (Troland, 1928, p. 490)

In Troland's physiologically-grounded hedonism, purpose existed as a thought or conception in the brain. The brain, as Troland conceived it, was to determine preferences from among conscious experiences:

The physiological side of this process may be called *preference*, and involves the occupation of the focus of consciousness by one action image (or perception) to the exclusion of others. The alternative which is actually chosen may be said to be

the most preferable one, or to possess the highest degree of *preferability* among all those which are available. However, if the originally preferred alternative were to be ruled out, some other alternative would be chosen; and if the latter in turn were excluded, still another would be taken. By continuing the process it would obviously be possible to determine the *order of preferability* of all of the alternatives which are presented by the situation....Relative preferability values could be obtained by the "method of paired comparisons" in which every alternative is compared separately with each of the others, and the total number of times a particular alternative is preferred is taken as a measure of its preferability. (Troland, 1928, p. 493)

Psychophysics, for Troland, expanded into a hierarchical system of higher governing purposes in the brain:

Such preferability values would evidently not be explanations, but only descriptions of the given system of choices. As such, they represent no theory but merely the plain facts about any case of human action, or the selection among alternatives. Now purposes, in a generalized sense, may be defined as *determinants of preferability*; a purpose is a *basis of preference*. Any adopted purpose, however, may itself be regarded as the product of a process of preference, since some different purpose might conceivably have been adopted. But, by the principle of the hierarchy of purposes, we explain the acceptance of a given purpose as an outcome of its successful subservience of some broader, already established purpose. If we follow out this analysis, we may find, either that it leads through an interminable regression, or that it carries us back to some ultimate purpose or purposes which underlie all other proximate purposes; and themselves have no determinants. Concerning such ultimate purposes we can either say that they are not the results of an act of preference at all, because they always operate and have no possible alternatives; or else that there is no exception to the type of preference for which they stand. They possess universal and ultimate preferability, and all other preferabilities must be derivatives from them. (Troland, 1928, p. 493)

An ultimate, irreducible, and hedonistic purpose is to be served by complete technology:

The function which complete technology is created to fulfill is that of producing the maximally preferable total human experience. In order to carry out this function we must discover the ultimate and most general determinants of all preferability, which will constitute the dominant desideratum, or the *ultimate basis of preference*....The solution of this problem has already been provided by our doctrine of the hedonism of the past, which states, in effect, that the preferability of any alternative line of response is proportional to the total amount of affection which has been experienced with it during the entire lifetime of the individual, up to and including the present moment. (p. 494)

The brain, Troland hypothesized, performed an "affective calculus," summing the total amount of affection or pleasure experienced over the life history and reporting the result of this calculation to consciousness. "Complete technology" is in the service of maximizing this experience, according to Troland:

The function of complete technology is to determine the forms of human conduct which will integrate the largest amounts of affection. There is no real paradox in the fact that technology must devote its attention to the future whereas the happiness,  $\int dt$ , must be integrated into the past. The past, which is over and done, cannot be changed and is a subject-matter only for history. Controlling the amount of happiness in the past can only be accomplished by attention to the affectivity of the future, which is constantly passing over into the past. In order to summate any variable in time, it must move progressively into the past.

The instantaneous present, however, is the only concrete reality, and the principle of maximal integrated affection is only a demand that the affective intensity of the present consciousness should be maintained continuously at as high a value as possible. The magnitude of the happiness integral is an index of the success with which positive affectivity is maintained, regardless of the passage of time. In order to accomplish this maintenance, technology must direct its attention to the future, which merely means laying plans and making preparations for the control of affection. (Troland, 1928, pp. 494-495.)

Troland conceived of this monitoring of affective experience as an individual affair. He recognized that the introduction of other persons into the system was a complication, since he held that an individual's "own affective processes are the sole determinants of his own behavior" (p. 495). But he saw the need for technology in solving the problem of mass happiness, as well:

Technology, however, is ordinarily a collective endeavor and represents a combination of the interests of a number of individuals, with a view to the advantage of each of them; and, hence, its plans will naturally apply to the happiness of all. One of the most important problems which technology has to face is that of eliminating the conditions which make it possible for one individual to profit hedonically by another individual's hedonic loss. (p. 495)

Troland, bridge-builder between psychological hedonism, technology, and ethics, died early and his psychology passed into obscurity. Historians of psychology dimly

remember him through repeating his formula of "three hedonisms"--of the past, the present, and the future--in order to emphasize the "hedonism of the past" (Allport, 1954; Wertheimer, 1972, Hilgard, 1987). It can be sensed, if not easily seen, that these three hedonisms all played a part in Troland's idiosyncratic system.

There are less rarefied and exalted visions of the technico-hedonic aim in American psychology. Albert Ellis, in Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy was more accessible:

I do not, as a psychologist, believe we can have any absolute, final, or God-given standards of morals or ethics. However, I do believe that, as citizens of a social community, we must have *some* standards of right and wrong. My own feeling is that these standards are best based on what I call long-range or socialized hedonism--that is, the philosophy that one should primarily strive for one's own satisfactions while, at the same time, keeping in mind that one will achieve one's own best good, in most instances, by giving up immediate gratifications for future gains and by being courteous to and considerate of others, so that they will not sabotage one's own ends. I am also, however, ready to accept almost any other rationally planned, majority-approved standard of morality that is not arbitrarily imposed by an authoritarian clique of actual men or assumed gods. (Ellis, 1962, p. 134)

"Socialized hedonism" and "socialized medicine" ring with the same tone. A hint--only a slight one--of one of the countervailing responses to this hedonistic trend in psychological pleasure promotion can be seen here. Pleasure is to be pursued, but not in the present. These are examples of how psychologists promote a view of pleasure in their proposals for reform and melioration, as well as within their theories. It is difficult, in cases like Thorndike's, Troland's, and Ellis's, to divorce the promotion from the theory. It is noteworthy that all of these examples come from within the psychological establishment. Skinner's Walden II, for example, is still widely used as a textbook; Miller addressed the (then) central political institution of American experimental psychology. That address was reprinted in the American Psychologist, a widely-circulated generalist psychological journal. Health, human-factors, environmental, and industrial psychologies are respectable areas of experimental psychology. Even Troland's obscure "complete technology" was not contained in a separate article in a lesser-known journal (as was

Duncker's phenomenology) but formed the basis for the last chapter of his then well-known Fundamentals of Human Motivation. Pleasure is an internalized psychological value, which is amply represented in psychology's proposals for public action.

### Psychologists' Private Pleasure Promotion

One cannot say that psychological discourse in America is ever really "private." The psychological establishment has, in the course of its professionalization, created a publishing industry which insures the dissemination of virtually everything that psychologists think or say. This system of dissemination is so complete that not only research results and theoretical proposals come into public view, but also a varied collection of commentary, dialogue, brief notes, autobiographical statements, and other forms of literary as well as scientific communication. By "private" here, I mean to distinguish between proposals such as those in the section above which seem clearly aimed at psychology's public purposes, and those which, though "public" in the sense that they are in the "great text" of psychology's communications system, are directed more toward internal research questions. Outlined below is a range of this "private" communication which relates to pleasure.

The first type of pleasure promotion stems from psychologists' defense of their interest in the subject. The amount of research which leads to the convergence of pleasure ideas is rather small in proportion to the research conducted on the less pleasure-laden topics of psychology; much less than on the concepts of "intelligence" or "development," for example. As mentioned in Chapter 2 above, pleasure sometimes takes a low place in the hierarchy of important terms in psychology. One of the problems in describing the psychological concept of pleasure is that the theorists involved must be detached from the contexts in which psychological history usually places them (e.g.,



Maslow with the "humanists," Duncker with "cognitive science"). Part of the rhetoric surrounding pleasure may be connected with psychologists' attempts to establish their minor interests as legitimate.

When one turns to researchers interested specifically in pleasure, one sometimes perceives a tone of resignation and defensiveness in their comments about the subject. This is especially true in psychological aesthetics, and in some of the fringe areas associated with pleasure, notably humor. For instance, in 1968 D. E. Berlyne opened his chapter on "Laughter, Humor, and Play" in the Handbook of Social Psychology with the following deferential comment:

This chapter considers some forms of behavior that seem to be lacking in "seriousness" and have, on the whole, not been taken very seriously by psychologists. Ways in which laughter and play might contribute to adaption and survival are not immediately apparent. It is widely believed that their absence can impair physical and psychological health, but conclusive evidence on this point is not available, and, in any case, would hardly be easy to find....Even if a correlation between some index of well-being and degree of engagement in laughter or play could be established, these activities might still be effects or accompaniments of well-being without in any way causing it. (Berlyne, 1968b, p. 795)

The mood is apologetic--researchers sometimes have the perception that what they are doing is not the most important part of psychology. A classic historical evaluation that fits this mold is found in E. G. Boring's assessment of Fechner in his History of Experimental Psychology (1957). Describing Fechner's work after the Elemente der Psychophysik, he wrote that

Fechner, however, had now accomplished his purpose. He had laid the scientific foundation for his philosophy and was ready to turn to other matters, keeping always in mind the central philosophical theme. Moreover, he had reached his sixties, the age when men begin to be dominated more by their interests and less by their careers. The next topic, then, that caught the attention of this versatile man was esthetics. (pp. 281-282)

Here, aesthetics is only an "interest," to be pursued alongside more serious psychological goals. Boring, it can be noted, did not include "aesthetics" in the index to his history of sensation and perception (Boring, 1942).

Others who have pursued pleasure have not been apologetic. Some did not refer at all to pleasure's status as a psychological research topic, and proceeded as though it was "natural" that psychology should study it (e.g., Karl Duncker). Still others were not content with either an apologetic or neutral attitude about pleasure. In the introduction to Wells's compendium Pleasure and Behavior in 1924, Joseph Jastrow wrote that

The present contribution is focused upon a field that has attracted the spot-light of psychological interest. The reconstruction of psychology as the science of behavior has brought about a renewed attention to the life of the feelings and emotions and the sources of motives for action. Man as a rational animal has by no means been dethroned, but rather has been reinstated in his estate with a fresher and a deeper understanding of the function of his rationality to give point and substance and refinement to his affective life. Happiness and success are interpreted as high-level sanctions of endeavor which has its motive source in lowly origins, where simpler pleasures rule as rewards and simpler pains are imposed as penalties. Ever subject to the same incentives for the wiser direction of his conduct, man's power to attain nobler prides and more complex shames testifies to the social evolution that has transformed his environment without turning his nature from its ordained orbit. Such loyalty to original nature is quite compatible with the highest aspirations and the wisdom to set a goal and devise the means for its attainment. Man remains the pleasure-loving creature, while enlarging the scope of his pleasures and the level of their satisfaction. The recognition of the pleasure scale that runs the gamut of human experience is as essential as the recognition of the intelligence scale that surveys the scale of human endowment in terms of capacity for the solution of problems. (Jastrow, in Wells, 1924, pp. xii-xiv)

The ebullient Jastrow was, in light of the real situation of hedonism and pleasure in mainstream psychology then, exaggerating. Statements about the centrality of pleasure, however, continually recur. Jerome Kagan asserted confidently, in 1967, that "The joint ideas that man is a pleasure seeker and that one can designate specific forms of stimulation as sources of pleasure are central postulates of every man's theory of behavior." (Kagan, 1967, p. 134) This theme, amplified and applied to culture generally,

appears again in the conclusion to his chapter on morality in The Nature of the Child in 1984:

Humans are driven to invent moral criteria, as newly hatched turtles move toward water and moths toward light. The conditions for moral virtue in modern society--the state that one seeks to attain in order to reassure oneself of one's goodness--include pleasure, wealth, fame, power, autonomy, mastery, nurturance, kindness, love, honesty, work, sincerity, and belief in one's freedom. (Kagan, 1984, p. 152)

Arthur Staats, in Psychology's Crisis of Disunity in 1983 (Staats, 1983), identifies "value" as a promising "interfield" in psychology, associating philosophical contributions from sources as diverse as Hobbes and Santayana with the achievements of his conditioning theories and the physiological "reward centers" of James Olds. Other attempts at "unified" psychology--for instance Joseph Rychlak's (Rychlak, 1988)--give pleasurable affect a prominent place as well.

Kagan's assemblage of the components of virtue illustrates one of the devices used by psychologists promoting pleasure within theoretical works. Since several elements of pleasurable experience have been isolated and studied--Kagan lists many of these, including mastery, nurturance, and autonomy, along with a version of "self-esteem"--they can be combined, in the way that the style of technical psychological writing readily allows, into formidable pleasure-chains. (Other examples of "chaining" or aggregation have been seen already, in connection with Berlyne and Csikszentmihalyi.) The "calling of the roll" of prior arguments in support of psychological positions can have a strong rhetorical effect, for those familiar with the names and terms. Also, newly introduced pleasure terminology can augment previously established concepts. For example, Hadley Cantril used Alfred North Whitehead's conception of "form and flow" in 1967 (Cantril, 1967) to illuminate one aspect his conception of the "transactional" nature of the mind. Cantril's paper, recently reprinted (Cantril, 1988), gains meaning by the introduction, in the 21-year interim, of Csikszentmihalyi's "flow experience."

Pleasure-rhetoric appears to increase in certain situations, and when certain aspects of the concept are discussed. The devaluation of the concepts of pleasure and hedonism in the 1930's and '40's brought together a sizable group of tension-reduction opponents. Among these were some of the more outspoken figures in psychology's history. Even soft-spoken and judicious psychological researchers could be moved to at least wry comments on the issue. P. T. Young quoted from A. T. Jersild's Child Psychology to make this genial point in his Motivation and Emotion in 1961:

A common assumption underlying many theories of motivation is that the mainspring of human action lies in some *deficit or tension*. This assumption is implied in the writings of Hull, Miller and Dollard, Mowrer, Murray, and others. These writers speak of drive reduction, anxiety reduction, need satisfaction, tension reduction, etc....This theoretical approach minimizes or ignores the positive side of motivation. Jersild (1954), in pointing out the limitations of the deficit-tension theories, writes that he is reminded of a certain mythical dog, Miltiades, who was never active except when he itched. Then the one compelling passion of his life was to scratch the itch so that he might return to a state of inactivity. Miltiades never had a yen to go places and do things of his own accord! (Young, 1961, p. 588)<sup>82</sup>

Others were more colorful. D. O. Hebb, in 1955, saw those who would continue with the "hedonism of 1911" as "irresponsible" (Hebb, 1955, p. 466.). Harry Harlow, in 1953, equated the fight against tension-reduction to be equivalent to good common sense, implying that the opposition was lacking somewhat in this quality :

It may be argued that if we accept the theses of this paper, we shall be returning to an outmoded psychology of tropisms, instincts, and hedonism. There is a great deal of truth to this charge. Such an approach might be a regression were it not for the fact that psychology now has adequate techniques of methodology and analysis to attack quantifiably these important and neglected areas. If we are ever to have a comprehensive theoretical psychology, we must attack the problems whose solution offers hope of insight into human behavior, and it is my belief that if we face our problems honestly and without regard to, or fear of, difficulty, the theoretical psychology of the future will catch up with, and eventually even surpass, common sense. (Harlow, 1953, p. 31)

Abraham Maslow was always ready to promote the "higher pleasures," as can be seen in his commentary on James Olds's paper in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Of Olds's rats, Maslow had this to say:

I disagree strongly also with Olds's rejection of the concept of need as "a physiological concept not pertinent to psychological dimensions." Dr. Olds needs to be reminded not only that only organismic goals give some sense to activity, but also of the necessity to distinguish sick goals from healthy ones. The fact that intact rats do not have sick goals demonstrates only that one must ultimately work with human beings if one wishes to understand human beings. The motivational problem became a problem at all only because of human concern with it. The problems of health and sickness, of psychotherapy, of ethics, of happiness and fruitfulness and creativeness, all demand inexorably the concept of need for their understanding and solution as I think I have clearly demonstrated. Forgetting this is a common parochialism of rodentologists. (Maslow, 1955a, p. 144)

Olds's findings, Maslow asserted, "clearly kill need-reduction theories of motivation forever"(p. 144).

Now that both tension-reduction and stimulation-seeking have been superseded by other less simplistic formulations, the vibrant color has left the journal articles. Then, however, it was a visible, noisy argument about a glaring error, and it succeeded. It is important to note that these comments were contained within articles in respectable psychological journals with a wide circulation: in Young's case, in a comprehensive advanced text on motivation. This was not an argument carried on in the second or third rank of publications.

The final level of this "private" pleasure valuation sees pleasure moving from the scientific discourse of psychology to more ethereal regions. Contemplation of pleasure leads, sometimes, to mystic expression. As valuation of the wholistic aspects of the pleasure experience increases, so does the amount of religious, aesthetic, and cosmic sentiment in psychologists' statements. Later in his commentary on Olds in the 1955 Nebraska Symposium, Maslow turned to the behavior of the rodents, rather than of the "rodentologist":

If we are permitted to say that Olds's animals indicate by their cessation of activity that septal stimulation end-experience is more pleasurable than the end-experience derivable from the outer world, then this is a kind of turning inward to experience, where stillness is needed, and a turning away from the external world, where activity is needed. It suggests to me a possible parallel with human states of various sorts, not only with hypnotic trances, and schizophrenic turning inward, but also with the so-called mystic or oceanic experiences, the beatific states of concentration on "higher" consciousness reported from the East, as well as with the concentrated fascination of aesthetic and cognitive insight experiences. In all of these, the conscious experiences can be so attractive as to withdraw attention from all else.

I suppose Olds and Hebb will be horrified by this kind of speculation. From their point of view they may well be opening a Pandora's box of mentalism, centralism, and subjectiveness. (Maslow, 1955a, p. 147)

Maslow's mystic rats were a metaphorical elaboration of R. G. Heath's reports of the subjective sentiments of his self-stimulating patients (Heath, 1964). In psychology, the tendency to relate the conscious experience of pleasure either to other cultures or to other worlds is strong. Thus the personologist Nevitt Sanford, in his introduction to the collection of studies on LSD-25, *Utopiates*, in 1964 remarked that

the contributors to this volume are more inclined to accent culture. They marshal evidence that the effects of any drug tend to be in keeping with the values of the culture or subculture in which it is used--or, if the user's wish is to express rebellion or dissidence, the effect will stand in opposition to the prevailing values. (Blum, 1964, p. xiv)

And, most recently, Constance Pert, co-discoverer of the opioid receptors in the brain, views the mind as an "emanation of emotional information processing" (p. 111) mediated by the opiate receptors. Her recent description (Pert, 1988) of these mechanisms concludes with references to yogis, and, in a concluding section entitled "Can Mind Survive Physical Death?", to information which can "transform itself into some other realm" (p. 111). She writes that "the nature of the hypothetical "other realm" is currently in the religious or mystical dimension, where Western science is clearly forbidden to tread" (p. 111). Here both aspects, "private" and "public" of psychological

pleasure valuation merge in an "external" popular article: Pert's concise rendition of current neurochemical hypotheses appeared in the Whole Earth Review.

The positive valuation of pleasure appears to be expressed most often in terms of conflict: in defense of a research interest, in opposition to competing pleasure hypotheses, and in cultural and philosophical terms. As will soon be apparent, there is probably good reason for this posture. But there are some more innocent valuations of pleasure. Some of the desire to promote pleasure, happiness, or welfare has been covert. Raymond Dodge, one of the founders of the Yale Institute for Human Relations, virtually invented the eye movement. It would be incongruous to see him portrayed in any history of psychology we now have as an exponent of happiness. Yet he confided in his autobiography in 1930 that he was

desirous of participating in the solution of one more problem in applied psychology. That is the problem of protracted human happiness. Whether or not it fits in with one's philosophy of life, the fact is incontestable that happiness is an important if not the most important aim of human endeavor. Notwithstanding this fact, it has received no commensurate scientific attention. The theory of the happy life remains at about the level where Greek philosophers left it. There has been an immense amount of ameliorative activity and human welfare work, but it is practically all a treatment of symptoms without fundamental analysis. We are trying to correct a number of the supposed major conditions of unhappiness. Personnel studies try to avoid putting round pegs in square holes. Studies of family life...try to develop adaptive behavior in the smallest social group....

Scientific information as to the fundamental positive conditions of protracted happiness are conspicuous for their absence. We do not even know the laws by which pleasant situations become unpleasant and unpleasant situations become bearable or even pleasant. The positive conditions of happiness are left largely to accident, such as the satisfaction of instinctive wants with its tragic disillusionment and negative adaptations, the economic pressure to provide a market for manufactured products, the exigencies of the labor market, the desire to amass wealth, or the Bolshevistic abolition of private wealth. There are numerous wise protests that protracted happiness is achieved by none of those things; but positive, scientific data on the real conditions are as inconspicuous as scientific interest in the problem. If there were a real solicitude for intelligent adaptation, our science would be busy with very different tasks. (Dodge, 1930, pp. 119-120)

There is a varied range, then, of psychology's promotion of pleasure. As Morawski has shown, the "forgotten Utopias" contained ideas from the scientific work of the

psychologists who wrote them. These were expressed outside of psychology by means of a literary vehicle distinct from the ordinary communications within psychology. Along with this "externalization" of value concerns, one can range the "internal" valuations outlined above. Here, parts of the pleasure concept, and sometimes the idea of a completely pleasurable Utopian life, are found not in works of a different genre, but in the standard psychological literature. Psychology's morality, as Leary (1980) has noted, is a deeply ingrained tradition.

### The Repression of Pleasure: Resisting Utopia

Aligned against this collection of positive valuations of pleasure within psychology are a number of counter-rhetorics, which function in the same way as do the tendencies toward asymmetry and indifferenciation in the quantitative one. They serve to impede the transmission of the idea of pleasure as conscious and valuable into psychology and its history.

Some major psychologists in this story have adopted an ambivalent attitude to the subject. William James, for instance, has proved to be a major figure in the creation of a phenomenology of pleasure. Richard Atkinson, in his comprehensive survey of motivational theories in 1964 (Atkinson, 1964), praised James's "sophisticated" view of hedonism; Karl Duncker acknowledged him as one of the few psychologists who clearly saw the "hormoid-hedonoid" polarity within pleasure. James, however, can just as easily be viewed as an opponent of pleasure. Those wishing to cast him in this light can find in James's works some strident statements to support their case. In "The Moral Equivalent of War," for example, James stated unequivocally that a "simple pleasure economy" could not form the basis for a secure peacetime economy (James, 1910/1963, p. 297). This view connects with James's earlier vision of the Chautauquan utopia in his address "What Makes A Life Significant" in 1895. There he described, clairvoyantly it seems,



what was, in effect, the world of Walden II. Reacting to this, explicitly asked for bad things to balance out the good, for the sake of realism:

And yet what was my own astonishment, on emerging into the dark and wicked world again, to catch myself quite unexpectedly and involuntarily saying: "Ouf! what a relief! Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight again. This order is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too uninspiring. This human drama without a villain or a pang; this community so refined that ice-cream and soda water is the utmost offering it can make to the brute animal in man; this city simmering in the tepid lakeside sun; this atrocious harmlessness of all things--I cannot abide with them. Let me take my chances in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings." (James 1895/1963, pp. 272-273.)<sup>83</sup>

So far as any psychologist (or any person in culture) promotes pleasure by means of a literary Utopia, there will always be a ready supply of critics. Skinner's--a successful Utopia--has been no exception. Part of the reaction to Skinner's non-forgotten Utopia has the same tone James adopted toward Chautauqua--Utopia is a flat, uninteresting world. How can one be happy, and, like Mrs. Olson, not know it? Certainly this is evidence that the popular conception of a valuable pleasurable life is that it should be a conscious one. But, as James's reference to a global concept of "economy" indicates, the psychological resistance to pleasure is deeper than a simple dismissal of utopian dreams. Gordon Allport, in his textbook Pattern and Growth in Personality in 1961 (Allport, 1961) pictured, differently than in his Handbook article in 1954, some more shortcomings of the psychological view of pleasure. There, Allport chose to discuss pleasure in terms of Hindu psychology (an interesting commentary on the cross-cultural impetus of the subject.) "It is," he wrote, "inexcusable provincialism for scholars in the West to neglect the wisdom of the East" (p. 564). His discussion of the relation of duty and pleasure in terms of one element of that wisdom follows:

Most men, the theory holds, have four central desires. To some extent, though only roughly, they correspond to earlier and later periods of life. *Pleasure* is the first desire. It is predominant in infancy, but remains throughout later ages. The desire for pleasure is soon supplemented by the need for *success*. Youth and the

middle years are spent in the pursuit of occupational and social achievement. But as maturity sets in there is normally a strong orientation toward *duty*. One must provide for one's offspring and aging parents, and the ethics of social living take hold upon one's values. Finally, and especially toward the end of one's life, comes a desire for understanding--for philosophical or religious meaning--and with it a longing for *liberation* from the pleasure-success-duty stages of life. (pp. 564-565)

Here is some of the "moral asymmetry" noted in Chapter 2: pleasure is the leading characteristic of earlier, immature life. Allport continued, evaluating psychology's approach to pleasure:

It is interesting to note that no major Western school of psychology includes this whole sequence of four stages within its view of human nature. Positivist psychology give full and lavish attention to the first two stages--to pleasure, in its theories of tension-reduction, reinforcement, libido, and needs; and to success, in its studies of power, status, leadership, achievement, masculinity. But positivist psychology has little to say about the duty motive (except that it is a reaction to the internalized parent image), and still less to say about the desire for philosophical and religious meaning, except to say that such a desire is a defense mechanism, and escape device no different in kind from suicide, alcoholism, and neurosis. Existentialism, by contrast, gives full recognition to duty (responsibility) and to the will-to-meaning. Yet oddly, existentialism says little about pleasure and success as motives. (p. 565)

A concept of conscious pleasure incorporating states of exaltation and joy, and including the idea of the contrast between faith and anhedonia, is not in evidence here. In 1961, although Allport was able to see the reaction against tension-reduction in terms of "success" and achievement, almost all of the terminology describing these two elements is connected with psychologies which did not emphasize the phenomenology of conscious pleasure. The sole exception in Allport's list would be McClelland's (1955b) psychology of achievement motivation, which contained elements of Wundtian dimensionality. This testifies to the strength which these theories had in psychology during the "positivist" or behaviorist period, and to the fragility of the conscious pleasure concept in comparison to them.

Allport's formulation connects with another potent force in psychology leading to a dismissive attitude toward conscious pleasure. This is the pervasive view, recently well-

chronicled by Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown in an article in the Psychological Bulletin (Taylor & Brown, 1988), that reality is generally not pleasurable. She notes that the view of reality that psychologists from a wide spectrum of fields ask patients or readers to adopt is one in which the self has accommodated to a large number of unpleasant things. Especially in adult life, sacrifice, delay of gratification, and ethical austerity are the hallmarks of maturity and rationality. An optimistic view of things may be just unrealistic, or may tend toward the pathological. (In American psychology, to be optimistic is to be unrealistic, but to lack pleasure--to exhibit anhedonia--is a psychiatric condition allied with schizophrenia and other major pathologies.) Remarkably, in a culture which emphasizes comfort and efficiency, psychology has maintained a stern sense of duty. Leisure, for one example, has been seen during the period as a "threat" (Cutten, 1926) and as a "problem" (Skinner 1953, 1986) by psychologists. This is reassuring from the point of view of psychology's intimate connection with morality and value, if not from the standpoint of a psychology of conscious pleasure.

### The Repression of Pleasure: Philosophical Opposition

The asymmetries of American psychological thinking about pleasure are strong enough by themselves, I believe, to mask the development of a concept of conscious pleasure and force it into the background of psychological ideas. But the external intellectual environment has probably affected the concept as well. The psychological pleasure concept developed, over this century in an intellectual climate with strong antihedonistic views. Philosophers, especially British ones, appeared very glad to be rid of hedonism around 1900 and afterward. There has been some connection between ethics and psychology here. Around 1925, statements referring to the success of psychology in combating and destroying hedonism can be found in both American and British philosophical articles. For example, in 1927, in the International Journal of Ethics, John

Wild of the University of Michigan published "The Resurrection of Hedonism," a reply to a version of psychological hedonism proposed by one R. M. Blake a year earlier. There he wrote that

Hedonism in the most recent literature has undoubtedly been looked upon as something possessing a purely historical interest--something now outgrown. For most of us Butler's criticism of psychological hedonism and egoism, the familiar contradictions of Mill and Spencer, the polemics of idealists such as Green and Bradley, and, last but not least, the keen analysis of Mr. G. E. Moore, have been decisive. It is all the more interesting, therefore, to be confronted with a contemporary attempt....to defend this pariah among ethical doctrines. (Wild, 1927, p. 11)

In The Proceedings of the British Academy in 1928, L. R. Farnell contributed this obituary:

In belittling or defaming the value of pleasure, the Stoic theory was inferior to the Aristotelian, but could easily be brought into accord with medieval Christian ethics. The renaissance of hedonism as an ethical creed was one of the distinctive phenomena of the philosophy of the seventeenth and still more of the eighteenth century; its latest champion may be said to have been John Stuart Mill of the nineteenth. It may be regarded as wholly extinct now: its overthrow being due partly to the onslaughts made upon it by thinkers of the Hegelian school--notably by Bradley in his *Ethical Studies*--partly to the modern progress in psychology. Its admitted failure as a basis of ethics was due to the recognition of the impossibility of resolving our perceptions of right and wrong into considerations of the mere quantum of pleasure; due also to the exposure of the fallacy of hedonism in trying to adapt itself to our ethical experience by maintaining the qualitative difference between pleasures higher and lower, and thus abandoning pleasure altogether as the sole standard of action. (Farnell, 1928, pp. 99-100)

The philosophical controversy appears to have centered around univalent and absolute philosophical conceptions of hedonism as the "sole good," so in the present context the philosophical argument is beside the point. However, these comments point to a rhetorical pattern devaluing hedonism, and clearly connect some parts of psychology to its demise. These statements appear to point to the criticisms of hedonism voiced in James's, Baldwin's, and especially McDougall's and Dewey's psychologies, criticisms which undoubtedly owed a great deal to British sources.<sup>84</sup> Farnell's mention of the

Hegelians brings to mind John Dewey's view of rational hedonism expressed in his Human Nature and Conduct in 1922:

Future pleasures and pains, even of one's own, are among the things most elusive of calculation. Of all things they lend themselves least readily to anything approaching a mathematical calculus. And the further into the future we extend our view, and the more the pleasures of others enter into the account, the more hopeless does the problem of estimating future consequences become. All of the elements become more and more indeterminate....Do pleasures due to defective education or unrefined disposition, to say nothing of the pleasures of sensuality and brutality, rank the same as those of cultivated persons having acute social sensitiveness? The only reason the impossibility of the hedonistic calculus is not self-evident is that theorists in considering it unconsciously substitute for calculation of future pleasures an appreciation of present ones, a present realization in imagination of future objective situations. (Dewey, 1922, pp. 203-204)

Here American psychology's residual aesthetic hedonism is reduced to "sensuality." And the theme of quantitative hedonism, still prevalent in psychology, is associated with futility. Wild drew on Dewey, and psychology, in his critique:

So, although Mr. Blake denies psychological hedonism in its absurdly extreme Millian form--that "the sole human motive is the desire for pleasure"--he is still a psychological hedonist in believing the desire for pleasure to be consistent with human psychology, and thus natural. Accordingly, I do not believe Mr. Blake is at all successful in his attempt to dodge the strictures of modern, dynamic psychologists, such as Professor Dewey, who tend to view symptoms of hedonism as essentially psychopathic....I suspect, therefore, that after all Mr. Blake is a psychological hedonist in an objectionable sense, as all hedonists must be, at least to the extent of holding to the plausibility of a Humian or Titchnerian psychology of mental states which may be naturally desired. (Wild, 1927, p. 17)

Some American psychology, at least, was viewed as a supporting force in excising hedonism as a philosophical concept. And some other American psychology--behaviorism, associationism, and what remained of "psychological aesthetics"--may have appeared irrelevant and wrong to hedonism's critics when it suggested hedonism of any sort. Economic theory also may have contributed to this devaluation of psychological pleasure theories as well. Thorstein Veblen hurled a thunderbolt against psychological hedonism at the turn of the century:

The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another. Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. (Veblen, quoted in Breit & Ransom, 1971, p. 40)

From early on, psychological theories of pleasure, including evolutionary and quantitative formulations, were in intellectual disrepute in some influential related areas.. This disreputable character has lasted quite some time. Utilitarianism, which for historians of psychology is one accepted explanation of hedonistic trends in psychology, is still under attack by both British and American philosophers. For example, in J. J. C. Smart's and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), Utilitarianism is characterized as shallow and simplistic--a common criticism of hedonism as well:

Utilitarianism is in more than one way an important subject...One important feature of it, which I have tried to bring out, is the number of dimensions in which it runs against the complexities of moral thought: in some part because of its consequentialism, in some part because of its view of happiness, and so forth. A common element in utilitarianism's showing in all these respects, I think, is its great simple-mindedness. This not at all the same thing as lack of intellectual sophistication: utilitarianism, both in theory and practice, is alarmingly good at combining technical complexity with simple-mindedness....Simple-mindedness consists in having too few thoughts and feelings to match the world as it really is. (Smart & Williams, 1973, p. 149)

Smart and Williams are British: Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (MacIntyre, 1984), one of the most widely-read and well-cited American philosophic works of recent times, is also particularly curt and dismissive of hedonism, associating it with the failure of the Enlightenment moral vision.<sup>85</sup> One can find positive valuations of pleasure and hedonism in philosophy: Gosling's recent work has gone some way toward restoring hedonism (of a rational, ethical sort) to respectability (Gosling, 1969; Gosling & Taylor, 1982). Sympathetic valuations of pleasure are found in philosophies which are either not

current, "mainstream" ones (e.g., Santayana, R. B. Perry, C. I. Lewis, S. C. Pepper) or else morally despised (e.g., Marcuse).<sup>86</sup>

The idea that "hedonism is dead" still persists today in British and American philosophy, though perhaps not as strongly as before. As recently as 1987, the Oxford Companion to the Mind, a thoroughgoing authoritative British compendium of current psychological definitions, included a section on "Hedonism" authored by a philosopher, J. G. Cottingham:

The psychological thesis that people only pursue pleasure seems false. It is a matter of common sense that people pursue a wide variety of goals in life (e.g., scientific truth, justice, religious enlightenment); and it does not appear that the pursuit of these differing goals can be exhibited as being 'really' the pursuit of pleasure--unless the concept of pleasure is defined so widely that the claim that only pleasure is pursued becomes trivially true. Ethical hedonism also seems untenable. The value of goods such as liberty and autonomy cannot, it seems, be explained solely in terms of the amount of pleasure which may be produced by securing them. (Cottingham in Gregory, 1987, p. 308)

Within American psychology proper, Allport's 1954 summary of the history of the early philosophic critiques of hedonism has continued to be reprinted in the Handbook of Social Psychology (twice, in 1968 and in 1985). The old set of arguments against hedonism is still visible in one of the basic texts of academic psychology, in one of the few places where hedonism is treated as more than a self-evident basic principle of psychology. There is a conflict between psychology, part of which associates hedonism with common sense, and philosophy, which sees it otherwise.

### The Repression of Pleasure: Resisting Technology

The connection between pleasure and technology is another point at which opposition to the concept is met. It seems significant that, though psychologists have

debated "technology versus science" at least since the time of Munsterberg and Titchener, comparatively few of them have authored works only on technology, or have been called upon by philosophers and historians of technology for theoretical support. Perhaps psychology has made it clear to the society "outside" that its stance toward technology is as operator and entrepreneur, not as theorist or, more importantly, as critic. Certainly psychology's technological role is its most visible one in society, where, however, technology may be perceived as a problem. Technology is often feared and, within academic circles also, has acquired negative connotations (see Winner, 1979). If technology is considered to be an "autonomous" and threatening entity, psychology may be on the devil's side.

Much of the psychology of conscious pleasure is embedded in technological proposals. For example, Troland celebrated technology as the highest possible achievement of science and psychology. Skinner claims, against those who see technology as dangerous or evil, that rational control of behavior is entirely and matter-of-factly possible. Whether technology is perceived as mendacious or whether it is resisted because it threatens the status quo does not seem to matter. There is, regardless, a strong ambivalence about technology in American culture, and psychology will meet resistance in this line until its technological aims are understood.

#### The Repression of Pleasure: Prohibitionism

Finally, there is the problem that some of the evidence that supports modern motivational psychology relies on a phenomenology of addiction. Addiction is a particularly sore spot, both within and outside of psychology. Outside of psychology, there is no question that any part of psychology based on addiction will not be well received in the prohibitionistic American culture. The euphoriant effects of drugs, Richard Wilmot (1985) has observed, are viewed as "false pleasures" by the American



psychiatric establishment. He writes that "when pain and pleasure merge in Occidental Christian culture, modern psychiatric medicine defines it as "abnormal." When pain and pleasure merge during sex, it is sadomasochism--abnormality. When pain and pleasure co-exist in a drug experience, it is *euphoria*--a pathology" (p. 159).

Inside psychology, psychologists have divided for years over the valuation of the addictive experience. Anecdotal testimony and some autobiographical accounts indicate that addictions of various sorts have been at least as common in psychologists as they are in the general population. That psychologists split over the prohibition in the 1920's shows that they have been of two minds about the issue during the period in question (Devonis, 1984). There are tendencies, within the study of the processes of addiction, to speak of pleasure as a problem, one which if solved would be a key to solving the problem of addiction. The rats of the alcohol labs regularly find alcohol "pleasant" when they adapt to it. This is considered a solvable problem. Human drinkers do find alcohol pleasant: this is a **problem**, not a phenomenon, in psychology today.

D. O. Hebb, liberal in his use of analogies to addiction<sup>87</sup>, wrote in his autobiography (Hebb, 1980) of the strength of the three addictions in his life: to work, to tobacco, and to marriage (he married 3 times). The suggestion that work can be an addiction has come and gone as a "fad" phrase in popular psychology ("workaholic"): Hebb's suggestion that work is a positive source of value and a pleasurable occupation may be masked, for anyone reading this description, by cultural markers of "badness" and "degeneracy" which still attach to addictions of all types. From Ross Stagner's History of Psychological Theories (1988) comes an unsubtle hint of how the moral problem intersects with the theoretical one on the pleasure issue. Maslow, he writes, believed in the unconditional gratification of children, and quotes a passage describing a child's discovery of "delights." But, he continues in the next sentence, "This sounds enough like Freud's pleasure-principle, the characteristic of the infantile personality, to be disturbing.

And we do not know what "delights" should be forbidden: alcohol, drugs, and sex?" (P. 368)

It is not only because addiction is a necessary phenomenological component of a psychology of pleasure that a pleasure psychology is difficult to establish. Phenomenology itself still meets resistance within psychology. There are still strong prohibitions, in experimental psychology at least, against the use of phenomenal description beyond the bare minimum necessary to establish the existence of phenomena. There is a strong division between psychologists who value reports of "subjective" experience, and those who value "objectivity." The study of pleasure is caught in this dichotomy: so long as the subjective experience remains fully unexplored, there will continue to be a resistance to experiments in which phenomenal experience plays a large part, although this tendency, like much of the old "hard science" posturing of psychology, has softened recently.

Is pleasure positively valued in psychology? This is a philosophical problem posed to a science now not notably philosophical. Within psychology, there are strong tendencies to brake any overt hedonistic tendency in psychology. Psychology splits into two (unequal) parts on this issue. It is not impossible to find justification for the belief that pleasure can be conscious and valuable, if one looks for it. But pressures exist to make this choice less available. Until a clearer picture of psychology as a form of ethics is gained, all that can be said is that there is clearly an ethical question. Since the history of psychology does not find the basis of psychology in value and ethics, but rather in ideas, theories, and schools, the dimension of pro- and anti-hedonism has not surfaced in the analyses of vectors or dimensions within the psychological community (Coan, 1968). But this dimension is clearly there.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE PLACE OF PLEASURE IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

#### Conceptual Conclusions

The concept of conscious pleasure is still evolving in psychology, and so these conclusions are of course not final. Pleasure, like pain and the other affective states, is paradoxical. It can be viewed as a restricted part of experience and, at the same time, as a state which fills consciousness. The evidence is that psychological contributions to the understanding of pleasure have, in psychology's first modern century, clarified the dimensions of this paradox: few have approached its resolution. About the analysis of pleasure into its components, the following general conclusions can be stated:

1.) The most important common finding is that pleasure itself can be analyzed into several experiences. Some research supports an analysis based on bipolar dimensions similar to those believed to mediate emotion. Given the number of polar dimensions of pleasure, the range of questions that can be asked has increased. Psychology can now ask, for example, whether comfort, safety, and other dimensions of pleasure are psychological problems in their own right, and whether states of this sort can be investigated in isolation from larger comprehensive theories of emotion.

2.) Phenomenological research on pleasure has experienced slow development, but continues in psychology. The historical pattern indicates that progress is made on pleasure when, as in other fields of psychology, phenomenological observations are

collected and ordered. It appears likely that more detailed phenomenological investigation of the individual phases and components of pleasurable experience will continue.

3.) Remarkably little is known about sensory pleasure. The sensory physiology of intimate physiological pleasures (weeping, micturition) is not well known. Likewise, the perceptual mechanisms connected with attitudes, moods, or feelings remain at the beginning of study. At present, sensory-pleasure research is scattered over the domains of addictions, appetite, consumer behavior, and other more classical domains of sensory psychology. The psychology of perception has moved only slowly toward integrating aesthetic phenomena into its explanatory system. Proposals such as Gibson's in which the so-called "lower" senses are integrated with the "higher" ones promise a fuller future for the explanation of sensory pleasure.

4.) Also, very little is known about the large-scale relation of pleasure, the individual, and society. The investigation of pleasure in social psychology and in developmental psychology has focussed on individuals, or on either naturally-occurring pairs (mother/father-infant) or structured small social groups. It is not certain how large-scale environmental phenomena (population density, etc.) relate to pleasure, although applied psychology proceeds as if there is a relation between environmental management and pleasure. The statistical research on mass happiness and satisfaction points in the direction of developing newer and more sensitive measures of group satisfaction. There certainly seems to be a sense in which organizations, groups, and societies can be characterized on generalized "morale" or "satisfaction" dimensions, but the underlying philosophical stance appears to be that pleasure is at base an individual, private phenomenon--sociality may condition pleasurable experience yet may not be, in psychology's view, pleasurable in itself.

Along with this effort to analyze pleasure as a perceptible or conscious phenomenon, psychologists have converged on a conception of pleasure as a basic dimension of life. Here, psychological thought has developed, through the modern period, in these main lines:

1.) Steady progress in physiological psychology has led to the conception of the conscious experience of pleasure as the result of the interaction of a number of physiological mechanisms. The most recent research identifies a cluster of neurochemical systems which mediate the four processes which Olds observed to lie at the base of motivational phenomena--need, drive, positive approach, and avoidance. The important direction of development has been, for some years now, the integration of the chemical pathways with the neural pathways (which do not necessarily coincide). The findings in neurochemistry seem to point to a much more diffuse system mediating affective experience (Klein, 1987; Pert, 1988). There is tension in physiological psychology, at present, between the conception of a division of affect into a series of basic response patterns (hedonically asymmetric) and the findings which show the broad distribution of addiction-producing chemicals throughout much of the brain (hedonic generality). Perhaps the "avoidance" and "fear" mechanisms will be conceived, in the future, in terms of the pleasures they engender, as well.

2.) There have been a variety of lines of research which have supported the conception of pleasure as varying in "acuteness." These have included "phasic" approaches often associated with "tension reduction" hypotheses of motivation and consummation, in which the process of obtaining pleasure is explained within the compass of a single experience or action pattern, for instance eating or sexual behavior. Others, including opponent-process formulations and the research on "flow," have suggested that pleasure is the result of many experiences in succession--that pleasure is a long-term dynamic

process. In each of these areas, the contrast between pleasure and pain is still drawn rather sharply. Remnants of taxonomic thinking, both in dimensional taxonomic systems and in descriptions of motivational mechanisms, tend to preserve historic hedonic asymmetries. Also, recent theories which have emphasized the lability of pleasure have remained within the domain of motivation generally and have made only slight headway against persistent ideas of pleasure, outside of that domain, as a sporadic and infrequent experience. But phenomenological evidence has continued to accumulate against both tension reduction and conceptions of pleasure as transient. Several models have developed which link pleasure to attention and arousal, and these can certainly be adapted to a conception that that pleasures can occur in succession, with new ones replacing old ones as attention and interest shift. One might predict further reconceptualization of pleasure, in psychology, as a dynamic series of experiences.

3.) The old idea of a generalized "hedonic tone" persists. This may be because the individual components of "hedonically toned" experiences have not been identified yet. The physiological data seem to support the idea of a varying "tone" of pleasure which can be modulated, behaviorally, to produce a less discontinuous emotional series. At any rate, "tone" carries with it a conception of pleasure as a constant experience, rather than a sporadic one. The idea of "tone" seems to be supported also by the persistent identification of the "anhedonic" process with a general decrease in all function, rather than a replacement with positive unpleasantness or pain. However, the clinical (and phenomenological-anecdotal) data of anhedonia remain in a separate area of psychological study and wait for further integration into emotional and cognitive theory

4.) There has been a movement, even within the areas of psychology which have not valued consciousness, back toward a "hedonism of the future." From James's "interest," through Tolman's "expectancy," to Bindra's (1974) "interest" and modern cognitive

motivational theories, the idea that sentient organisms, among them humans, can plan for the experience of pleasure has never really left psychology. There is, however, some survival of the behavioristic, "law-of-effect" style of thinking about pleasure in psychology, which counteracts this future-oriented tendency. And the development of a psychology of the stimulus regarding pleasure--in the domain of taste mainly, but also in the idea of "affordances"--indicates that other important regions of psychology have a more environmentally-deterministic conception of pleasure, as well. The freedom to plan and choose involved in a "hedonism of the future" is tempered by these deterministic lines of thought. It remains to be seen whether these stimulus-based approaches will link with a theory of consciousness or aesthetics, as Berlyne hoped that they would.

There is also a convergence around the idea of taste. Psychological research on taste has pointed toward some invariant properties of stimuli which make them hedonically acceptable (e.g., Pfaffman, 1960). But, even in this line, individual differences have been discovered. The study of aesthetics in terms of basic motivational processes has likewise uncovered some invariants of stimulus pleasantness, as have the Gestalt studies of pleasantness of form. There is a tension, however, between this view which makes pleasure a common perception across many members of the species, and the old idea that "taste cannot be disputed" (i.e., measured and regulated). Modern psychological thinking seems to point to many common determiners of taste, yet it cannot be denied that what is considered in "good taste" or "aesthetic" has a variety of interpretations both in psychology and in its surrounding culture. Meehl's idea of "hedonic capacity" points toward one resolution of the problem of taste; Csikszentmihalyi's to another. Meehl suggests that perceivers are different, at some basic biological level, in their capacity to understand stimulation as pleasurable. Csikszentmihalyi, by incorporating a variable of intelligence into the idea of pleasure, seems to imply, along with Maslow, that the ability to experience some forms of pleasure--the most engaging, interesting, and fulfilling

forms--may be connected with the level of performance skills which a person brings to environmental situations. Together these patterns in psychological research suggest that aesthetic taste is something which is, perhaps, normally distributed in the population. Possibly this, along with a lack of training in the discrimination of pleasures, gives America its joyful tastelessness.

Karl Duncker observed, in a footnote at the end of his phenomenological analysis, that the qualities of the psychological observer might have an effect on the theory proposed. About William McDougall, for whom pleasure was epiphenomenal, he contributed the following bit of biographical lore:

It might be a worthwhile task to study the chief representatives of hedonism and hormism from the point of view of typology. Recently Professor Adams of Duke University told me that McDougall had been the type of man who fails really to appreciate sensory and artistic enjoyments, but that he had been a great golfer. When I pooled this bit of information with what I already knew about the work of the great hormist, e.g., the number of strongly assertive books he wrote, his failure to give to art a proper place within his system, the overwhelming role which he assigned to self-regarding sentiments--I had no doubt as to what had made *this* man a hormist. (Duncker, 1941, p. 430) <sup>88</sup>

It is remarkable how persistent the ethical dimension of the pleasure question has been, historically, even within "hard" scientific psychology. Yet though psychology has developed the techniques, over the past century, for studying many dimensions of pleasure, it is noteworthy also how few psychologists have accorded pleasure great importance in psychology. and that pleasure is not of more importance in our history, as well. One might speculate that science, and psychological science in particular, has evolved a population of researchers for whom pleasure is not a particularly significant experience.



### Historical Conclusions

Probably the most important conclusion specific to the history of the concept of conscious pleasure is that pleasure appears to be in continuous evolution as a concept in psychology. A historian looking for discontinuities or revolutionary shifts would not find them in this area. The year 1932 seems to express the contrast between evolutionary and revolutionary development quite nicely. In that year both Beebe-Center's and Tolman's major works were published. Beebe-Center's Titchnerian, "old-psychology" approach might be considered the end of an era in contrast to Tolman's proto-modern cognitive psychology. Underlying this seeming discontinuity, however, are several persistent traditions: the continuous presence of psychological aestheticism, the long struggle against devaluations of pleasure, and the physiological tradition. In light of these underlying continuities, 1932 seems more like a change of phase--both an end and a beginning.

After concentrating on the American aspects of the concept's development, it should be said that it is certainly the case that American psychology's interest in pleasure would not be as large as it is without the infusion of a good deal of extramural psychology. The speculation that hedonic asymmetry may be the result of a "genetic" biological-perceptual predisposition on the part of researchers can be tempered by observing that there has been a large contribution from other cultures to this question. By and large, the researchers who have contributed most to the concept's development were either Americans trained in European psychology, philosophy, and culture (James, Baldwin) or else were not Americans--Berlyne, Hebb, Duncker, the Gestaltists from whom Maslow drew his theories, Ribot, and Scitovsky (who assimilated Berlyne into economic thinking).<sup>89</sup>

About the individuals in pleasure's history, it is pleasant (!) to note that the names associated with concepts in history, rather than with "schools and systems," are different and somewhat obscure, and are arranged in a different order. As pleasure, as a concept,

softens the boundaries between systems and approaches in psychology, its history also indicates that some psychological concepts are probably developing in a more evolutionary manner. The individuals involved in this particular pattern of development are characterized mainly by their eclecticism and their moderate position within the "left-right" spectrum of psychology that Cerullo (1988) has identified. They are mainly synthesizers, not revolutionaries. Perhaps the fact that the concept has been developed in the "center" of psychology rather than in its more militant regions, outside of the behaviorism-mentalism wars for the most part though surely affected by them, may contribute to its obscure position in history. We have wanted revolution and highly visible change in our history. The facts appear to indicate that the situation is otherwise with us: we are an evolving science. The pattern of development of the concept of conscious pleasure, a mixed physical and moral concept, may give some indication of the type of pattern which might be expected when other parallel moral concepts are investigated historically. The concepts of freedom and safety, for instance, if they were to be traced in psychological history, would uncover many of the same names which are in this history as well. Certainly a history of American psychological conceptions of freedom would have to include William McDougall, as well as Abraham Maslow and Gordon Allport. If we were to go backward and look for sources of moral concepts in our history, we are certainly well-advised to understand the whole of the philosophical development leading up to psychology. In the case of pleasure in this century, one finds as many Kantian (Wundt) as Lockean (Spencer) elements. Of course, I have not traced the philosophical stems of current developments in any great detail. But this could certainly be done: one would discover several hedonisms existing in parallel. This is just the situation that obtains in philosophy, so we should not think we are some new science on this score.

Along with the factors mentioned in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, there are also accidental factors which may have contributed to the lack of a conceptualization of pleasure's place

in our history. Several of those psychologists who contributed the most to the phenomenology of pleasure died in their prime. Robert MacLeod left The Persistent Problems of Psychology unfinished just at the point where he introduced "hedonism" when he died at 62; Maslow also died at 62. Berlyne died at 52, Olds at 54. Leonard Troland died in an accidental fall at 46 in 1932. And Karl Duncker, suffering from depression, took his life at 36 in 1940. Others took some time to get into print: Heider's Psychology of Interpersonal Relations appeared 33 years after his doctorate; Csikszentmihalyi's Beyond Boredom and Anxiety appeared when he was 45. The farming-out of the aesthetic work to masters' candidates by the earlier proponents of "hedonic tone" may have contributed as well to the phenomenological tradition's having less influence that it has had on the development of the concept.

Some other factors which are probably not accidental have combined to make the pleasure concept less visible as well. Our value psychologies are not that well known, and these are generally not the product of younger, more visible, and more "revolutionary" psychologists. Hadley Cantril (who also died comparatively young, at 63) did not really hit his stride until the mid-1950's, when he was in his 50's. A striking example is Hall, whose Morale did not appear until 1920, when he was nearly 80. And B. F. Skinner, currently 85 years old, is just now writing an Ethics. Physiological psychology, though viable and strong, never seems to enter into our histories in a central position. And the flight from neurologizing in mainstream psychology, if it had not been checked by Hebb in 1949, was not an accidental development and deserves fuller study.

A word should be said about the larger picture of the history of psychology that emerges from a consideration of the history of the development of the pleasure concept. Michael Wertheimer (1987), in a general history of psychology two-thirds of which is devoted to a consideration of the various schools and systems (both in philosophy and psychology), suggests that the "age of schools" came to an end around 1940, and was followed by a modern period of eclectic, individual investigations. This is the picture of

the "psychological studies" which Sigmund Koch (1985) sees as a demonstration of the fundamental diversity of psychology as a science. Berlyne's "hedonistic delta" is a version of this conception within the study of pleasure. What I see, in contrast to the view of psychology as a "divided science," is that beyond the eclecticism and the fragmentation, psychology does move forward toward complex explanations of important problems. The conception of pleasure which has developed so far integrates contributions from biology and physiology, from clinical psychology, from social and developmental psychology, from the study of personality--from virtually every area of psychological study. One cannot grasp even a part of the psychological understanding of pleasure without having all of these components.

There are combinations occurring in psychology which historians of psychology are, perhaps, in a privileged position to view. So the first lesson that the study of a concept such as pleasure should teach is that seeing eclecticism as a historical explanation can become as much a hindrance to seeing purpose and direction in psychology as the old "schools and systems" approach was. Psychological historians have to look beyond the mere fact of eclecticism for the deeper connections--which do exist. Also, the study of pleasure is particularly useful in showing that the aesthetic and phenomenological traditions in psychology are really complementary, in a large sense, with their purported opposites. The history of conscious pleasure, at any rate, cannot be understood if the aesthetic tradition is not given a prominent place. Beyond this welcome restoration of a part of psychology's personality to its whole, there is another admonition to historians contained here. That "art" and "science" combine in the study of pleasure, not in the artificial sense of science aiding art, or art "humanizing" science, suggests that other polar divisions of psychology (see, e.g., Coan, 1968) may also hinder the perception of larger patterns in psychology. Psychology is, after all, more than academic and institutional politics--it is not really to be understood in the same terms in which we understand, say, the two-party system.

Ideas, and their development, are what psychology is about. Pleasure is only one of the important questions which it is psychology's task to answer. Our history should record more of how our psychological ideas develop within the whole texture of psychology, so that the ground may be prepared for the necessary cooperation between fields which it will take to answer them.

Conscious pleasure, though it is important, is only half of the story of pleasure in psychology. Having made the case for psychological unity which is intimated by the development of the pleasure concept, I have to say that pleasure's history puts one dichotomy into sharp relief, the division between consciousness and unconsciousness as leading ideas in psychology. Pleasure's "unconscious" dimension is actually two stories, one connected with behaviorism and the other with psychoanalysis.

For the main characters in the story of conscious pleasure--James, Baldwin, the "aesthetes," the Gestalt psychologists, the "emotionologists," the "rationalists," Maslow and Harlow, Meehl and Kagan--pleasure is palpable and real. But this line of psychological thought is countered by stronger tendencies across psychology to devalue the extent and vividness of pleasurable experience in consciousness. And there is another problem, one which I mentioned at the beginning of this piece: consciousness, since the beginning of the modern period in psychology, has had an uncertain presence in psychology. There are subtle--and not-so-subtle--indications that the consciousness of pleasure is viewed as a transient phenomenon, and that most pleasure operates at a subliminal level. Take, for example, Gardner Murphy's view, expressed in his Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure in 1947. In drive-based language he expressed an anti-tension-reduction view:

Drive, in other words, is a collective name for a bodily condition, always composite and more or less unstable. To say that something "puts an end to the drive" means only that it puts an end to a particular localized tension....But as the central nervous system becomes more complex through evolution, so that memory

keeps action tendencies alive beyond the waning activity of the chief center of physiological intensity, the expression "a drive has been satisfied" means less and less...Anticipations, expectancies, appetites, enrich the world of drives, and the life of motivation is as much a matter of *increasing* tensions in such ways as it is a matter of reducing them. (pp. 103-104)

One might read this as a statement of the possible range of conscious pleasures--though not as a description of any specific pleasurable experience. One can be sure that Murphy understood something about conscience, if not consciousness--in the Glossary one finds the following definition of "conscience": "The impulse to act in accordance with one's moral judgement" (p. 982). Yet the discussion of pleasure in Personality eventually becomes located in a section on "autism" in perceptual development. This "autism" is not the "autism" of the behavioral clinic, but a stage in which

affective elements are wrought into the total picture in which cognitive integration has been or is being achieved....Typical autism is thus not merely an expression of the third level of perceptual development; it is an expression of those phases of third-level perception in which the interaction of affective and cognitive elements goes on without the observer's being sharply aware of what is happening. As the blood stream, for example, bathes the brain with varying endocrine products, one sees (or remembers, or imagines) in accordance with the changing thresholds. (p. 366)

Pleasure, at this level, need not be conscious: the metaphor of the bloodstream (seen already in Chapter 1 with Pitkin and Weiss) is evident in this early integration of emotion and cognition.<sup>90</sup> Further on, Murphy continues:

When appetitive behavior is aroused and sustained by conditioned stimuli, it is, for rough purposes, correct to say that the organism is "seeking satisfaction." To be sure, it may not know exactly what it is seeking; certainly it seldom knows enough to formulate the abstraction that it is "seeking satisfaction," but scientists may make the abstraction for it. Practical men manage one another, as they do their dogs, in terms of holding up rewards and punishment. Since, according to the present conception, it is the drive itself that is conditioned, and since the drive is an appetitive or defensive trend, it is sufficient to say that satisfactions and frustrations, joys and woes, operate as motivators. There is no need for a pleasure principle, a law of effect, in which the hedonic tone consequent upon an act has in its own right an effect upon behavior. Conscious pleasure or displeasure may indeed be present, and important; but according to the present working hypothesis they accompany appetitive and defensive strivings without being independent agencies. (pp. 374-375)

Here pleasure is epiphenomenal: it *may* be conscious, and *may* be important--but it need not be. Later, on the same page, Murphy describes the situation in which consciousness may be important in motivation:

There is, nevertheless, a place for consciousness in the schema of motivation, and a very important one. We have seen that in the trial-and-error process there is more and more elimination of the frustrating and increasing adience in relation to the satisfying. A person spends more and more of his time, if he can, in situations which are satisfying. If there is within his body an event which symbolizes the satisfying world, he may be happy to live with the symbol....More often, however, the symbol is incompletely satisfying....When the satisfaction is remote, dwelling upon it may become torture--another instance of motivation directed by a learning process, but in itself hardly subject to a simple pleasure-pain interpretation. (pp. 375-376)

Even within psychologies which are friendly to a concept of consciousness, a combination of negative assumptions about pleasure may combine to place it in the background of experience. With psychologies in which unconsciousness, rather than consciousness, is the dominant theme, the presence of pleasure becomes even more uncertain. The strange relations between behaviorists and feeling deserve more historical attention, as it appears that this is one of the main reasons why the concept is perceived to have declined in psychologists' estimation. It certainly seems that the aura of automaticity and indifferentiation that still surrounds pleasure in psychology is partly the result of the continued persistence of elements of behaviorist programmes.

I skirted Freud intentionally to make a point: the American concept of pleasure does have a pattern of its own. Now that some of the lines of development of the American pleasure concept are clearer, the presence of Freudian ideas in American psychology appear in a clearer light as well. A few of the points at which the Freudian tradition intersects with the American one have already been mentioned. There is hardly a textbook in America which does not include some brief reference to the "pleasure principle" of Freud. Usually this involves some distortion. For instance, the idea that the

pleasure which is the aim of the "pleasure principle" is often rendered as brutal. With such renderings, it is not surprising that the "reality principle" must be called in to the rescue. One of the foremost contributions of Freudian thought on the question, at least from the standpoint of its practical effect in the creation of a pleasure climate in psychology, is the tie between the concept of "reality" as delayed gratification in Freud and the various other orders of asceticism which characterize American psychologists' depiction of "reality" (Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Freudians have had a hand in some other developments, as well: Rado, a psychoanalyst, contributed to the creation of the concept of anhedonia. Also, the effect of Freud has been felt in the sphere of moral development, where an asymmetry of pleasure has emerged in which hedonism is a phenomenon of an earlier stage of development.

Freud was an influence, but the question is, with regard to American psychology generally, if Freud was in the air, who breathed it, and how much? Behaviorists saw Freud as a supporter of unconscious motivation. Some psychologists appeared to be attracted by Freud's view of pleasure as tension-reduction, since it harmonized with a tendency already prevalent in psychology. Hebb went so far as to term Freud an "objective scientist" (Hebb, 1974). Behaviorists were certainly willing to accept Freud as a substitute for the psychology of emotion (e.g., Watson) and, as well, saw Freudian ideas as interesting phenomena to translate into behavioristic idioms. Other psychologists testify to a perceived need, during the high tide of behaviorism, for the introduction of Freudian ideas to balance out behaviorist views. So Sarason (1988) mentions that Freud preserved the emotions and pleasure for study, Allport (1938) credited Freud with "discovering" the depth of emotional life, and Berlyne (1973) notes that Freudian psychology was a place where psychologists interested in pleasure took refuge.

But in America, Freud was not the whole pleasure story. "Hedonic tone" (and the psychological-aesthetic trend generally) stems from psychologies such as those of Wundt and Fechner which were sources of Freudian thought. The further development of the



phenomenological psychology of pleasure in America goes in another direction than the Freudian. Rado was an important figure in the development of the anhedonia concept: Meehl cites him, rather than James or Ribot, as his predecessor. But contributions to this part of the pleasure concept were not limited to Freudians: James and Ribot predate Freud; Meehl is partial to Ellis's rational-emotive therapy; Duncker and Allport were hardly dedicated Freudians.

The American development of Freudian psychology seems to parallel the general reaction against tension-reduction and other antihedonistic approaches in American psychology. The early Freudian psychology may have been a hedonism, but several later modifications make its hedonistic principle less important, or at least not the only important basic drive. Freud himself wrote "Beyond The Pleasure Principle" to revise and extend the dimensions of his motivational theory. But this had the effect of intensifying the reaction within ego-psychology and other American Freudianisms against the idea that deficiency and anxiety constitute the themes of psychic life. After "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," Freud's psychology took a dire turn: his shift to a deeper and more somber key (with the introduction, e.g., of Thanatos) was not followed. This reaction against a "deficiency" or antihedonistic Freud also took place in Marxian interpretations of Freud as well. It may be that Freud was a necessary catalyst in the reactions against antihedonistic psychology in America.

With regard to the consciousness of the pleasure experience, Freud's description location of the pleasure principle in the id and his emphasis on unconsciousness leads me to concur with the estimation of David Rapaport, who saw pleasure and unpleasure as not reliably conscious phenomena in Freud's view of experience (in Cofer & Appley, 1964). The tendency to portray the pleasures sought by the id as conscious constitutes one reading of Freud: I prefer to think of Freud's pleasure as an undifferentiated force similar to that in the more "unconscious" American psychological hedonisms.<sup>91</sup>

The continuity of a concept of rational, knowable, differentiable consciousness of pleasure in America suggests that this was a view of pleasure against which Freud and the Freudians posed their psychology. But the Freudian pleasure concept originated at a time at which psychology in general gave more importance to pleasure than it did later. The reaffirmation, between 1955 and the present, of rational hedonism in American psychology appears not to be due only to a reaction against Freud, nor solely due to the positive effect of Freudian thinking on American psychology, but rather as the continuation of a tradition which forms a necessary background to Freudian thinking. Freud himself was a great phenomenologist, and more sensitive to the nature of pleasure than either his textbook supporters or his ego-psychological critics saw. Sometimes in American psychology Freud is invoked as an ultimate recourse when phenomenology is necessary--for instance, in Gruber's and Papert's interpretations of the nature of emotional thought in Chapter 3. Until the Freudian pleasure view is fully and adequately understood, uncertainty remains about the strength and direction of the effects of Freud. In a way similar to the way that pleasure sits athwart the structure of American psychology, so Freudian psychology, with all of its nuances and subtleties, also crosses the concept, at another angle. Beyond this, I have to rest at present on the estimation of some recent commentators within psychoanalysis who emphasize that the Freudian pleasure principle is one of the less well-known aspects of psychoanalytic theory (Grossman, 1986).<sup>92</sup>

Has the persistence of rational, knowable pleasure as a psychological concept had any effect culturally? Here one should first ask: What is American culture, and pleasure within that culture? It is a rich culture, and can serve as the ground for a mindless, memoryless, selfish hedonism (see, e.g., Sukenick, 1987), or a rational, calculating, forward-looking hedonism, or an abnegating hedonism, or even for virtue. Americans seek comfort, safety, and risk: the more one knows one's fellows, the less aesthetic they appear to be. Yet they are still believed to understand advertisements which say that an

automobile is a "sublime driving pleasure." Do Americans generally understand their pleasure as a "sublimated drive"? Or do they experience awe and exhilaration in the driving itself? American psychology holds both views: only when it becomes clear that there are choices about the quality of pleasure which is experienced can the effects of psychology's teaching be gauged.

Standard American dictionaries give the definition of "hedonism" as the doctrine that pleasure is the good, or the only good (a simplification of the philosophical problem of pleasure, to be sure). But debased conceptions of pleasure and hedonism also thrive in American culture. A recently-published dictionary of "cultural literacy" (Hirsch, Kett, & Trefil, 1988) has three entries relating to pleasure. Under "hedonism," while it mentions that Epicureans have held that intellectual and sensory pleasures are the "highest good," it quickly assures the reader that in "common usage" hedonism refers to sensual pleasures. The "pleasure principle" is defined in terms of instinctual demand--"usually sexual or aggressive" (p. 406)--which must be "tempered" by the "reality principle." Under "Proverbs," one finds only that "we must take care of our responsibilities before enjoying ourselves"--business before pleasure (p. 48). Some might, as for example Scitovsky (1976) does, see in this pattern a relic of our Puritan past: probably, though, the cultural misunderstandings of pleasure reflect the fact that pleasure is not well known.

For some time, in the past decade, it was fashionable to invoke Freudian concepts connected with selfishness (i.e., "narcissism") to describe American culture. There is a connection between the negative view taken of the self-concept by culture critics, the understanding of "hedonism" as a purely selfish practice, and a consequent intellectual devaluation of hedonism. The desuetude into which hedonism has fallen philosophically, and the marginal importance of conscious pleasure in psychology, have abetted such views. Some criticisms within psychology have tended to emphasize the selfishness of

hedonism, contrasting it with altruism and other ethical and moral positions (e.g., Campbell, 1972, 1975).

Yet there is evidence that there is a level beyond which selfishness (and "selfish" hedonism along with it) becomes ineffective as a concept useful for comprehending, psychologically, American culture. The fashionable "narcissism" in the culture criticism of the 1970's has been shown to be an artificial, one-sided construction (Alford, 1988). The concept of pleasure as epiphenomenal and of no real significance psychologically has gradually been opposed, eroded, and changed in psychology, and perhaps the waning of the use of "narcissism" and other borrowed Freudianisms in culture-criticism reflects both this change and a gradual diminishing of Freud's influence in American psychology as well. At present there is reason to hope that American psychology, having preserved a concept of conscious and knowable pleasure, can help advance proposals in which an aesthetic consciousness of both individual and social life (e.g., Churchman, 1979) are offered as solutions for the pleasure shortages in modern society. The still-scattered concept of pleasure, if it were to be brought together as Berlyne hoped, might focus the culture on the ultimate problem of the selection of the best style of life. Realization of the aesthetic problem, and training in taste, might relieve the culture of its current heterogeneity in this basic dimension. Concentration on the possible pleasures, and their relative valuation, might contribute to ordering the cultural environment of pleasures, which is now, at all levels of culture, very imperfectly and incompletely formed.

## REFERENCE NOTES

1. Boring (1957), p. 705.
2. Klein depicts William McDougall's "hormism" against the background of Spinoza's theory of the emotions. Klein, as usual, is prescient in other matters: he finds similarities, for example, between John Stuart Mill's qualitative hedonism--only recently reexamined in philosophy (Edwards, 1979)--and "self-actualization" (see Chapter 3, below).
3. Martindale (1984) sees behaviorism as the prime force masking the concept of hedonism in psychology, as do Mary Henle (personal communication) and Hans Wallach (personal communication).
4. There is a further distinction possible within philosophic hedonism, between hedonism conceived as an individual lifestyle, and "ethical" hedonism, which may be understood as "concern for the welfare or happiness of others which one *ought* to foster" (Klein, 1970, p. 549). As will become apparent below, both sorts of philosophical hedonism accompany psychological hedonism in American psychology.
5. See, for instance, Wallace Craig (1918), or Conwy Lloyd Morgan's dialogue with William McDougall about the evolutionary significance of pleasure (conscious pleasure, very apparently) in Mind, 1929 (McDougall, 1929; Morgan, 1929). It is remarkable that Morgan is remembered by psychologists most for his reductive "canon" (see Klein, pp. 156-157) and little else.
6. On Spencer generally, see Richards (1988).
7. On classical theories of pleasure, see Gosling and Taylor's monumental The Greeks on Pleasure (Gosling & Taylor, 1982). Relevant references here include: on Kant, Guyer (1979); on the Enlightenment view, Simonowitz (1983); on the predecessors of British utilitarian hedonism, McReynolds (1969). On the history of aesthetic taste, and the concept of taste, generally, see Summer (1987), Guyer, and also Gerard's An Essay on Taste (1759/1963), including its editor's introduction.
8. James (1877) reviewed Grant Allen's Physiological Aesthetics for The Nation in 1877 where he excoriated the simplistic physiological account in Allen's hedonistic psychology. There one finds a wonderful example of James's wit. The evolutionary hedonists, Allen among them, saw a relation between the "increasing nourishment" or "augmentation" of brain processes which were said to produce pleasure, and the "expansive" feelings thus produced. About this, James commented that "the form of the consciousness in hardly any degree repeats or reveals the form of the process (if it did, our sole intellectual capital today would be an intimate knowledge of the anatomy

and physiology of the brain)" (James, 1877, p. 185). James's very similar remarks on Spencer and Bain in the Principles are found in Vol. II, pp. 549 ff. A very complete account of James's treatment of hedonism in the Principles is found in Atkinson (1964).

9. Troland himself held to a version of "hedonism of the past," one which would not necessarily involve a memory or image of pleasure in the process of repeating a pleasurable act. In arguing that an actual image need not be involved in an "affective calculus," he found support in Thorndike's formulation of the "hedonism of the past", namely:

Thorndike's view provides us with a formula which does not suffer from this restriction. The animal is not required to *recall* anything, in order that he should profit by his past experiences of pleasure or unpleasure. He merely finds an increased tendency to act or to choose certain kinaesthetically represented alternatives, because of their previous association with pleasure, or the release from unpleasure.

Troland, unlike some of the behaviorists he drew on for his theoretical formulations, was an exponent of consciousness. For Troland, pleasure was bound up with the terms of "experience" and "consciousness." He distinguished between these as follows:

We may distinguish between *consciousness* as an instantaneous affair, and *experience* as a temporal succession of consciousness. As thus defined, an experience has a beginning and an end in time, but any consciousness is an instantaneous snapshot. Although it may seem that this makes consciousness a very ephemeral thing compared with experience, it should be noted that the only portion of experience which actually exists is the present consciousness, which, strictly speaking, is without duration, although it moves continuously along the time line. (Troland, 1928, p. 283)

And he was willing to consider (in 1928) introspective evidence. In a discussion of "the psychological properties of affection," he excluded a strictly sensory interpretation of pleasure, but included it as an "attribute" of consciousness:

The almost universally accepted notion among psychologists that affection requires a sensory, perceptual, or imaginal foundation clearly suggests that it is attributive in character. Although affection is unstable and liable to change, nevertheless it is easily conceived as constant over some finite span of time, so that we are not justified in viewing it as a process. The introspective examination of affection also shows that it is not--at least psychologically--a process. Consequently, we shall regard it as being an attribute, inhering in any other component of experience which circumstances may indicate. Thus, we may find: affective sensations, affective perceptions, affective images, etc. The entire consciousness may be, and usually is, affective as a whole. We shall never find a pure pleasantness or unpleasantness in isolation from definite conscious contents of a non-affective sort. A pure or floating "affect" in the Freudian sense is impossible. (p. 282)

It is interesting to compare Troland's "wholistic" conception of affective consciousness and his fairly fine-grained analysis of conscious states with Gibson's affordances and Duncker's analysis of conscious pleasure in Chapter 3 below. I find as yet no strong evidence that Troland had much effect on other similar formulations, however.

10. See Postman (1947).
11. For the early history of this problem, a good account is found in David Rapaport's Emotions and Memory (1942/1967), as well as in Chapter IX of Beebe-Center (1932). I am indebted to Dr. John Mayer for a report on the current status of Bower's research in this area.
12. Colin Wilson (1972) traces Harlow's interest in "intrinsic motivation" back as far as 1932, when he and his graduate student, Abraham Maslow, were working on puzzle-solving in primates.
13. Cyberneticians generally are "friendly" to pleasure, in the sense that their theories can be used to support conscious psychological hedonisms (providing for foresight, consciousness, etc.). Sometimes truly "hedonistic" subjects were considered. For example, in the transactions of the Ninth Conference on Cybernetics (von Foerster, 1953), both humor (Gregory Bateson) and emotion (Lawrence Kubie) were discussed. However, as noted in Chapter 3 below, cybernetics and information-processing theories have to be used by hedonists to become hedonistic.
14. On Berlyne's life and psychological works, see Cupchik (1988).
15. See, for example, Klein (1987).
16. For Young's account of his hedonism, see his Motivation and Emotion (1961) and especially his Emotion in Animals and Man (1973). An excerpt from the latter work describing the history of his interest in hedonism is illuminating:

At this point I think it might be in order to give a bit of personal history. I knew Watson personally and read some of his manuscripts while a graduate student studying with Titchener. I, too, had intellectual difficulties with the doctrine of psychological hedonism. The chief difficulty involved the mind-body relation. How can pleasant and unpleasant *feelings* (which are subjective) influence *behavior* (which is objectively observed)? Later I realized that there is no real problem here.

With an eclectic, multidisciplinary approach to psychological processes it became clear that what one observes from one point of view can yield an understanding of what one observes from another standpoint....It is a fact that I was forced into an acceptance of an objective theory of hedonism by a series of experiments upon the food preferences, appetites, aversions, dietary habits, and related processes, in laboratory rats. There was no mind-body problem while studying animal behavior because the rats could not make introspective reports of

their feelings! And many of the hedonic principles of motivation which had been worked out with subjective methods were confirmed and substantiated by strictly behavioral methods!

Today I am convinced that the hedonic principle has a general validity that is independent of any particular point of view. In general, affective arousals regulate the pattern and course of behavior; they reinforce behaviors which are learned; they are prominent factors in organized and disorganized activities. (Young, 1973, pp. 318-319)

Young's (1972) autobiography gives an account of his early work with Titchener on "mixed feelings" (Young, 1918).

17. See James's "Course Notes on Ethics, 1885-89" in the recently published Manuscript Essays and Notes (James, 1988). The holographic notes for James's course in Aesthetics are in the Harvard University Archives.
18. See Berlyne (1971) for an account of the aesthetic work of Langfeld, Pratt, and others.
19. See, for example, Anastasi & Lund (1928), and also Farnsworth (1950). M. F. Washburn was a leading figure in the preservation of interest in aesthetics during the 1920's and '30's.
20. See, for example, Strelau (1987), Ridgeway and Waters (1987), and Martindale (1984).
21. "Funktionslust"--pure functional pleasure--surfaces at numerous points in psychology: for instance in Fromm (1947) and Maslow (1955). Henry Murray, another uncategorizable psychologist, held in Explorations in Personality (1938), that there were three dimensions of pleasure. Murray and his followers are best known for the last two: pleasure as achievement and pleasure as need reduction. Usually Murray is associated with the last sort of pleasure. But his first pleasure dimension was "activity pleasure, accompanying the rise of 'energy' (zest) and its discharge ('overflow') in uninhibited movement or thought." Murray connected this sort of pleasure not only to Bühler specifically, but to Aristotle and Sir William Hamilton as well.
22. See his Essays on the Psychology of Art (1966).
23. Tolman, for example, eventually turned to the term "cathexis" to account for affective/cognitive phenomena (Tolman, 1945). Garcia and Holder (1985) provide the following account of Tolman's use of that term.

By this term he meant the specific attachments that are formed to certain types of goal (US) [i.e., unconditional stimulus, ed. note.] objects which satisfy basic (FB) [i.e., feedback, ed. note.] needs. After US-FB conditioning, not any US will do; the subject becomes attached to certain types of food, drink, or sex partners and is often disgusted by other types. (p. 85)



On the influence of Freud on behavioristic psychologists generally, see Shakow and Rapaport (1964) and Rosenzweig (1985).

24. The Allport referred to is Floyd Allport, whose Psychological Review article "A Physiological-genetic Theory of Feeling and Emotion" (Allport, 1922) received some notice in discussions of pleasure in psychology for some years after its publication.
25. I have made a rough survey of the areas in psychology into which 212 article titles from the September 1988 PsycLIT could be classified. This includes articles abstracted in Psychological Abstracts between January 1983 and September 1988. The leading categories were: psychoanalytically-oriented, 15%; general psychiatry (non-psychoanalytic), 9.5%; addiction, 9.5%; emotion, 9%; developmental, 9%; sex, 6%; cognition, 5%. Other categories into which fewer than 5% of the total were classified included (from greatest to least): biology/physiology; economics and industrial/organizational; aesthetics and music; sensory; social; play; environmental; phenomenological; creativity; value; religion; sport and risk; and "cross-cultural."
26. See, e.g., Wise and Bozarth (1987).
27. For example, this passage in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902):
- The next step into mystical states carries us into a realm that public opinion and ethical philosophy have long since branded as pathological, though private practice and certain lyric strains of poetry seem still to bear witness to its ideality. I refer to the consciousness produced by intoxicants and anaesthetics, especially by alcohol. The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the *Yes* function in man. It brings the votary from the chill periphery of things to the radiant core. It makes him for the moment one with truth. (pp. 386-87)
28. Actually, Olds consistently spoke of "positive reinforcement," or "reward," which have pleasurable connotations within psychology and within culture, but are technically just "positive reinforcement.". Olds invoked the results of R. G. Heath, who implanted electrodes in human subjects and monitored the results of their self-stimulation, when Olds wanted to describe the human consciousness of the phenomenon (see Olds, 1955, pp. 101-105.) On Heath and his human experiments, see his account in Heath (1964).
29. The most regular occurrence of "pleasure" in modern textbooks is usually a combination of (1) "pleasure centers" and (2) the "pleasure principle" (Freud)--about half a page devoted to each.

30. Interestingly, Troland's hedonistic theory is not mentioned by Olds, nor is Troland included in the references attached to his APA presentation from 1954 (Olds, 1955).
31. See especially Fodor (1983).
32. See James, Principles, Vol. II, p. 524.
33. Beebe-Center's chapter headings were, after his introduction: I. Definition of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness and Hedonic Tone; II. Methods of Experimentation; III. The Relation of Hedonic Tone to Mental Elements; IV. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Primary External Stimuli; V. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Secondary External Stimuli; VI. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Motivating Factors; VII. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Maturation and Learning; VIII. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Muscular and Glandular Responses; IX. Memory in Relation to Hedonic Tone; X. Hedonic Tone in Relation to Nervous Processes; and XI. The Theory of Hedonic Tone (Beebe-Center, 1932, pp. vii-viii).
34. On this, see Duncker's comment on univalent systems of pleasure, Chapter 3, below. See Kiesow (1928) for an analysis of pleasure which includes counterarguments to von Frey's asymmetry, including Stumpf's.
35. A full account of this episode is found in Henle (1986).
36. See Odbert, Karwoski, and Eckerson (1942). On synaesthesia in general, in which Nafe played a leading investigative role, see Marks (1978).
37. The standard reference for the James-Lange theory is James (1884). Also, see the discussion in Chapter 3 of Plutchik (1968).
38. The index to Cannon's Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage (1929/1953) gives eight subheadings for "pain," but does not list "pleasure" or any pleasure-cognates (except the "feeling of power").
39. The best compendium of research in this area is Campbell et al. (1976).
40. Sociologists and other social commentators in the 1950's tended to take a dim view of pleasure. Along with Whyte, see Riesman (1950). The most interesting works in this genre are by the popular anthropologist Lobsenz (1960), and the drama critic Walter Kerr (1962).
41. On value scales in psychology, see Morris (1956) and Feather (1982).

42. The best recent exposition of this research is in Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach(1989). Also, see Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), who critique Rokeach's statistical approach.
43. Hebb, when considering pleasure, wanted to be free of "the little man inside the skull who *approves* of some sensory events relayed to him by the nervous system, *disapproves* of others, and guides behavior accordingly" (Hebb, 1949, p. 234). Hebb's physiological account of pleasure included a familiar theme: pleasure, he said, was the effect of the development of new associations (cell-assemblies) in the brain, or of the removal of impediments to development. This sort of explanation is quite close to the Spencerian/evolutionary hedonistic one in which pleasure is connected with, as Troland put it, "beneficial biological conditions" (Troland, 1928, p. 286).
44. See especially Oliver & DeSarbo (1988).
45. There is a good deal of "taste" research, but with regard to consciousness, its status is ambiguous. Many of the classic studies have been carried out on rats (e.g., Pfaffman, 1960; Garcia, Ervin, & Koelling, 1966). Aesthetic and social "good taste" are only implied in most "taste" studies, which stick pretty close to that particular sense. One interesting early example of this separation of the "tastes" in psychology is found in Hollingworth and Poffenberger's The Sense Of Taste (1917). There, "artistic" taste is discussed in a concluding chapter, the purpose of which appears to have been to distinguish the "higher" senses subserving aesthetics from the "lower" sense discussed in the preceding chapters.
46. The current status of this issue is described in Buckley (1989), pp. 212-213.
47. Modern sociobiological approaches appear to be "strictly business" regarding pleasure, with pleasure very definitely connected to sex, and little else. The following passage, from Carl Bajema (1986), illustrates the separation often between the "purposive" and "gratuitous" aspects of pleasure found in this literature. "Advances in contraceptive and abortion technology," he writes, "have made it easier for individuals to separate the procreative and recreative (erotic) functions of sexual intercourse. Many scholars have contended that the "novel environment" created by costly children, more effective means for separating the procreative and recreative dimensions of sexual intercourse, and so on, has generated selection producing an inverse relationship between socioeconomic power and reproductive success" (p. 187). This connects, of course, to a larger theme of "business before pleasure" which is found not only in sociobiology, but also in psychological treatments of play and leisure as well.
48. See, for example, Fawcett, Clark, Scheftner, & Gibbons (1983).
49. A good historical summary of this line of research is found in Hilgard (1986), Chapter 9.
50. On the "neutral point," consult Ribot (1896), Beebe-Center (1932), and Rapaport (1942/1967).

51. For instance, in E. C. Tolman.
52. On the current status of theories of sensory pleasure, see Cabanac (1979). Interestingly, the dedicated hedonist Troland considered not only the sensations connected with the desire to urinate (characteristically unpleasant, he said) but also those following urination and defecation (correlated with pleasantness.)
53. See Plutchik (1968), in which hate is considered a combination of "disgust + anger" (p. 119). This work also contains a good survey of many other dimensional schemes for emotions (Ch. 4, pp. 51-52). The lack of a dynamic dimension to the emotions has long been noted and is only currently being rectified. On this, see Hilgard (1986). On the lack of a "relativistic" conception of pleasure as compared with a "static" one, see Kagan (1967), and also Cabanac (1979).
54. See Geldard (1953, 1984).
55. For instance, at the University of New Hampshire in the 1970's, Dr. Ronald Shor (one of Fritz Heider's graduate students) studied humor by means of a "mirthometer"--a set of strain gauges attached to the face and body to collect physiological measurements of reactions to humorous stimuli.
56. Best exemplified in the once "hotter" argument between "behaviorism" and "phenomenology" in the 1960's (see Wann, 1964).
57. See Boulding (1956) and Boulding (1986).
58. Other aspects of cognitive psychology have a more visible pleasure content. For example, a good study of the dynamics of pleasure in "pleasure reading" has recently appeared (Nell, 1988).
59. I have found only one psychologist, the (late) German motivational psychologist Heinz Heckhausen, who has seriously considered Duncker (e.g., Heckhausen 1973, 1977). American psychological works, even Newell's recent detailed appreciation of Duncker (Newell, 1985), cite only Duncker's work on thinking.
60. See Maslow (1955b), pp. 1-3.
61. A. H. Maslow, unpublished paper, typewritten, titled "Motivation Theory: The Question of Hedonistic Theory," dated 2/13/42. In: A. H. Maslow Papers (hereafter Maslow Papers), Folder M438, "Hedonism." (Courtesy Archives of the History of American Psychology, Akron, OH.)

62. A. H. Maslow, unpublished typewritten note, titled "Hedonism," undated (most probably around 1950). Maslow Papers, Folder M438, "Hedonism."
63. A. H. Maslow, unpublished typewritten note, titled "Hedonism," undated (around 1950). Maslow Papers, M438.
64. A. H. Maslow, unpublished handwritten note, undated. Maslow Papers, M438.
65. A. H. Maslow, unpublished typescript, titled "Hedonism," dated 2/51. Maslow Papers, M438.
66. Research on "peak experiences" has been continued by Gayle Privette (1983)
67. The relevant section is in Csikszentmihalyi (1975), pp. 1-12.
68. On this episode, see Anderson (1982).
69. James (1890), Principles, Vol. II, p. 298.
70. Anderson (1982).
71. See Meehl (1987) and Rado (1964).
72. See Plutchik (1968), Chapter 4; also Meehl et al. (1971). Also of interest in this context is Spearman's (1928) concept of "emotional g," a general emotional factor paralleling the "g" factor in intelligence.
73. Michael Freund (1985) describes the split between philosophical and psychological conceptions of "happiness" nicely. He conceives of that split as representing a "tension" between normative and empirical aspects, with psychology handling the "empirical" side of things. He appears to portray psychological/empirical approaches to happiness as more dangerous, and less speculative, than they have been. (Incidentally, it is worth noting that much valuable material on "happiness," "pleasure," and the like is found in a journal entitled New Ideas in Psychology, where Freund's article was published.)
74. Scitovsky sees consumers as caught in a tension between "defensive" and "creative" consumption behaviors (see, e.g., Scitovsky, 1976, p. 108). Like Epstein and Maslow, he identifies a strong component of "safety" or "security" in pleasure. See also Wessman (1956).
75. See Maital and Maital (1982).

76. See, for one (early) example, Parsons and Shils (1951). This is particularly interesting from the standpoint of a concept of pleasure, not only because of the pleasure-avoidance of its varied contributors, including Parsons and Tolman, but because of a statement of Henry Murray contained therein. Thomas Szasz, in his Pain and Pleasure (1957) quoted Murray to open his discussion of the pleasure concept. An excerpt:

One of the strangest, least interpretable symptoms of our time is the neglect by psychologists of the problem of happiness, that inner state which Plato, Aristotle, and almost all succeeding thinkers of the first rank assumed to be "the highest of all goods achievable by action." Although the crucial role of dissatisfaction and satisfaction is implicit in much that is said about motivation, activity, and reinforcement, psychologists are generally disposed to shun these terms as well as all their synonyms (displeasure-pleasure, discontent-content, sorrow-joy, and so forth) as if they were a horde of spirochetes capable of reducing us to a state of general paresis. (Murray, in Szasz, 1957, p. 186)

77. William James (James, 1867/1920), letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, September 1867.

78. See, for example, Kaplan (1982).

79. Topics fairly closely related to pleasure seem to call forth a class of books which cannot exactly be termed "popular," either because they bristle with references and jargon, or because they are unsystematic and almost "chatty." These incorporate some reasonable scientific premises fused with a definite "moral tone." The best (and most productive of scientific research) in this class would be Hans Selye's The Stress of Life (1956), which offers, incidentally with its main theoretical premises, the prescription of "altruistic egoism" for stress. Another recent member of the class is R. N. Campbell's The New Science: Self-Esteem Psychology (1984). In the preface to this work, Campbell addresses "the salesman, the advertiser and the politician, as well as...the educator, the psychologist and the theologian" (p. xi). He proposes several "Laws of Human Behavior." The first law, says Campbell, is that humans will seek to maintain or increase a sense of their own excellence; the second, that humans seek to maintain or increase their level of sensual pleasure; and the third Law states that "virtually all human thoughts, words, and actions spring from the two above motivations, operating singly or in combination" (p. xi). Granted that the beginning is simplistic, what follows is not: a 300-page attempt to sort out the concepts of self-esteem and pleasure in such diverse works as Thomas Aquinas, Nietzsche, and Freud (all extensively quoted). No desultory reader (or perhaps *only* the desultory reader) will be tempted to wade through it, even though Campbell's aim of tempering both self-esteem and the drive toward "sensual" pleasure is laudable. Campbell's is another benign example of a tendency which prompts writers who recognize the importance of pleasure toward premature synthesis and moral exhortation. An example of an early work in this genre by a respectable psychologist is F. L. Wells's Pleasure and Behavior (1924), which is unsystematic but contains numerous sensitive descriptions of the phenomena at issue. In the same class, somewhat less benign, is G. L. Patzer's The Physical Attractiveness Phenomenon (1985). Patzer appears to believe that "attractiveness is destiny," and has collated much of the psychological literature in this area to propose that a "new science" of attractiveness be created: papology (from the acronym for "physical attractiveness phenomenon"). Patzer's proposal is interesting: to insure that the desirable social goals

implicit in the study of attractiveness be attained, he believes that a "science" must be created in order to attract funding, which might not be forthcoming were "attractiveness" to remain a less-respectable part of psychological research.

There is thus a "hinterland" of works which, while not "mainstream science," are not quite popular "self-help" tracts or journalistic transmutations of scientific results. These form a class, perhaps, of "transition stages" between "science" and "superstition" (see Burnham, 1988). Pleasure and its cognates seem to migrate to this area.

80. See Ellis (1960) and Lowen (1970) for two literate examples of this genre.
81. Skinner (1986) sees "counseling and education" as *the* occupations of the future. Staats (1988) notes the recent shift in Skinner's thinking on the issues of feeling, and pleasure specifically.
82. Regarding this, it may be noted that Henry Murray himself lamented at length the lack of the study of happiness in psychology (see Szasz, 1957, p. 186), and that O. Hobart Mowrer was classified as a "neohedonist" by Postman (1947). The battle lines, though real, were not distinct.
83. On James as "anti-pleasure," see Remley (1963). For a more balanced historical account, consult Myers (1983), as well as Atkinson (1964).
84. On the origins of philosophical anti-hedonism at the turn of the century, see Watson (1895) and Wright (1907).
85. MacIntyre (1984), Ch. 6.
86. See Santayana (1931), Perry (1954), and Lewis (1946). Marcuse's "On Hedonism" is contained in Negations (Marcuse, 1968): this early (1937) work of Marcuse, in which hedonism is seen as (vaguely) "liberating," was savagely attacked by both Alasdair MacIntyre (1970) and Eliseo Vivas (1971) in conjunction with their attacks of Negations. Vivas was an early influence on Maslow (Wilson, 1972).
87. See, for example, Hebb (1955b), first paragraph.
88. "Professor Adams" is Professor Donald K. Adams.
89. Not surprisingly, D. E. Berlyne was one of the most astute observers of this cultural difference (Berlyne, 1968a).
90. The "bloodstream" metaphor connected with pleasure is also found in Henry Murray: see Murray (1938), p. 132.

91. See Shakow and Rapaport (1964), p. 131 ff.
92. Among those psychologists who are only "semi-Freudian," two have made quite notable contributions to the psychology of pleasure: J. C. Flugel in England (Flugel, 1955), and the idiosyncratic Thomas Szasz (1957), who is one of the few psychologists who sees "pleasure" as an autonomous "concept."



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